THE FRAGILE POWER OF MIGRATION:
the needs and rights of women and girls from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan who are affected by migration

2018
Report: “THE FRAGILE POWER OF MIGRATION: the needs and rights of women and girls from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan who are affected by migration, 2018”.

This research on the needs and rights of women and girls affected by migration from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan was prepared by a team of experts from PIL Research Company with the support of the IOM missions in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The IOM Mission in Kazakhstan – the IOM Sub-regional Coordination Office for Central Asia (IOM Central Asia) – provided overall guidance and coordination for the project.

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2018
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Lead authors Gulnara Ibraeva and Gulfia Abdullaeva prepared the report in collaboration with a team of experts, including Mehrigul Ablezova (Kyrgyzstan) and Gulnora Beknazarova (Tajikistan).

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<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAEU</td>
<td>Eurasian Economic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIDH</td>
<td>International Human Rights Federation (French acronym)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORT</td>
<td>National university entrance examination (Russian acronym)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STI</td>
<td>Sexually transmitted infection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

The concepts of migration, integration, multiculturalism and return migration, along with other terms, arrived in our lives not very long ago. However it seems as though we have known them all our lives and understand their meanings, and what is more we often use them to describe real life. For example, young residents of Bishkek and Dushanbe alike today react fervently to how rapidly their cities are being filled with migrants from rural areas and how these migrants are negatively changing the faces of the capitals, and not for the better. In doing this they forget that in the last decade of Soviet history, the 1980s, the so-called titular ethnic groups made up 22.9 per cent and 31.6 per cent respectively of the populations of these cities, and that most of today’s “urban residents” arrived in large numbers only recently.

In his book “Integration of migrants: Concepts and Practices” Russian academic V. Malakhov subverts key migration terms, speaking about the ambiguity of each of them.2

Researcher I. Plyugin’s position entirely accords with this: he states that the term migrant has not yet been defined in international law, and that law enforcement practices in various countries around the world use three main criteria to define a migrant: place of birth, citizenship and place of residence. Each of these criteria is also problematic and changeable. This can easily be seen from the status of Kyrgyz and Tajiks (over 30 years of age) in Moscow: citizens of the two sovereign states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, who had been born in a single state called the Soviet Union, are now immigrants in the former capital of their homeland.

In their article “Who is a migrant? Once again to the issue of basic sociological characteristics”,3 researchers P. Lisitsyn and M. Ermakova sum up their analysis with the conclusion: “migrants are not entities in the world; ‘migrant’ is a perspective of the world.” From this starting point, it becomes clear that migrants should be researched not as a group but as a category, and the key research questions should be: “Who makes up this category?”, “How and why was this category created?”, “How is the category institutionalized?” and “What does this institutionalization result in?”4

THE AIM OF THIS PROJECT is to research the situation of women and girls affected by migration in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and to determine and analyse their vulnerability and needs – as well as the institutional, political and social environment that they find themselves in – in order to further develop policies and programmes of activity for countries participating in migration. A particular focus of the study is to explore the challenges of reintegrating women and girls who have experienced migration after their return to their homelands, and the problems that women and girls from migrant families find in adapting after returning to their homeland.

How and why did it become necessary to distinguish the category of “women and girls affected by migration from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan”? How justified is it to include women and girls who have had personal experience of migration in this category with those who were members of families of labour migrants but stayed at home? Is it possible to see similar needs and problems, achievements and opportunities behind the separate trajectories and different destinies of the women and girls from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan affected by migration? These and other critical issues formed the basis of this publication.

In order to answer the research question, this report reviews trends in the situation and needs of women and girls affected by migration from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and examines the impact and role of migration infrastructures on the fates of women and girls.

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4 Ibid.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The main methodological framework of the study was the theoretical approach of migration infrastructure, which means systematically interconnected technologies, institutions and entities that create and provide conditions and regimes of mobility for different categories of people. That is, the approach is intended to demonstrate how different components of migration infrastructure specifically affect the migration behaviour and practices of various women and girls from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan affected by migration.

The most valuable thing about this theoretical approach is the understanding that the migration strategies of men and women from different countries and strata do not emerge from their will and desires, or from rational choice. On the contrary, the trajectories of mobility and the fate of migrants – women and men – are determined by specific complex configurations of this migration infrastructure: legislative systems and procedures for documenting citizens and non-citizens, communications and transport infrastructure, migration brokers of all types and statuses, cultural practices and social networks.

RESEARCH METHODS

In order to ensure the collection of complete and reliable data, a methodology was designed that included qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis methods. In particular, the following methods were used: (a) desk review; (b) policy analysis; (c) expert interviews; (d) focus group discussions; and (e) content analysis.

The aim of the desk review was to identify gaps in the field of the rights, needs and vulnerabilities of women and girls affected by migration in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan by analysing documents and statistics. The policy analysis component of the research included analysis of state policies, strategic programmes, national action plans, state expenditure and regulatory documents in relevant sectors. A total of 30 semi-structured interviews were conducted (15 in each country) with representatives of state institutions and local government, civil society organizations, international organizations, trades unions and other relevant structures. The expert interviews revealed the opinions of experts about gaps in services and programmes, and provided recommendations for actions at local, national and regional levels to reduce the vulnerability of women and girls.

During the research, 40 focus group discussions were held (20 in each country) in settlements with high levels of external migration. The focus groups enabled the collection of in-depth information about the needs and rights of women and girls from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan who are migrants or affected by migration, and also about the types of support services and programmes that they have used, are currently using and/or would like to use. A total of 203 people took part in focus groups in Kyrgyzstan, and 164 in Tajikistan. The number in each focus group varied between 6 and 12. The interviews allowed for full information to be received about the needs and vulnerabilities of women and girls who were migrants or affected by migration, and also a subjective perspective on the factors influencing this vulnerability. Extended interviews allowed in-depth information to be received about the needs and vulnerabilities of women and girls affected by migration, as well as a subjective understanding of the factors influencing their vulnerability. A total of 10 in-depth interviews were conducted: 5 in each country.

The research included a combination of qualitative and quantitative content analysis of mass media articles published in key media in both countries. The research group analysed media products from six leading online informational agencies in Kyrgyzstan (www.24.kg, kaktus.media, akipress.org, www.kabar.kg, www.azattyk.org, and www.sputnik.kg) and five in Tajikistan (avesta.tj, sputnik.tj, www.asiaplus.tj, muhojir.info and rus.ozodi.org) published between 1 May 2017 and 31 May 2018. Analysts conducted the content analysis in several languages – the original languages of publication and Russian.
Figure 1. Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents in Kyrgyzstan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience of migration</th>
<th>No experience of migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Worked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (mean)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family status</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced / widowed</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial situation of the family</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enough for food and clothes</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough to buy expensive things</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can buy expensive things</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational attainment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary (including unfinished)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized secondary</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher (including unfinished)</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2. Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents in Tajikistan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience of migration</th>
<th>No experience of migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Worked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (mean)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family status</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced / widowed</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial situation of the family</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enough for food and clothes</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough to buy expensive things</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can buy expensive things</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational attainment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary (including unfinished)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized secondary</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher (including unfinished)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

This study is based on a qualitative strategy for data collection and does not fulfil the requirements of representativeness. Most of the survey respondents spoke of their experience of labour migration to Russia and Kazakhstan. The information sources (the statistics and research data) also mainly cover the migration context and the situation of labour migrants from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in these destination countries. The experience of citizens of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the expanding range of destinations of labour migration (Turkey, the Republic of Korea, Italy, the United Arab Emirates and other countries) is still very poorly represented in academic literature and statistics.

For this study, thanks to the forum on Kyrgyz diasporas held in June, we were able to conduct several interviews with labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan from all over the world. However, for the most part these interviews reflect the interests of diaspora leaders. In addition, the researchers did not have the opportunity to conduct interviews with representatives of Tajik diasporas. The limitations of the study could also include the non-systematic approach to the study of public discourse on labour migration from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in Russia.
CHAPTER 1. THE CONTEXT OF CENTRAL ASIAN LABOUR MIGRATION AND GENDER ASPECTS

Labour migration is traditionally and predominantly researched in the context of international economic relations, in its interdependence with various processes and phenomena in the economic life of modern society.

A large body of research literature on labour migration is also devoted to studying changes in legislation and other political and legal aspects of the context of migration, as well as changing social and cultural norms and relationships. The research tradition of studying the contexts of labour migration takes gender into account in varying degrees: as a rule, research into the economic context of labour migration is gender-neutral, and a political and legal approach often fails even to see people as a whole, while social and cultural contexts, on the contrary, impose their own distinctive factors of labour migration for men and women.

This chapter provides a brief summary of the “inclusion” of women’s topics in various aspects of the labour migration context.

1.1. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF LABOUR MIGRATION AND GENDER SPECIFICITY

Already seven to ten years ago, most of the research on labour migration from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Russia focussed on economic and socioeconomic topics, primarily studying the role of remittances in income generation for a large proportion of the population, and the social and economic consequences of labour migration for families and their well-being.

The attention paid to money transfers of migrants is understandable: remittances from migrants play almost the primary role in the economy. This is not just because of the high levels of migration, but also the serious socio-economic, demographic and even political consequences for countries of origin of migrants and host countries. For example, according to the World Bank, remittances to the Central Asian Republics from Russia alone amounted to US$13.5 billion in 2013, and Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan had the two highest proportions of gross domestic product made up by remittances: 52 per cent and 31 per cent respectively. In 2017, remittances made up 35 per cent and 31 per cent of the GDPs of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan respectively.

Despite the high importance of remittances from migrants to their families, neither state or society records who exactly is earning and how much. Accounting for the gender contribution to transfers is often subjective and is not always possible because of the particular situation of women in the labour market: their involvement in the shadow, informal sector hinders measurement of their incomes and their contributions to economic development in both destination and source countries.

What is more, as noted in the guidebook “Methodological approaches to the study of labour migration from the CIS countries to Russia: the gender aspect”, in addition to difficulties in taking account of the economic contribution of women, who are mainly employed in the service economy, the female contribution in the form of reproductive labour in migrant worker families is invisible and immeasurable, while the scope of employment and income of migrant women in the entertainment and sexual services industry has not been determined.

7 Malycheva, M., Metodicheskiye podkhody k isledovaniyu trudovoy migratsii iz stran SNG v Rossiyu gendernymy aspekt [Methodological Approaches to Research on Labour Migration from CIS Countries to Russia: The gender aspect], Moscow, 2008, p.6
Studies reveal that the structure of employment of Tajik and Kyrgyz women in migration differs significantly: women from Tajikistan more commonly follow the migration of the “breadwinner” as family members, while women from Kyrgyzstan tend to have a more “independent” and active role in migration.

It is not possible to assess the proportions of female labour migrants from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in each of the various sectors of the Russian labour market: there are only surveys of the representation of female Central Asian workers as a whole:

Table 1: Fields of employment of female labour migrants in Russia, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service sector, total</th>
<th>42%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Including:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic service</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing and utilities</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trade</strong></td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Construction and renovation</strong></td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Industry</strong></td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Others</strong></td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tyuryukanova, 2011

Research on labour migrants in the Russian Federation by Tyuryukanova and her colleagues showed that women from the CIS working in employment sectors such as domestic services and trade are mainly hired by private employers, while in education, healthcare and industry they work primarily in organizations and firms.

Russian studies have shown that wages vary by industry: specialist employees in education and healthcare are higher paid, but their proportion among migrants from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is negligible. The next level consists of domestic workers, such as nannies and nurses, but their

Figure 3: Changes in labour migration remittances from the Russian Federation as proportions of GDP in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan

![Graph showing changes in remittances from 2013 to 2017 for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.](image-url)
modes of work, and the degree to which their rights are observed, remain hidden for researchers. The lowest earnings are for women employed in housing and utilities, agriculture and cleaning. These labour niches are the most common among women migrants from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. For example, according to the specialized study led by Tyuryukanova, every fifth woman from Kyrgyzstan works in the cleaning sector. A study of labour migrant communities in Yekaterinburg in 2012 showed that the proportion of Tajiks was even higher: almost one in three workers said that she worked as a cleaner.

Table 2: Employment of female labour migrants by type of employment, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization or firm</th>
<th>Hired by private person</th>
<th>Self-employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing and utilities</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services, excluding domestic</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic service</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tyuryukanova, 2011

Table 3: Gender aspects of employment of labour migrants in Yekaterinburg

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salesperson</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Builder</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loader</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janitor</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled labourer</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibraeva et al., 2013

The concentration of labour migrants in a few sectors of work, and the segmentation by ethnic group of female workers inherently creates over-supply of labour and, correspondingly, reduces salaries in these sectors.

The differential in wages between migrants and Russian workers averages 15 per cent; in a time of economic growth this difference may contract to 13 per cent while during a crisis it can grow to 20 per cent, according to researchers at the Higher School of Economics. E. Chernin, a Russian working at the Centre for Labour Studies at the Higher School of Economics, notes: “When comparing the incomes of migrants and the local population, we see that in 2007 the differences between the salaries of migrants and Russians were 36-38 per cent, and in 2009, 42-46 per cent.” Researchers Vakulenko and Leukhin have established that “foreign workers are subject to severe wage discrimination: the average salary of Russian workers with the productivity of migrants exceeded the average migrant salary by 40 per cent.

9 https://www.audit-it.ru/news/personnel/846994.html - this is the conclusion of Evgenia Polyakova and Larisa Smirnykh from the Labour Market Research Laboratories of the Higher School of Economics in their work: Differentiation of labour incomes between external immigrants and local workers in the Russian labour market.

10 Report of the third session of the Higher School of Economics Young Scholars Seminar “Secrets of Academic Cuisine” on the topic “Migrants in the Russian Labour Market: Portrait and salary”
on average between 2009 and 2013. It appears that the main reason for this gap is the specific sectors (or types of economic activity) in which workers are employed.”

Interviews with migrants testify to different ways of finding work: from networks (this is usually in more "protected" niches that are regulated by law and require higher qualifications, for example school teachers or hospital doctors and nurses) to chance, in which migrants found work by reading a job announcement on the street or meeting a person who told them in conversation about potential employment opportunities. Many hired jobs do not have any “prerequisites” at all – for example, women and girls from Tajikistan may stand around early in the morning in a certain place at a vegetable store in Yekaterinburg to be hired for a day or more to sort fruit and vegetables.

A study of women's participation in migration in 2010 revealed, for example, that more than half of female external migrants had worked in their latest position for less than six months, and only 24 per cent for more than a year. Similar “dynamically fluid” employment is typical for male migrants. But, despite the fact that in general the place of work of the migrant is not stable, in most cases it is not one-off and not spontaneous. Changing the place of work automatically means changing place of residence of migrants. So large masses of migrants are permanently in movement, forming groups of modern urban nomads.

Low-skilled and unskilled positions prevail among the niches occupied by migrants from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This is due to the market demand that has been created for labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in terms of qualification and educational characteristics, as Russian researchers have revealed concerning the participation of women in migration:

- The educational attainment of migrant women seems excessively high in relation to the fields of employment and the work positions they occupy in Russia. Thus, almost 15 per cent of those working in construction and renovation and 22 per cent of those employed in trade have higher and incomplete higher education, while 10 per cent of women working in Moscow as cleaners have higher and incomplete higher education.

- In general, this is similar to the educational attainment of Russians employed in the same sectors, but migrants tend to occupy much more modest job niches in these areas of employment than Russian workers. For example, 21.8 per cent of those employed in construction in Russia and 21.0 per cent of those in wholesale and retail trade in 2008 had higher or incomplete higher education.

Working in non-prestigious labour niches, migrants are always liable to often change their place of work. The frequency of changing workplace is not just down to the individual choice of the migrant, but is also the result of changing trends in migration policy in the destination country. Stricter regulations noticeably worsen migrants’ chances of free movement from one workplace to another, and increase the opportunities for exploitation of and discrimination against migrants on the part of employers.

Research in Yekaterinburg in 2012 established the existence of a correlation between the regulatory status of labour migrants, particularly women, and their age and family status: the younger and unmarried women are more likely not to have legal status. Living with spouses and children reduces the risk of irregular residence status. It is likely that being responsible for oneself and one's children makes migrant families take extra steps to receive the necessary documents, while younger and more autonomous labour migrants feel it is irrational to spend a lot of money and time on obtaining the essential documents. As a hypothesis, it can be supposed that the latter have stricter commitments for sending money to their families back in the homeland than families of labour migrants who have arrived with their families and who at the same time cannot afford not to go to work in the first few days because they have more limited financial “reserves”.

12 G. Ibraeva, A. Niyazov, M. Ablezova, A. Moldosheva, Gender and Migration Research Report, ICCO Cooperation, 2014
15 More precisely, the relationship between illegal status and age of migrant is in the form of an inverse U-shaped curve. Younger and older respondents are less likely not to be registered as migrants than respondents aged from 30 to 40 years.
Work regimes are made more complicated if labour migrants are staying with children. Many studies have show that both men and women in migrant families from Central Asia try to work, irrespective of whether or not they have small children. The research on labour migration from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in Yekaterinburg also established that a total of 104 children under six years of age were living with their migrant parents. Of these, 49 children were living in families in which both spouses were working. Only 11 of the 104 children were at kindergarten. In order to address the challenge of care for small children, families from Kyrgyzstan are using a reinstated form of private care for pre-school age children by older adolescent girls. This arrangement has been termed “bakchy kyz” and is based on the traditional everyday system of values and attitudes. Bakchy girls are employed according to principles of kinship or regionalism, and girls in traditional families are considered to possess the skills of caring and caring for children as a natural quality. Bakchy girls lose their access to education during their period of “care experience”.

1.2. THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF LABOUR MIGRATION AND GENDER SPECIFICS

The main contradiction in modern migration processes can be formulated in the words of the Austrian researcher R. Baubeck as “the discrepancy between the borders of the nation state and the borders of citizenship”. Kyrgyzstan’s membership of the EAEU does not compensate for the mismatch of borders, but does nevertheless lead to a “preferential” regime for migrant workers who are citizens of Kyrgyzstan in Russia. This is in contrast to labour migrants from Tajikistan, who still have to overcome the challenges of being in Russia: “the economic situation, reproducing factors that stimulate the shadow economy, which produces the basic demand for illegal workers.” Changes in Russia’s migration policy have given rise to a situation in which, in certain periods of time, labour migrants from Tajikistan are more likely to be “law-abiding” and legalize their status on a mass scale. At other time intervals, people from Kyrgyzstan are more likely to regulate their status.

1.2.1. DISCOURSE ON SECURITY

The securitization of migration has taken place against the backdrop of globalization worldwide and attempts by state authorities in countries of destination of labour migration to oversee and control the migration of large masses of people. Migration as a phenomenon is explained by a context of complex and interrelated flow of goods, finances and people. Flows of goods around the world are traditionally perceived positively, as part of the liberal understanding of development. Money flows are sometimes used as a criterion to evaluate a country’s development, and even as a political argument in discussions about the costs and benefits of labour migration for source and destination countries of labour migrants. However, the flow of people invariably leads to efforts to limit migration at any cost, and to develop policies to curtail it. It is specifically and primarily flows of people through international borders that shape discourse on security.

A wide range of factors contribute to intensification of the securitization of migration issues, including the significant increase in illegal migration flows, particularly during economic recessions; real and imagined links between migration and terrorism; organized crime; and the spread of dangerous diseases.

16 G. Ibraeva, A. Niyazov, M. Ablezova, A. Moldosheva, Gender and Migration Research Report, ICCO Cooperation, 2014, p.15
18 For example, in 2012, a study in Yekaterinburg found that the favourable (simplified legalization) regime, which was in place for citizens of Tajikistan, ensured that there was a lower proportion of migrants without legal status among actual respondents from Tajikistan. The most “law-abiding”, according to this study, are migrant worker women from Tajikistan, and the least men from Kyrgyzstan.
20 For example, in order to reduce the inflow of refugees after the Arab uprisings in 2011, the EU states spent EUR 2 billion on “strengthening border security” and EUR 700 million to create conditions to receive refugees. While in 1990, 15 countries had barrier walls on the border, by 2016 the number of such countries had grown to 70. For more see, Guardian Weekly, Five Myths about the Refugee Crisis, 15 June 2018, pp. 26-30
The key aspect of security linked to migration has traditionally been seen as state, or national security – which is presented as defending and ensuring the integrity and preservation of national territory and state sovereignty: this means caring for citizens and legal residents of the state. Therefore rhetoric on security is used to justify total surveillance, detention, deportation and other harsh policies. Measures taken to ensure security with regard to migration imply state efforts to know and command information about migration flows, and to differentiate and create varied regimes and policies with regard to various categories of migrants.

Migration legislation in source countries (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and destination countries (Russia and Kazakhstan) differs in intensity and volume, thematic make-up and functional significance. In general, most changes to laws and regulations in the Russian Federation are introduced with the purposes of “defending national interests”, which in practice results in a deteriorating regime for labour migrants, even if this contradicts the legislation. This can be demonstrated by recent changes to Russian migration legislation (for more details see chapter 2, section 2.1, Regulatory (components of) infrastructure).

The reality of the lives of migrants differs significantly from the norms, and every new change in policy can aggravate the migrant rights situation. The infographic below shows the main aspects of violations of migrants’ rights in the Russian Federation, which are dissonant from political programmes and security policies and development for the country’s citizens.22

While urban planners and city administrators strive to make Russian cities as comfortable as possible for citizens of the country, labour migrants from Central Asia cannot freely use this comfortable infrastructure and are forced to organize their lives in a “parallel city”, including ethnic cafes, sports clubs and hospitals.

For many labour migrants, health concerns are postponed to a future return to their homeland, either because medical services are too expensive for migrants or because their personal priorities do not include these services. According to Kyrgyzstan’s State Migration Service, of the 399 dead bodies returned officially to the country from Russia between 2010 and 2017 114 died of disease.23 In addition, some of the dead were migrant women who died in childbirth or during pregnancy due to severe complications associated with chronic diseases in a context where they lacked access to medical services. In particular, of 48 maternal deaths in 2017, 5 were of migrants.

23 http://delo.kg/index.php/2011-08-04-18-06-33/10846-gruzy-200-iz-rossii-skolko-ikh-na-samom-dele. It is important to note that these statistics only cover officially registered labour migrants in the Russian Federation, and mortality among illegal labour migrants is not counted by the state, and the state does not provide support in such cases to members of the family of the dead migrant to transport the body or to meet other needs.
### Figure 4: The reality of the lives of labour migrants versus the security and development policy for citizens of the destination country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes of Sobyanin’s election programme for Mayor of Moscow (2013)</th>
<th>Reality for migrants in Moscow (from field research and mass media)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **1. Mobile city:** A programme to develop the transport infrastructure: free and European-style comfort in the city’s transport system. | Full and partial immobility of migrants  
- For family members – women and small children – migration is limited generally to rented accommodation, a respondent said “I was in prison for two years.”  
- Migrants try to live close to their places of work or at the workplace itself, to limit their encounters with the police. |
| **2. Comfortable city**  
A new quality of urban environment: improved yards, parks and other leisure infrastructure |  
- Migrants are very much attracted to parks, squares and shopping centres. They don’t relax there, however, but are generally working  
- Leisure areas are not always safe for migrants. For example, there was a conflict involving Tajik migrants at a Moscow shopping centre in 2017.  
- Migrants relax in a parallel Moscow (ethnic discos and sports halls) |
| **3. Healthy city**  
A programme for modernization of health care: quality medical services, increased birth rate and reduced mortality. | Care for personal health is set aside.  
- The expensive medical care in Russia is not affordable for all migrants: maternal mortality in Kyrgyzstan as a result of limited access to services  
- Ethnic clinics provide a limited spectrum of services and are also not accessible for all migrants  
- Migrants who have higher than average migrant income go to Russian clinics if they have complicated diagnoses. |
| **4. Educated city**  
Education quality standards in the capital will be higher than the Federal ones | Discrimination in education  
- There is access to school education, but lack of language knowledge puts children several levels behind  
- Adolescent children of migrants face discrimination and disrespect |
| **5. Kind city**  
Care and support for pensioners, families with many children, families of children with disabilities and social orphans. | Xenophobia: at all levels discrimination and violations of migrants’ rights occur. Migrants face hateful language in public discourse. |
| **6. Safe city**  
Effective migration policy: reduced crime, less illegal migration and fewer unqualified migrants. Task: to ensure observance by migrants of the traditions and customs of everyday life accepted in our society. | Law and order produce illegal migration in Russia  
- Meeting the registration requirements of migration policy in advance is impossible for migrants from Central Asia  
- For migrants there is a high risk of death – either from unprotected, unsafe work, or from violence by xenophobes. |
| **7. Open Moscow**  
Quality state services and accountability of the authorities to citizens (online services in all sectors, information portals, including on vacancies in the city housing and utilities service) | Suppression of the fact that even services guaranteed in law for migrants are often only provided following a bribe or in a context of bureaucratic barriers and discrimination, curtailment of rights and degradation of dignity. There is a lack of reporting on the billions of dollars that migrants generate for the economy. |
1.2.2. MEDIA DISCOURSE

The Russian researcher Mukomel notes that in the speeches of senior officials, there has been an evolution since the beginning of the 2000s from a “straightforward approach linking migration (implying illegal migration) to crime, drug trafficking, smuggling and trafficking in persons, and threats to national security”, to a rhetoric of forced requirement for migrants, and from this rhetoric to the modern actualization of the problems of the cultural identity of the host community and migrants, the adaptation of migrants and the economic consequences of migrations.

Based on detailed analysis, the Russian researcher Yakimova divided the media discourse into two models: the migration crisis model, in which international migration relates to social problems and is perceived as a threat; and a model of pragmatically-limited tolerance, where international migration is perceived as an inevitable evil that we must nevertheless put up with in order to meet the demand for foreign workers in the domestic labour market.24

In the migration crisis model, the main discursive practices are:
• Publications are devoted mainly to the criminal activities of migrants and represent them as a threat to national security
• Intentional repeating of language used in other texts to reinforce negative social ideology and a hidden negative evaluation
• The tone of the headings and material is negative, alert, worried or ironic.

In the model of pragmatically limited tolerance, the discourse practices are presented as follows:
• Publications mainly cover the labour activity of migrants and their role in the national economy, and represent migration as part of the global business, cultural and educational development of the region
• Intentional text-forming categories provide positive social ideologies, metaphors of cooperation and tolerance, neutral journalistic terms, and phraseological standards that justify the need for migrants
• The tonality of the headings and materials is neutral, balanced and benevolently positive.

Yakimova summarizes her analysis by highlighting the following characteristics of the images of immigrants, as constructed in individual and mass media consciousness:
• **Otherness**: migrants are culturally distant, poorly adapted and not willing to integrate;
• **Danger**: migrants are increasing in number, and in the future could by their numbers absorb the indigenous population
• **Hostility (aggressiveness)**: migrants are criminals, and pose a threat even in case of non-criminal employment
• **Unassuming**: migrants do heavy and dirty work for small reward
• **Endurance**: migrants are hardworking, work a lot and often combine several jobs
• **Demand**: migrants are needed to perform low-skilled jobs that local people do not want to do.

The mass of migrants is not portrayed as homogeneous; different ethnic groups are seen as being different in terms of “degree of danger / usefulness”. However there is no explicit gender aspect in media discourse (apart from women being portrayed as victims of trafficking or the danger of vice). Traditionally, a labour migrant is a man, and a migrant woman is seen as “attached” to a man as a member of his family, and is therefore invisible as an employee.

Violations of the rights of Tajik and Kyrgyz migrants in the Russian discourse recorded in public discourse are dissonant with the political programmes and policies for security and development for the citizens of the country, and migrant workers are socially excluded from the security regime.

Ultimately, threats to the human security of irregular migrants far exceed the threats to national security that they might represent.

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25 Ibid.
1.2.3. THE DOCUMENTATION OF CHILDREN AND WOMEN

According to the World Health Report (for 2008), 40 per cent of all 128 million births in the world every year remain unregistered because of the lack of a civil status registration system. The situation concerning deaths is still worse: more than two-thirds of deaths are not recorded in state registries around the world.\(^{26}\)

The importance of the problem of documentation of civil status in the Asia-Pacific region is demonstrated by the agenda of the first Ministerial Conference on Civil Registration and Vital Statistics in 2014, which led to the Proclamation of the Decade of Civil Registration and Vital Statistics in Asia and the Pacific, 2015-2024.\(^{27}\)

A review of literature on migration in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan revealed that the countries each have their own peculiarities with regard to access of citizens to the documentation of civil status. In Tajikistan large numbers of people still have problems obtaining state registration of civil status (such as birth certificates, registration of marriage, passports and so on). Thus, the 2012 study “Legal problems: the needs of the population for legal services and practical solutions” found that 54.7 per cent of the women and 45.3 per cent of the men among the 909 respondents mentioned receiving civil status documents as a key legal problem. Of these 38.3 per cent of respondents did not take any action to obtain documents, due to lack of information on how to resolve the problem.

Accurate official statistics on citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic without passports or birth certificates and persons living in the country without defined status are not made public, although officials, civil society and human rights activists testify that there are many such people in the country.\(^{28}\) It is important to note that the situation in Kyrgyzstan has improved significantly since 2011, when the first public service centres (hereafter referred to as “one-stop shops”)\(^{29}\) were established to make provision of Kyrgyzstan’s population with national passports more efficient, and the services themselves were standardized.

In Tajikistan problems of documentation are primarily linked to acquiring birth certificates and passports. The most important cause of this is seen as the high cost of documentation. The respondents did not raise the issue of high prices without reason: Tajikistan’s international passport is the most expensive in the Commonwealth of Independent States. The official cost of a biometric passport (consular fees), as established by Government Decree 546 of 2 November 2007, is $75. In addition, this recipient must pay 75 somoni of state duty and 40 somoni for the service. This is an additional 115 somoni (or $13)\(^{30}\) (National Bank of Tajikistan rate of 23 January 2018). As a result, a biometric passport costs $88, and the standard period of receipt is 15 days from the date of submission of documents.

The cheapest passports in the CIS are issued for citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic. Receiving it initially costs 530 soms, or only $7.70.\(^{31}\) The period for receipt is 18 days. If an international passport is urgently needed, the cost will increase, depending on the timescale, with a maximum cost of $90 for a period of receipt of three hours. Replacing a passport in Kyrgyzstan will usually cost 590 soms. For its loss or damage, citizens of this country pay 730 soms.”

The actual cost of a passport can increase, particularly in Tajikistan, because citizens (according to our respondents), have to travel repeatedly for a document. For example, single women from Bokhtar with experience of labour migration discussed it as follows:

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\[^{26}\] https://books.google.kg/books?isbn=9244563738
\[^{28}\] https://ru.sputnik.kg/society/20180212/1037711595/obyazatelen-li-inn-dlya-detey.html: Checks by the State Registration Service revealed that 216,000 schoolchildren did not have personal identification numbers, while several thousand children (the number required clarified) did not even have birth certificates.
\[^{31}\] 1 USD = 68.39 som, National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic rate as of 31 January 2018, http://www.nbkr.kg/index1.jsp?item=1562&lang=RUS
As I stated, between 1994 and 2005 (her sister studies with “The respondents noted despite the significant institutional mechanisms put in place to improve the situation in this area. these population groups in Kyrgyzstan, as in Tajikistan, leads to statelessness over several generations; Kyrgyzstani men at various times in the past and whose Uzbekistani passports are no longer valid, settle karyilmans to provide the full package of documents needed to obtain a passport (this is the case among many importance of documentation, and late application for registration. It is also sometimes not possible for respondents from Kyrgyzstan, the main reason for children not receiving birth certificates or maternity homes combine their databases of births, and provide birth certificates straight away in the maternity home.

In Kyrgyzstan, the problem of the remoteness of documentation service centres was largely resolved in 2011-2012, when a One-Stop Shop was opened in each aiyl okmotu (sub-district): today when citizens apply for passports they can easily obtain them. Moreover, a range of social institutions – for example, general secondary schools – assist senior school pupils to receive passports, as passports (ID cards) are required for taking national examinations (ORT) and obtaining certificates of education. Since 2018, the State Registration Service has been undertaking a pilot in which registry offices and Ministry of Health maternity hospitals combine their databases of births, and provide birth certificates straight away in the maternity home.33

For respondents from Kyrgyzstan, the main reason for children not receiving birth certificates or passports is, generally, negligence and misunderstanding among certain groups of citizens of the functional importance of documentation, and late application for registration. It is also sometimes not possible to provide the full package of documents needed to obtain a passport (this is the case among many karyilmans: ethnic Kyrgyz from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan or Afghanistan who have come to Kyrgyzstan to settle34). Similar problems are typical for a group of women from neighbouring Uzbekistan who married Kyrgyzstani men at various times in the past and whose Uzbekistani passports are no longer valid, without having received internal passports for Kyrgyzstan either.35 The problems with documentation of these population groups in Kyrgyzstan, as in Tajikistan, leads to statelessness over several generations, despite the significant institutional mechanisms put in place to improve the situation in this area.36

32 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/26930196.html
34 According to the focus group respondents, resettled persons do not possess many documents that are essential for passport applications (such as birth certificates), and as a rule the states from which the karyilmans came do not fulfill requests for the certificates to be reissued.35 There are some citizens of the former Soviet Union who do not have a defined citizenship, as well as foreign citizens (de facto stateless) and children at risk of statelessness.
36 The existence of “invisible” citizens has become more prominent for the state over the last few years thanks to the efforts of civil society. As a result of this, a range of problems have been resolved, including opportunities to register. Under article 16(4) of the Law “On Internal Migration”, citizens without a fixed place of residence can register with the local government body in the area in which they are living.

Report: “THE FRAGILE POWER OF MIGRATION: the needs and rights of women and girls from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan who are affected by migration, 2018”
The focus group discussions revealed that mass labour migration significantly affects the documentation of citizens in Kyrgyzstan. Thus, if one of the spouses acquired citizenship of the Russian Federation or Kazakhstan, and the other remains a citizen of Kyrgyzstan, additional bureaucratic procedures are required in order to certify their marriage and register the birth of their children, requirements which the individuals concerned are unable to meet, being sure there will be red tape and risk of corruption.

The most widespread problem of documentation in Kyrgyzstan relates to state registration of marriage, as in the last decade religious marriage registration (nikah) has almost universally “displaced” registration in registry offices. Interestingly, in their words the respondents recognized the importance of civil registration for the rights of women and children, but at the same time in practice nikah is dominant and defended on cultural grounds.

The issue of marriage registration is no less important in Tajikistan than in Kyrgyzstan, and many aspects of women’s vulnerability caused by absence of state registration of marriage were revealed both in focus groups and in case studies in the field research. However, respondents from Tajikistan mainly prioritized the issues of obtaining passports and birth certificates.

Meanwhile, some of the respondents in Kyrgyzstan testified about the advantages of not having state registration of a marriage for a migrant woman: if she gets Russian citizenship, for example, as a single mother she can claim more allowances and priority access to the education system. In addition, the absence of official marriage registration allows a woman to take children with her across borders without a notarized power of attorney from the father of the mother’s right to transport the child.

1.3. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ASPECTS OF LABOUR MIGRATION AND GENDER SPECIFICS

Study of the real experience of migration shows that labour mobility can have the effect of “social therapy” for labour migrants, which can cure them of social inertia and excessive dependence on the state. However, it can also have the effect of “social surgery” on both the migrants and their families, leading to loss of family and friends, deteriorating health, disintegration of families and a decrease in the birth rate; and on society as a whole, cutting off from the social body fully healthy parts in the form of able-bodied members who could act for the benefit of society.37

The social and cultural aspects of labour migration have at least three dimensions: the social consequences for Russian society, the consequences for the labour migrants themselves, and the consequences for the societies that have sent them.38

The social consequences of labour migration for Russian society have hardly been studied, but there are certain indicators. These are reflected, first of all, in the creation of models of the active labour behaviour of middle-class women in Russia. The presence of labour migrants in the Russian labour market in the niche of domestic labour facilitates the release of Russian middle-class women from housework and their active involvement in the labour market.39

Other aspects of the interaction of Russian and Central Asian cultures – including changing tastes in food and values of multiculturalism and tolerance – are also not being studied. In addition, the cultural influence of migrant workers – including domestic workers, neighbours and classmates – on the nurturing and development of Russian children continues to be invisible.

The consequences of labour migration for labour migrants themselves, including women, are more often the focus of research. The most significant changes in this area, which appear in numerous studies and publications include:

• Modification of family and marital patterns of behaviour: this is characterized by the emergence of non-traditional forms of relations for Tajik and Kyrgyz societies such as remote (separated) families, “guest” marriages, and fictitious marriages.

37 A. Tolstokorova, Geroini nashego vremeni: zhenshchyna trudovaya migratsiya iz Ukrainy [The Heroines of Our Time: Women’s migration from Ukraine”; Diaspora, 2012, No.1, p. 199
38 Each of the indicated dimensions is represented in academic literature and public discourse to a different degree.
39 From a macroeconomic perspective, the number of women working in the economy is growing, according to statistical compilations on the labour market in Russia.
• The change in the reproductive attitudes of migrant women – a phenomenon widely studied with regard to labour migration from Latin America and South-East Asia. Though the obvious changes in the reproductive behaviour of labour migrants from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are not described in the scientific literature, there is widespread evidence that maternity benefit has emerged as a motivation for giving birth among migrants from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan who have obtained Russian citizenship.

• The risks of stigmatization of women returning from labour migration are mentioned particularly often in the literature. It is noted that the desire to avoid stigma and social isolation as a result of stigmatization forces some women to “settle” in the country of destination for permanent residence.

• Public discourse often discusses the impact on the physical and mental health of migrant workers of long-term deprivation of food and sanitation, and also of socio-cultural isolation, although research in this area is not yet common.

• Changes in the professional status of women migrant workers are only sketched out in a few studies on labour migration. In public discourse in various countries, ideas are circulating of the de-qualification of specialists from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in Russia and Kazakhstan, given their unskilled work, as well as the concept of “re-qualification” of labour migrants who bring the skills and knowledge they gained as labour migrants back home from their countries of destination as “social transfers” and thereby invest in the development of their communities.

• The most radical change in the value system of labour migrants is also only being studied in a fragmented way. In the academic literature there is evidence of a change in spatial-temporal perception among labour migrants, a change in attitude towards the concept of “home”. No less interesting are isolated studies on the changing social networks of female labour migrants, including changing attitudes toward their children and parents.

• An issue which appears in public discourse is that of labour migration “empowering” women from Central Asian cultural societies; this area also requires more active study.

The social consequences for source societies seem to be the most researched dimension of labour migration. In particular, research in this area focuses on changes in the social stratification of society, risks of depopulation and negative trends in the development of the institution of the family.

Changes in the socio-stratification of society because of remittances and labour migration are presented in public discourse as the most effective strategy for combatting poverty in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. However, a number of studies show that labour migration to Russia and other countries does not affect the poorest families, due to their inability to bear the costs of migration.

The most “disentangled” theme in public discourse is that of negative trends in the development of the institution of the family, as influenced by the external labour migration strategies of men and women from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The issues raised most often in this aspect, include growth in divorce, related problems of abandoned children and the spread of social orphanhood, the growth of the number of “abandoned” wives and “abandoned” parents, as well as a new round of reproductive burdens for older parents because of the need to care for their grandchildren while their children are away as migrants.
Issues surrounding Central Asian migration have been topical and a popular subject of academic research since the mid-1990s, as the autonomy of the former Soviet republics strengthened and they became involved in global migration process. At the same time, it is important to note that until the middle of the 2000s, almost no attention was paid to labour migration from or within the Central Asian countries: as most of the migrants in the 1990s were “Russian-speaking” they were identified in analytical literature as “compatriots” returning to their historical homeland.

In the array of academic literature on Central Asian migration, the following approaches are predominant:

- **economic approaches**, calculating the benefits of labour migration for countries of origin and/or destination
- **a gravitational model of migration**, studying the push and pull factors that affect an individual’s decision about migration
- **the approach of the segmented labour market and study of social hierarchy** that explains which niches migrant workers occupy and why, and how this determines their life strategies and opportunities during and after migration
- **the theory of risk / securitization**, which focuses on the costs and dangers to society, the state and the individual in the process of social adaptation or alienation of migrant workers
- **the theory of network analysis**, the essence of which is that when a certain number of migrants have already settled in the country of destination (whatever their motives for migration) completely different forces come into play – specifically, forces of social interaction built on kinship or ethnic proximity.

The issues of migrants’ rights, the gender specificity of the situation and the behaviour of labour migrants have become the subject of migration studies focusing on Central Asia only comparatively recently, despite the fact that traditions of studying labour migration in terms of double costs for female labour migrants have been developing around the world for more than thirty years.

Assessing migration as a social process of mobility allows us to identify certain channels – paths and “transition points” from one space to another, which align and ensure high mobility for some and immobility for others. These channels, paths and transition points form complex “migration infrastructures” that can be defined as systematically interconnected technologies, institutions and entities that create / provide mobility conditions that are not the result of the desire or voluntary choice of migrants themselves.

An approach based on the study of migration infrastructures has not yet been applied to the study of Central Asian migration, but it allows us to see that these infrastructures determine the opportunities for integration in the destination country, reproducing working and living conditions for different migrants differently.

This research identified and analysed six different components of migration infrastructure and their impact on migration flows and mobility opportunities, as well as on the integration prospects of women and girls who are labour migrants in the host community:

- **Regulatory (components of) infrastructure.** These can be defined as disparate institutions, policies and discourses that turn migration into a “static policy object”. This infrastructure comprises state apparatuses and procedures for documenting, licensing and training migrants, among others. This includes not only state actors, but also a wider range of participants.

- **Commercial (components of) migration infrastructure** appears in places where there is not enough physical infrastructure and relatively well-paid work is abundant: where potential benefits exceed costs. This infrastructure primarily comprises recruitment agencies, including private ones,

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individual intermediaries to find work or housing, house renting funds and landlords. Migration brokers do not just sell opportunities to migrate abroad, but also deal with various components of infrastructure. These include, for example, collecting documents, organizing medical tests or training before leaving. All these have far-reaching regulatory consequences for the future.

- **Technological (components of) infrastructure:** this is the most obvious element of migration infrastructure. This includes communications and transport infrastructure, which play a key role not only in facilitating the recruitment of migrants, but also in changing the connections between migrants and their relatives and networks. Often development of regulatory infrastructure is accompanied by development of technological infrastructure. For example, the introduction of biometric documentation standards inevitably leads to the creation of a data storage system and the exchange of such data at international level, as well as facilitating migration procedures and strengthening opportunities to monitor.

- **Humanitarian (components of) infrastructure** are created as a result of transnational networks of interaction and financing for the dissemination of human rights norms, and appeals to official structures to protect rights and advocacy through the discourse of the victims. These infrastructural components include human rights and other NGOs and international organizations working to protect the rights of migrants and counter trafficking in human beings. Often, the media are also involved here, drawing attention to and demonstrating abuses against migrants, and stimulating a juridical response to them.

- **Cultural (components of) infrastructure** are determined by traditions and legitimate practices, allowing the mobility of some categories of migrants and determining the nature of relations and their connections with other categories of migrants and non-migrants remaining in their homeland. Thus, in a number of segments of the labour market of domestic workers in Tatarstan and Bashkiria, the demand for Muslim domestic workers was higher than for candidates with other religious identities. Therefore, a significant number of women migrant workers were encouraged to brand their appearance as that of practicing Muslims (wearing hijab, for example).

- Finally, **social (components of) infrastructure**, including networks and families of migrants who work to ensure oversight, protect migrants, and so on.

It is important to note that these types of infrastructures are in fact not clearly fixed and delineated structures, but rather a closely interacting and interwoven logic of actions, and that in their interaction they determine trends of migratory behaviours and practices.

Because of the complex nature of the interaction of infrastructures and the wide range of their impact on the life opportunities of labour migrants, this study presents only the most obvious or topical aspects of key infrastructure components. Thus, we will describe in some detail such components of regulatory infrastructures as documentation and legislation, but we will not concentrate on cultural practices and traditions. The social components of the infrastructure are presented in the report from various perspectives, in a multifaceted manner, which thus allowed this type of infrastructure to be separated into an independent section.

### 2.1. REGULATORY (COMPONENTS OF) INFRASTRUCTURE

Comparative analysis shows that development of migration legislation in four different states in different periods between 1992 and 2018 was of varying intensity.

The country that adopted the highest volume of laws and regulations between 2001 and 2005, and between 2006 and 2010 was Kyrgyzstan. The periods between 1996 and 2000 and between 2011 and 2015 saw the largest number of laws and regulations in this field being adopted in Tajikistan. The Russian Federation saw its highest numbers of changes in the legislative and regulatory framework for migration between 2005 and 2010, between 2011 and 2015, and between 2016 and present. The smallest number of legislative and regulatory changes was seen in Kazakhstan.
The legislative and regulatory base in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in the field of migration and combatting trafficking in persons is identical on the whole, with a few differences in the number of laws and regulations adopted and amended. This is because of the migration processes that have taken place in these countries, and the high flow of labour migrants from the countries, which influences migration policy and thus the adoption of laws and regulations to address it.

Study of Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s legislation has shown that laws and regulations in the fields of migration and counteracting human trafficking are primarily intended to:

• facilitate the creation and organizational development of state structures dealing with migration and countering human trafficking
• enable accession to international organizations on labour and migration issues, and protecting the rights of migrants
• define and implement concepts and strategies of migration policy.

The legislative and regulatory frameworks of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, as destination countries, differ conceptually in terms of the number of aims and the number of laws and regulations adopted. The Russian Federation has the largest number of amendments to its legislative and regulatory framework. The largest proportion of laws and regulations, in both the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, are intended to effectively control migration flows and implement migration policy. In the Russian Federation, the laws and regulations state that: “foreign citizens enjoy rights in the Russian Federation and bear duties on an equal footing with citizens of the Russian Federation, with the exception of cases provided for by federal law”, describe the rights of migrants and guarantee their protection, and speak of the state’s role in creating safe labour conditions and ensuring social guarantees.

The evolving nature of migration legislation in the Russian Federation relates to the challenges of effective oversight and control over large masses of people coming to the territory of a large country in rapidly changing political and economic conditions. Changes to Russian migration legislation in 2018 are linked with a number of circumstances:

• hosting the World Cup in 2018
• the legislative drive to expand the rules on liability for violations of migration rules (linked with the emergence of more diverse violations); and

During the 2018 FIFA World Cup, security measures included temporary migration rules reflected in chapter 3 of Law 108-FZ “On the preparations for and hosting in the Russian Federation of the 2018 FIFA Football World Cup...” of 7 June 2013, which focused on certain categories of foreigners and stateless persons. Among other measures, Law 108-FZ included a provision to shorten to three days the registration period for labour migrants from Central Asia.

The new developments in legislation include Constitutional Court Decree 22-P, which ruled that parts 1 and 2(2) of article 20 of Law 109-FZ “On Migration Registration of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons...” of 18 July 2006 did not comply with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, and ruled that criminal liability should be introduced for registration of foreigners in non-residential premises. Legal entities can now only register a migrant where there is adequate housing and habitable conditions for living. Officially, this measure represents a continuation of the struggle of lawmakers with “elastic” flats and elastic offices, but in practice it will worsen the situation of labour migrants, primarily those from Kyrgyzstan, which has enjoyed a preferential migration regime since August 2015.

As a result of these changes, from January 2019:

- the inviting party will have to monitor observance by invited persons of the procedure for staying in and leaving the Russian Federation (Law 2016-FZ “On Amending...” of 19 July 2018)

Sources: Authors' calculations based on data from the Centralized Bank of Legal Information of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Ministry of Justice of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Legislation Database of the CIS countries

Figure 6: Thematic spectrum of migration legislation in Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation Decision 22-P of 19 July 2017 in a case to verify the constitutionality of the provisions in part 1 and part 2(2) of Article 20 of the Federal Law “On Migration Registration of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons in the Russian Federation”

Since 26 July 2018, migration registration has again been conducted according to standard procedures. Citizens of Tajikistan, having arrived in the Russian Federation, should register within seven days of crossing the border. Citizens of Kyrgyzstan can be on the territory of the Russian Federation without registration within 30 days from the date of entry. To stay longer in Russia, foreigners should renew their registration or leave the country for three months.
The inviting party will bear administrative responsibility for non-compliance by a foreigner with the established purpose of entry into the Russian Federation or terms for departure from the Russian Federation.\footnote{https://rusjurist.ru/inosstranye_grazhdane_i_organizacii/novyj_zakon_dlya_migrantov_s_2018_goda/#a4}

The provisions of the decision of the Constitutional Court on the changes to migration reporting were also enshrined in national legislation when the President of the Russian Federation signed Federal Law 163-FZ “On Amending the Federal Law ‘On Migration Registration of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons in the Russian Federation’” on 27 June 2018: the changes entered into force on 8 July 2018. It is noteworthy that the amended legislation affects the terms of stay of citizens from EAEU member countries, as it makes no distinction between foreign citizens. Moreover, migration laws take no account of the gender specificity of foreign workers.

At the same time, the State Duma has approved new conditions for terminating the registration of a foreign citizen at their place of residence: now Russian citizens are allowed to withdraw the migration registration of foreign citizens without the agreement of the latter.\footnote{https://rus.azattyk.org/a/low-russia-migration-discussion-kyrgyz/29357139.html} The receiving party has the right to notify the relevant migration control authority or apply to a multifunctional centre for public services. After receiving the notification, the registration of the foreign citizen at the place of residence is revoked.

Russian politicians justify all these changes by arguing: “this is not a large-scale purging of migrants but only the introduction of clarifications into the law”, and that “the situation will not change much, but, on the contrary, justice will triumph. This is because companies and individuals who used to register migrants were not accountable under law!” That is, the changes are aimed at strengthening the accountability of employers and increasing the safety of labour migrants. The leader of the Zamandash political party comments on the changes in legislation in this way: “Now the Russian police and migration services have been given freedom, the pressure on migrants will increase. On the one hand, this is correct: Russia is acting in the interests of its national security. However this does not take into account the fact that Kyrgyzstan is a member of the EAEU. According to the EAEU rules: ‘citizens of member states of the association can freely move to the territories of EAEU countries.’ But unfortunately, this rule, as it turns out, is not being observed.”\footnote{https://rus.azattyk.org/a/kyrgyzstan-russia-migration-registration/29345066.html}

Russian human rights activist Valentina Chupik believes that the new requirements removed responsibility from employers and placed migrants in a difficult situation: “Now it will be impossible to register as migrants at the address of a legal entity, unless this legal entity provides housing in which the migrants will live. But enterprises do not have residential properties. Therefore, practically no one will be able to register. There is still an article in the Administrative Code on ‘use of premises for other purposes’. In the event that housing is provided, it will be insisted that this conforms to housing standards. This will be terrible for migrants. For example, Kyrgyz migration will become completely unlawful. Kyrgyz regularly rent their dwellings not from the landlords, but from so-called owners who are in fact also Kyrgyz, and who are renting the property from the real owners. That’s how the business works. Now all this will make it impossible for Kyrgyz citizens to reach the owners in any way. As a result, citizens of Kyrgyzstan will not be able to register in housing premises. They will purchase ‘dodgy’ residence registration which states that they live in other flats. But in fact they will not be living in these flats. They will be deported for this.”\footnote{https://visasam.ru/emigration/pereezdsing/vremennaya-registraciya-v-kazahstane.html}

Analysis of migration legislation in Kazakhstan revealed limited changes over time to legislation. This could imply stability and favourable conditions for labour migrants. However, as it turns out, de facto regulation of migration accounting is governed for the most part by secondary legislation, departmental instructions or simply by the subjective attitudes and opinions of officials.\footnote{https://visasam.ru/emigration/pereezdsing/vremennaya-registraciya-v-kazahstane.html} It is these subordinate acts that determine the status of migrant workers in the country. In particular, for migrants from Kyrgyzstan, the procedure for stay and registration for migrants are governed by the “Protocol on Amendments and Addenda to the Agreement between the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Procedure for the Stay of Citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic in the
Because Kyrgyzstan joined the EAEU in August 2015, the situation of labour migrants from the Kyrgyz Republic has significantly improved, as they have different terms for registration at least, and there is no need to obtain work permits / patents. However, Tajik migrants continue to face all the difficulties of obtaining permits, passing tests on knowledge of the language and history of Russia, and all other conditions for working legally in the Russian Federation. But for citizens of both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in Russia there is a common problem if migrant workers travel with family members (wife and children) who do not work outside the household: accompanying members of the migrant’s family are in an equally dangerous situation. There is no concept of “family member of a labour migrant” in Russia’s legislation, and no regulations on them. This makes the life of members of the migrant’s family unpredictable, and (deliberately) doomed to irregularity.

2.2. COMMERCIAL (COMPONENTS OF) INFRASTRUCTURE

As our research shows, as the number of rules and regulations concerning migration policy and practices (regulatory infrastructure) grow in destination countries, labour migrants’ costs of employment and legal residence in the destination countries also increase. For example, the closure of the Russian Federal Migration Service in 2016 and the transfer of its powers to the Main Directorate for Migration at the Interior Ministry led to a fourfold increase in violations of migrants’ rights, according to human rights activist Valentina Chupik.49

2.2.1 EMPLOYMENT

The increase in costs is due to a number of intermediaries springing up, each offering opportunities to mitigate or circumvent restrictive rules and complex procedures. One example of such mediators is private employment agencies in the source countries of labour migrants. The nature of the proposals and the service quality of the private employment agencies varies with changes in the regulatory field both in the destination country and the source country. The higher the unemployment rate and the demand for work in the source country, the higher the economic benefits of intermediation. The less that qualified employees intend to migrate in response to labour market demand,51 the more that commercial intermediaries - legal and physical, legal and illegal - begin to mediate to recruit migrants to go abroad.52

Thus, for example, according to the Informational Consultative Centre at the State Migration Service of the Kyrgyz Republic, as of 27 August 2018 77 licensed private employment agencies were recruiting citizens to work abroad,53 while on 1 October 2017 there were 50 on the register,54 and in 2013 there were just 4.55

49 http://www.mfa.gov.kg/contents/view/id/118
50 https://www.svoboda.org/a/29352834.html
51 If the demand is for skilled workers, then the candidates’ knowledge and skills of allow them independently, without intermediaries, to use technological means to find the employers.
52 The same tendency has developed in other countries. One example is Indonesia. Although the receipt of brokerage money for the employment of women as domestic workers abroad did not precede the departure of the migrant and created the risk of non-payment, the pressure of unemployment against the backdrop of the economic crisis led to an increase in the number of licensed recruiting companies and informal brokers. In 1995, there were fewer than 50 licensed recruiting companies, which every year sent approximately 200,000 workers abroad. By 2007, 500 recruiting companies sent around 700,000 workers abroad every year (the vast majority to Malaysia and Saudi Arabia). In other words, the number of licensed recruiting companies has grown three times faster than migration itself. For more details see Biao Xiang, Johan Lindquist. Migration Infrastructure. International Migration Review. Volume 48 Number S1 (Fall 2014): p. 128-129
53 http://oec.kg/index.php?act=view_material&id=919
54 http://oec.kg/index.php?act=view_material&id=919
55 https://auca.kg/ru/tspcnews/2883/
The conjuncture of the labour market abroad and the demand for migration to various countries of destination, combined with the political conjuncture, also affects the offerings of the private employment agencies.

2.2.2. HOUSING

The lack of a housing market that provides the documents and services required by law leads to the emergence of various intermediary schemes and structures. In Russia, for example, intermediaries may be Russian citizens who are former compatriots of the labour migrants, and who sublet “bed space” in a rented apartment, while receiving economic benefits (in the form of a “cash” profit or by receiving their own “paid-for” sub-let “place of residence”); this may also be finding areas that are not on the radar of the state bodies, where one can live in one’s own way (one of the respondents reported how a whole group of Kyrgyzstani citizens had lived for more than six months in an abandoned tuberculosis dispensary building in Krasnoyarsk); or it could be initiatives of employers who seek to maximize their profits by increasing the working day to the extent possible, with the exploited workers living on the job site (by which means the employer can also cut back on wages). The Russian researcher V. Peshkova\textsuperscript{56} notes in her work on the creation commercial migration infrastructures in response to problems with access to housing for migrants from Central Asia": “Over the last three to four years, the market for intermediary services has also been supplemented by migrant-oriented real estate agencies. Some Kyrgyz real estate agencies grew out of the activities of a single migrant who found accommodation for himself, and then his compatriots, which led to a client base being formed and real estate agencies created.”

Studying the way this commercial infrastructure operates allows one to see the links between human mobility and immobility, and the power relations that unequally decide a migrant’s mobility.

Thus, labour migrants and members of migrant families are particularly likely to be either partially or totally immobile in large cities, where life in general moves very fast and all urban systems promote

\textsuperscript{56} Peshkova V. “Infrastruktura trudovykh migrantov v gorodakh sovremennoyRossii (na primere migrantov iz Uzbekistana i Kirgizii v Moskve)” ["The Infrastructure of Labour Migrants in the Cities of Modern Russia: The example of migrants from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in Moscow"]. MirRossi. 2015. No. 2, pp. 129-151. https://mirros.hse.ru/article/download/4937/5302/
mobility. For example, migrants often prefer living in their places of work or, if they work as lorry drivers, in their vehicles. In this way, they reduce the risk of being caught by the police during the commute from their home to their place of work, and thus having to pay bribes. The money saved by not having permanent housing, as well as by minimizing the number of "meetings" with the police, will be sent to families in the form of remittances.  

In our focus groups, the respondents more than once testified that if a woman stays in a rented flat with small children, she will not be allowed to go outside the building, while going grocery shopping in a local shop can lead to disaster: detention, separation from children, deportation, and children ending up in a residential institution. Migrants had heard of – and several times recalled – the unhappy fate and death of five-month-old Umarali Nazarov – the son of a labour migrant from Tajikistan.

Lidiya Grafova, the chair of the executive committee of the Forum of Migrants’ Organizations and a member of the Public Council of the Federal Migration Service of Russia, believes that “this tragic case once again showed with monstrous clarity the injustice suffered by migrants in the Russian Federation. They seek to give the impression that all the law enforcement agencies in the country are busy putting things in order in the explosive migration sphere and this is necessary for our population’s security, but we see that actions to combat illegal migration often turn into medieval ‘witch hunts’. The most unfortunate are suffering: those to whom our staggering legislation does not give the option of receiving simple registration, while repeat illegal migrants, even after committing crimes, can easily escape punishment with a bribe.”

Labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in Turkey do not live in such a constrained way: the regulatory infrastructure itself is defined by a different regime: a significant proportion of female labour migrants from Central Asia go as domestic workers and find work with a place to live: this is determined by the labour regime and the values of the employers, and the requirements of the employer’s liability law. However, even labour migrants in other fields of work cannot create “elastic” flats in Turkey to save money, because rented flats are located in condominiums, in which every tenant exercises oversight over housing resources. In the service sector in Turkey, there is another form of legal residence of labour migrants: they stay at the hotels where they work.

### 2.2.3. DOCUMENTATION

The most important component of the migration infrastructure is documentation of the citizens of source countries. As shown in Chapter 1, women and children find it very difficult to access documentation services (obtaining birth certificates and passport) because of high economic costs, a lack of visible benefits from obtaining documents, procedural (bureaucratic) delays in the provision of services, the inaccessibility of the service (both financial and physical), the fact that many women and children endure violence and discrimination, and an inability to make decisions on documentation in their own interests.

However, labour migrants in Russia or other countries of destination also need to obtain other documents that permit them to work legally. Processing these documents is often not the choice of the individual migrant: that person only becomes legal or irregular as a result of the prevailing power resources in various components of migration infrastructures. One survey respondent explained why she and her colleagues were forced to remain in an irregular migration situation for their whole time in Russia: “When you have no money, how can you process documents in one day? However many times we go, we don’t have documents. We ask the bosses: first give us the money, then we will get the documents, then deduct it from the salary. No, on the second day we were taken to the militia to pay a fine of 4,000 roubles. Then the Georgian was forced to pay a fine. We had worked with him more than a year and brought him profit. Every year we came and worked with him. He sent us money for a ticket.” Another respondent explained that it is possible to appear in the banned list despite not breaking the law: Participant 1: “At the moment, the championship is being held in Russia and they are deporting for no reason.” Moderator: “For no reason? All the documents are in place?” Participant 1: “Sometimes all the documents are in order or in other cases 2-3 days are left before the documents expire.”

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57 https://auca.kg/uploads/.../Presentation_Akylbek_Tashbulatov.pdf
59 Focus group, Hissar and Yavan, women migrants
60 Focus group, Bokhtar, single women migrants
Creation of an arbitrary system for documentation of migrants in the receiving country and barriers to law-abiding and legal labour migration has led to an alternative documentation system being created in the migrants’ homelands as an adaptation mechanism. When they return to their homeland, migrants from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan who for various reasons were banned from re-entering the Russian Federation (or less often Kazakhstan), change their given names and family names, as well as all the documents proving their identity. In both countries, intermediary structures have been established that organize the process of changing names and documents. In Tajikistan, according to respondents, this process is on a massive scale and is quasi-legalized, bringing additional funds to the state budget (the Ministry of Education changes its certificates, the registry office reissues marriage certificates, and passport offices provide new birth certificates and passports). The process of re-documentation that has been developed is in practice better than the primary (legal) documentation: this is, however, conditioned by the readiness of persons who apply for documents under different names to pay for these services.  

Therefore, the pattern of behaviour of illegal migrants from both countries must be understood on the basis of the availability of such a commercial infrastructure. As one of the experts notes: “Deportation of Tajiks often develops an instrumental relationship: those who need to go back repeatedly know about how to circumvent the re-entry ban, while those who are not going to go soon do not think about the issue at all. The latter category includes, in particular, grandmothers who travelled to their children and grandchildren in Russia and were deported.”

During the focus groups, respondents in Tajikistan stated that they had been given opportunities for repeat migration thanks to this component of the infrastructure, and that they intended to seek this kind of assistance: “I was deported. Now I need new documents, to change to my parents’ surname or that of one of my relatives. Now I need a lot of money to change my documents.”

The study revealed that media discourse reflects the procedures and practices of documenting and monitoring the migration flow (checks/raids and residence permits), as well as the adoption of sanctions by the courts against illegal migrants: these descriptions rationalize the behaviour of irregular labour migrants and reveal how the authorities responsible for regulating migration infrastructures have an interest in irregular migration and therefore reproduce it. At the same time, during the field surveys, respondents rarely reflected on the situation in this way: more often they agreed with the discourse of guilt for irregular status, and justified it by lack of funds or slowness, or lack of knowledge and information. Even respondents who had been deported through a court ruling against a group of dozens of labour migrants saw this decision as legitimate.

2.2.4. BAKCHY KYZ (GIRL NANNIES)

A particular “adaptation strategy” used by migrant families in the context of the unfavourable Russian environment for family migration is “bakchy kyz”. Bakchy girls are often found in Kyrgyz migrant families. As finding places for small children in state and municipal nurseries and kindergartens is impossible due to the lack of places, and sending children to private kindergartens is too expensive for migrant families, migrants travelling with the family decide to bring a nanny from their homeland. First of all, the common language allows the children to adapt to the nanny without stress. Secondly the cost of such labour is minuscule compared to what would be paid to adult nannies from the homeland. In addition, adolescent girls, who are brought in as bakchy not only do not know their rights, but often cannot even conceive of themselves as possessing their own will, desires, and rights, and can therefore be exploited for an unlimited time, performing all kinds of work for the household.

In the southern regions of Kyrgyzstan, in the media, or in the Osh bazaar in Bishkek, you can find advertisements for hiring bakchy girls for migrant families in Russia. Some advertisements even give the offered payment: $500. Informants in Kyrgyzstan and Russia have received various pieces of information about how parents voluntarily send their underage daughters to work as bakchy girls, often using illegal methods to send them – using other people’s documents, because parents in the village do not draw up power of attorney to accompany someone else’s child on the flight, and so on. Also during the study in Yekaterinburg in 2012, information was received about the high risk of violence, including sexual violence, in the families of bakchy girls: this has been is confirmed in individual well-known case studies from the media about the tragic fate of bakchy girls.

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61 The possibilities of re-documentation have fallen significantly over the past year due to the introduction of biometric testing at border controls.

62 Focus group, Bokhtar; single women migrants
One of the respondents in Osh testified that a neighbour couple had hired a 12-year-old relative from her village as a nanny for two young children. An adolescent herself, the girl was not yet even fully ready to look after herself, but was given the responsibility for two young children for 14-16 hours at a time without breaks. During this time she fed them – and herself – exclusively on instant noodles, kept water on the boil and tried to make sure the children did not cry, run or make other tenants of the flat upset. As the respondent notes, the girl was always sleepy, because she did not get enough sleep, she did not eat the quantity and type of food required for an adolescent, was cut off from her relatives and could not even complain of tiredness. Whenever the couple that hired her were dissatisfied with her, they had no qualms about calling her offensive names, and several times the respondent even witnessed physical assaults on the girl.

The scale of the problem of bakchy girls is not possible to measure because this employment, like other types of domestic work, is invisible from the outside. A study on “invisible” migrants in Kazakhstan63 established that this is a fairly common practice among Kyrgyz migrants:

“Young relatives or fellow villagers are frequently hired as nannies. As is the case when adults are hired, relationships with minors are built on trust and no official documents are signed, which results in cases where the promised salary is not paid to the girl’s parents and the girl herself cannot provide proof of work.

“Parents agree that the employer will send the money their daughter earns directly to them and that their daughter will live at the expense of her employer. Meanwhile, she does not receive anything for her own expenses... Experts report that for many parents it is important that their daughter working as a nanny brings in income, but also that the family employing her feeds and clothes her. Since the salary is so low, many parents resort to hiring out their children for this kind of work because of their dire financial situation.”64

As a rule, minors go to work as nannies for a year, during which they do not study but often continue to be enrolled in a school in Kyrgyzstan. Due to the missed school time, these girls do not receive a full quality education, which subsequently deprives them of the opportunity to continue their education and hence to find good work, and leads to further violations of their rights.

Often the girl also suffers sexual violence from the family who hired her.65 “After Grade 9 and Grade 10, while they can still travel with their birth certificates, they go to our Kyrgyz migrants. The girls themselves are young, and the husbands and other relatives there have relationships with the nannies.” The issue of domestic work remains hidden from view from the outside. This study failed to gain access to close relatives of girls who migrated as bakchy. We only had an interview with a girl with successful experience in migration as a bakchy. She talked about a favourable regime of rest and work, developing skills, and so on because she was living in exceptional conditions with the family of a diplomat at the Kyrgyz Embassy in Russia.

2.3. TECHNOLOGICAL (COMPONENTS OF) INFRASTRUCTURE

There are various ways of getting from one country to another: one person may chose the shortest route by air (business or economy class); another could travel to the other country by public or private land or sea transport; a third may get to the border of the destination country via a series of hitched car rides, and cross the border points herself on foot; while a fourth might get to the country’s border herself and try to cross illegally, away from the official crossing point. Each way has its own degree of time and cost, with different levels of comfort and security and variety of attendant experiences. For example, those who fly from one country to another business class pass through “green” corridors, are met by correctly behaving border guards, "entry facilitation services" and top-range cars waiting especially for them. It is no coincidence that the American researcher Lassen called such migrants the “aeromobile elite”.66 Impoverished migrants, who choose the “cheapest” ways to move from country to country face other realities at the crossing points: long queues waiting to cross the border, run-ins with the requirements (legitimate or not) of border officials, law enforcement, customs and other structures, and risks of corruption, discrimination and

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63 FIDH et all, Invisible and Exploited in Kazakhstan: the plight of Kyrgyz migrant workers and members of their families, Report 713, June 2018
64 Ibid, p.45
65 G. Ibraeva, A. Niyazov, M. Ablezova, A. Moldosheva, Gender and Migration Research Report, ICCO Cooperation, 2014
violence, as well as, in extreme circumstances, the possibility of being separated from accompanying loved ones and/or not being allowed into the country of destination (being turned away at the border itself or after perfunctory “court procedures”).

Thus, the crossing points themselves (border posts at airports, on land and at seaports) serve as a selection tool and determine mobility opportunities and even the future strategies of the migrants passing through them. The mode of “functioning” of transition points (the state border in this case) is determined by a whole range of factors: including the norms and procedures of law in place, practice of applying the law, the political conjuncture, the values and norms of specific border officials, the migrants’ knowledge of their rights / ability to pay and so on.

For the overwhelming majority of respondents, the subject of everyday routes around the city and the risks associated with them for labour migrants are very close to their hearts. Metro stations or public transport stops often also turn into specific points of transition, from a more risky space to the less risky approach to their accommodation, which gives certain degree of protection. At the same time, arrival / departure through border points was not particularly in the foreground of women, except for a few cases involving extreme gender practices or experience of empowerment. Most female migrants from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan probably still come on aeroplanes, and the experience of crossing border points (posts) is not likely to be traumatic.

2.3.1. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY AS MIGRATION INFRASTRUCTURE

The role of information and communications technology in the migration strategies of women from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is quite contradictory. On the one hand, as P. Stoker notes, “the development of global communications ... has reduced the ‘emotional distance’ between labour migrants and their home countries and allows them to maintain contacts far beyond its borders.” This is an important factor in the decision-making process about labour migration of women leaving their children in their homeland. Kyrgyz and Tajik residents very quickly took to using smartphones that allowed them to communicate as labour migrants with their relatives in their homeland at least once a day.

For labour migrants in Russia, the internet serves multiple functions:
- dozens of sites, of which one of the most popular is www.jerdesh.ru, help migrants find housing, work, complete work teams, help sell and buy goods from their homeland, report on diaspora activities, and so on
- ethnic communities publish their own newspapers and online magazines, supporting migrants’ access to information in their native language, information about their homeland and home area, and allowing them to participate in the life of their communities remotely
- for female labour migrants, mobile communication is a technical tool that allows them to participate in the bringing up and development of their own children.

However, along with the positive effects of information and communications technology, our respondents also mentioned negative aspects: mobile communication often becomes an instrument of control over female labour migrants or family members of migrants remaining at home. Very often, migrant husbands control each step of their wives at home. Moreover, the communication of young women and girls on smartphones, and use of the internet through smartphones, has become the basis for accusations of adultery, involvement in radical religious movements, and so on. In southern Kyrgyzstan and some regions of Tajikistan, there is even a repressive practice of depriving young girls and women of mobile communication and internet access.

Older respondents in the Hissar, Yavan and Khatlon focus groups (Tajikistan) often noted that they had faced cases in which daughters-in-law had acted immorally due to mobile communications and that their mobile conversations with other men had been the reason for divorce. In the focus groups in Osh oblast, young girls also noted that their parents often forbade the use of smartphones.

Thus, the repressive strategies of “educating” girls and young women in traditional families in the age of digitalization and globalization give rise to yet another type of vulnerability and deprivation.
2.4. HUMANITARIAN (COMPONENTS OF) INFRASTRUCTURE

After the tragic murder in Moscow of a little girl by a Muslim nanny from Uzbekistan, Gulchakhra Bobokulova, the demand for nanny and governess services fell by at least 30 per cent, according to recruitment agencies in the Russian Federation. Though it is clear that demand for nannies sooner or later recovered, Muslim migrant women began to face a special attitude towards them: distrust and fear among parents who needed to hire nannies. Dozens of newspapers, including www.gazeta.ru, social networks (such as vkontakte and mail.ru) hosted discussions about the tragedy in the spirit of “this is not a Muslim woman”, whole packages of advice discussed digital technologies that allow you to monitor the behaviour of a nanny during her work, and psychologists offered tests about how to recognize a sociopath in a candidate for domestic work. Quite often the statements were extremely racist in nature, recommending that Muslims, Asians, and so on should not be hired. Thus, the media demonstrated its potential role in migration infrastructure, affecting the selection of labour migrants in the domestic workers niche and the ability of migrants in this category to integrate in the destination country.

Researching public discourse on migration in the sending and receiving countries of labour migrants allows the question of “national security” to be understood, and to ask which stakeholders formulate the question in what terms. To compare public discourses for this study media discourse in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia was chosen, as well as academic / political authority discourse in Russia and expert opinions in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The media discourse is mainly formulated around the three controversial structural elements of the state’s migration security:

- (Lack of) capacity to govern migration flows
- The socio-economic utility of labour migration
- Protection of human rights (citizens against the risks of illegal migration / migrants).

A consolidated diagram is presented below of all the selected publications from the mass media in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, with the priority areas on the theme of migration.

Figure 9: Thematic spectrum of selected publications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to education for children of migrants</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return migration</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charity from migrants</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration as the path to a dream</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalization of migrants</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration as a cause of maternal mortality</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime among migrants</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irresponsible and unscrupulous migrants</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims of crime</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration policy, situation overview</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability of migrants' children</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural events linked to migration</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accidents affecting female migrants</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims of discrimination and violence</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims of sexual and labour exploitation / trafficking</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance, services to migrants and their families</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is no significant difference in the media discourse in the source countries, but just a more specific focus on the negative patterns of female migration. Thus, the most frequent themes addressed in the selected media in Tajikistan are: 1) human trafficking (victims of sexual and labour exploitation), 2) information and services for migrants and their families, 3) vulnerability of children of migrants, 4) life in migration and the fate of migrants, and 5) migration as the path to a dream. The top five themes in the selected publications in the Kyrgyz media are: 1) life in migration and the fate of migrants, 2)
information and services for migrants and their families, 3) trafficking in persons (victims of sexual and labour exploitation), 4) victims of discrimination and violence, and 5) crime among migrants.

Migrants themselves and members of their families more often speak about the risks of not being liked by employers and not being paid for their work, about the risks of violence from law enforcement bodies or xenophobic groups in foreign countries, of being tricked by compatriots or other interlocutors when in search of housing or work, of potentially falling ill, of not achieving their migration goals, or of problems in family relations. Migrant women often said that they worry about their relationships with their families and their children (they speak of a constant feeling of guilt and inability to change their children’s destiny), and about possibilities for reintegration in their homeland.

The mass media can also greatly influence the integration possibilities of foreign citizens who have already entered the country - migrant workers or students, for example – by bringing to prominence the issue of danger of migration of certain groups of migrants (ethnic, regional, confessional, and so on), which causes “fine-tuning” by potential landlords and employers in the destination country against migrants. Thus, in practice, the withdrawal of housing can become a real problem, as well as a selection criterion preventing certain types and strategies of migration and migrants (for example the departure of Tajik women as labour migrants, and the departure and cohabitation of migrant spouses or migrants with children).

Issues of protection of human (migrant) rights are presented asymmetrically in the public discourses of sending and receiving countries: in sending countries it is a relatively popular discourse, while in receiving countries it is extremely rare, although in Russian federal legislation a significant number of laws and regulations, including the Constitution (part 2, article 17 and part 1, article 19) and federal laws contain norms for the protection of migrants’ rights. However, in sending countries, these regulations tend to be concerned, not so much with the migrant himself, but with the pragmatic benefits of that person’s migration and the lowering of risk on that person’s return. Although it is precisely these goals that have forced the governments of the two countries – Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – to work actively in the last few years on issues affecting the vital interests of labour migrants, including health insurance and pensions. For Kyrgyz migrant workers, the prospect of a joint pension insurance agreement for the EAEU countries seems more realistic, although here drafts of this strategically important document have been being discussed since 2013. Diplomats and the Government of Tajikistan are working in the same direction, but so far their draft agreement has not received support from the Russian side. In the meantime, the realities of the lives of migrants differ significantly from the standards, and each new change in policy can aggravate observance of the rights of migrants.

1. Violations of migrant rights:
   - The rights to work, to an eight-hour working day, to fair working conditions, to equal pay for work of equal value and so on. As a rule, labour migrants are at risk of delayed payment or of not being paid in full, being forced into long working days and working weeks without days off, being forced to work without the right to time off for illness, and also suffering psychological violence, insults of their honour and dignity, and also sexual harassment or violence at work and in public places.

2. Violations of the personal rights and freedoms of labour migrants
   - The right to inviolability of the person, the right to justice. In reality, labour migrants experience constant violence from police officers / Federal Migration Service employees in the forms of detention without grounds; demands for corrupt payments and illegal confiscation of money and valuables; illegal placement in places of deprivation of liberty, including of migrant children; organization of “fast-track” group trials and deportation; and expulsion of children separately from their parents.

   - The right to life. Labour migrants risk suffering physical violence or threats of physical violence from organized groups of local residents, and this can lead to permanent injury or even death. Despite the actualization of media discourse on the rights of migrants and their protection by human rights defenders and NGOs, this component of migration infrastructure has not significantly developed. It is noteworthy that there is no government involvement in humanitarian infrastructure. In this regard, discussion of the so-called ethnic enclaves in Russia is symptomatic: this is a media dispute over a “Tajik” village in Tula region and the “Kyrgyz” village of Ala-Too in Tver region, which is not even built yet. Media channels provide diametrically opposed positions, speaking on the one hand of the inevitable stage of “solidarity” of ethnic
minorities and on the other hand recognizing the benefits of collective forms of adaptation to a foreign cultural environment. The position of the Russian government (or at least local officials) is visible in its actions and inaction. But the governments of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are not seen protecting the rights of landowners and right to housing in Russia. All these practices contribute to (lack of) trust towards various actors in sending and receiving countries, and reproduce the labour migrant as “appropriate” and safe.

The focus groups revealed that experience and opinions about the role of state bodies in addressing violations of the rights of migrants varies. One respondent from Tajikistan believes that where the rights of labour migrants are being violated government representatives and civic activists can provide real assistance, but that migrants simply lacked information about how to find them. “There is a place there like an Embassy. You go there, and our representatives are working there. One of them was called Karomat Sharipov. I went there. I put the documents together there, with Karomat Sharipov. My son knew a lot. He was accepted there in his second year of medical school. After four months of study, my son was deported - they deported a student. I was worried to death. We paid a lot of money for his studies. An acquaintance gave me Karomat Sharipov’s number. What I’m saying is that all people should know their rights: I went to him twice. They provided me with a lawyer and advocate, and I annulled the deportation of my son. He is now studying there. Many of our compatriots are illiterate. They shouldn’t sit with arms folded after deportation: they need to fight for their rights. They can help us in the Embassy of Tajikistan in Russia. Our Tajiks don’t know about such places.”

Among Kyrgyzstani respondents there was not even a single mention of a case in which state structures or non-governmental organizations and civic activists provided assistance to protect their rights; while not one respondent gave a favourable assessment of the activities of embassies, consulates or diasporas:

Participant 9: “They can not pay you. For two or three months they exploit you, and then do not give a salary.”

Participant 5: “For example, I worked with my husband almost a year. Three hundred thousand roubles – wages for 10 months – we could not get it. We wrote to our Embassy on the Internet. No answer. No help either.”

2.5. CULTURAL (COMPONENTS OF) INFRASTRUCTURE

The effect of cultural infrastructure on the behaviour strategies of labour migrants is particularly gender-differentiated: this is probably due to degree to which a traditional gender regime is anchored in the cultural system. Dominant ideas about the gender roles of women and men “push” or hold back certain categories of the population who do not conform to “normative gender standards”. For example, cultural attitudes and perceptions of the “intrinsic value” of a married economically passive life for a woman in the traditional cultures of Kyrgyz and Tajik societies practically drive widowed and divorced women, women not married by the age of 30, and other categories of “unsettled” women and girls, away from Tajikistan as labour migrants: such cases can be interpreted as an alternative survival strategy.

The instrumental value of children in families, especially girls, also leads to practices of forced labour migration as a survival strategy or a way to improve the family’s economic and social status. In Kyrgyz society, a phenomenon appeared that describes such a “push” through the phenomenon of #eldin kyzdary. The most frequent problems faced by labour migrants are associated with the unfairness of employers, hard working conditions and labour exploitation, the lack of a supportive environment for family migration and migration of women (including gender-differentiated practices of renting-letting). Despite the existing problem of Russian language proficiency, most respondents did not mention issues of training and testing, and only once in focus groups did complaints arise about the non-recognition of vocational education diplomas issued in Tajikistan. The rationality of such perceptions becomes understandable given the range of jobs on offer that do not require specific qualifications or knowledge, and also in light of the ability to perform unskilled work without knowledge of the Russian language. At the same time, during in-depth interviews (interviews for case studies in the Kyrgyz Republic and with an expert in Tajikistan), an important trend emerged reflecting the adaptation and adaptability of labour migrants to the cultural environment of the destination country.

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70 Focus group, Penjikent, women on the re-entry banned list
71 Focus group, Kant, single women and girls who worked as migrants
72 For more on this phenomenon and forced labour migration of girls from the Kyrgyz Republic, see the section on social capital and migration.
CHAPTER 3. THE SOCIAL CAPITAL OF MIGRANTS

In recent years, views on labour migration from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have remained largely unchanged. Generally, the main “class” of modern labour migrants is characterized as young rural men and women with low educational attainment and without experience of living outside their family and village community. If this is fair, the following questions are important: how and using which resources can migrant workers adapt to changing conditions and cultural environments in migration? With whom, and how, do they interact before, during and after migration, and which values support and reproduce this interaction? What do migrant workers themselves bring to this interaction (relationships and links), and what are the benefits or costs expected of and elicited from them? And finally, how do the gender, age, nationality, educational attainment and other characteristics of a labour migrant affect the volume and quality of resources received, as well as other benefits of interaction, and their obligations to maintain interaction? To answer these questions, the research attempted to study the impact of the migrants’ social capital on their own lives, and on the lives of their families and communities.

Without any pretence of participating in academic discussions about the concept of social capital, this research understands this term as the sum of the following:

• social networks / ties: that is, the circles of interaction and support available for labour migrants
• the information and assistance that labour migrants (including potential migrants) receive through their social connections
• the ability of migrant workers to secure advantages for themselves, the benefits of membership in social networks
• norms of reciprocity and trust that promote reproduction of the labour migrant’s social ties.

3.1. SOCIAL NETWORKS, BEFORE, DURING AND FOLLOWING MIGRATION

The world of girls and women in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan before migration is very much “tied up with” the family and the local community, and is often limited by them. As noted in an article on gender relations in the Tajik family by Russian scholar A. Temkina, the structures that organize the lives of women and men in Tajikistan are consistently patriarchal, including gender segregation of adolescents and children, the arranging of marriage by the older generation, and strict control over women by elders and men. The validity and relevance of the findings of Temkina’s study, conducted 14 years ago, are confirmed by ADB’s 2016 Country Gender Assessment for Tajikistan which maintained that “despite changes in gender roles in migrant families, there is no doubt that most authority in the household remains in the hands of men.”

The Gender in Society Perception Study in Kyrgyzstan in 2016 gives evidence of significant socio-economic inequality between urban and rural women and girls, and of a high proportion of households in which traditional gender norms dominate.

The respondents to our research frequently highlighted the deficit of their own power in their families, acknowledging that they could not independently make decisions about their future and, in particular, about migration out of the country. As one of the focus group respondents in Osh city (wives of husbands who...
left as migrants) said: “If [a woman] is married, then her husband decides; if she is not yet married her parents are responsible for her and decide if she should go or not.”

The attitudes of parents towards children, especially their daughters, is clearly instrumental in Kyrgyz society: the respondents repeatedly voiced the opinion that it is more pragmatic to send daughters than sons as migrants, because girls are more patient, hardworking and willing to make sacrifices for the family than boys. In support of this thesis of the instrumental value of daughters in the Kyrgyzstani research sample, some young unmarried respondents stated that either their parents had been indebted and decided that their daughter should go to work abroad, or that the girl herself – seeing her parents’ material difficulties – had taken the initiative and with her parents’ consent gone abroad as a labour migrant. In general, in 12 of the 20 focus groups in Kyrgyzstan, parents taking out bank loans and being unable to repay them was given as the reason for young daughters to seek work abroad. Based on the contributions of young respondents, this “readiness” of girls to serve the interests of their parents and family is the result of special socialization, and construction by parents of a discourse of service to parents. There is a pedagogical communication device particular: to this discourse of service: “#eldin baldary”.78 One girl admitted that her mother cited the example of “#eldin kyzdary” (someone’s daughters) more than once, that is, of girls who migrated so that their parents could afford to pay for repairs to their house and car; and who also successfully married.79

The “#eldin baldary” meme merged into a very controversial public discourse on migration in the Kyrgyz Republic: a “message” about the costs of labour migration – especially for girls and women – is dominant in media discourse. This part of media discourse has become the basis for the stigmatization of women returning from labour migration (the level of stigma is inversely proportional to the woman’s age). On the other hand, the mass character of women’s migration normalizes it in public consciousness, and this is reflected in examples in the media of the positive impact of a woman’s migration on the development of herself, her family and her community.

Research has shown that value-based attitudes towards girls in Tajik families and evaluation of their potential as earners outside the country have differed significantly from those in Kyrgyz families.80 In Tajik society migration of women is widely regarded as a purely negative phenomenon. Only the right of divorced and widowed women to travel as migrants is culturally recognized, as they have lost their breadwinner. As for girls and unmarried women, they themselves and their families, however difficult the economic situation, rarely consider migration as an option to resolve the problem. For example, one of the respondents from Bokhtar district stated that she often had nothing to eat and nowhere to sleep, because as an orphan she did not have her own house but flitted from relative to relative performing household labour in exchange for shelter. But neither uncles nor aunts wanted to accommodate her in the long term, despite her contribution through labour to their households. At the same time she could not take a decision to migrate without the risk of spoiling her reputation, because in the society there is a deeply held belief that unmarried women who travel as unaccompanied migrants are exclusively doing so to perform sex work. Decisions are made about labour mobility or immobility of girls and young women on the basis of norms of morality and concerns about reputation (especially based on gender stereotypes) rather than on pragmatic arguments. However, as noted by both the interviewed experts and the participants themselves, this approach is not characteristic of all regions. For example, the capital and Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast are presented as having more liberal values under which migration for study and work of girls and young women is more widespread, and female migration does not always have negative connotations, with migration to study often seen as part of achieving a gender ideal.

The migration strategies of girls and young women from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are different: the former can go alone, with relatives, female friends and acquaintances, while Tajik females migrate exclusively when accompanied by parents (mother or mother and father), or close relatives (brothers or older married

78 #eldin baldary (literally: children of other people) is a meme born in social networks and designating the main approach when raising children in a Kyrgyz family when parents. It has the aim of influencing the behaviour of children, comparing them to certain mythical children who succeed in everything, and bring only good, pride and joy to the family and envy to others. For more, see https://ru.sputnik.kg/columnists/20160524/1025613318.html
79 Chui focus group, single women and girls who have been abroad as migrants and worked.
80 This statement does not mean that girls are treated less as instruments or seen as valuable in Tajikistan. In fact, children in Tajikistan are also valued as tools to guarantee care for parents in the future. This is in particular indirectly evidenced by data on the problem of child labour in Tajikistan. For example, the 2013 Child Labour Survey states that about 500,000 children, or 23 per cent of children aged 5-17, were involved in child labour, although expectations and attitudes are gendered (there are expectations from the son, while the daughter is perceived as unable to assist parents in old age and illness, because they leave the family in marriage. For more details, see United Nations in Tajikistan, Annual Report on UNDAF Results, 2016.
sisters with their families). More distant ties are not considered “guarantors” for preserving the honour and reputation of Tajik girls, and are not recognized by the community as legitimate.

As migrants, girls and women from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan generally end up in distinct ethnic spheres, in which social capital is reproduced through various mechanisms.81

- expectations of support from “one’s own” group (“feeling of belonging”), which influence the behaviour of the labour migrant and strengthen group norms and values
- the consequences of having social capital — in the form of privileged access to information and other resources
- social networks – the context of resources and influence.

Analysis of these networks helps to define types of social capital: (1) **linking** members of the network with a common identity who see each other as similar (for example, strong family ties based on trust and reciprocity); and (2) **bridging** people who recognize their dissimilarity of status or identity.82

Life in migration allows labour migrants to combine linking and connecting social capital, through the reproduction of communication, interaction with their own ethnic group and establishing contacts and interaction with the ethnic groups of the host society. Generalized statements from respondents to the focus groups and interviewed experts on the changes in the nature and quality of interaction with “their own” and “other” groups, as well as the resources obtained from such interaction, are summarized in the table below.83

**Table 4:** Views of respondents on changes to social capital given the experience of labour migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Linking social capital</strong></th>
<th><strong>Bridging social capital</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic contacts with the homeland</strong></td>
<td><strong>Participation in activities / organizations of ethnic groups as migrants</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The family always supports – the home ties of migrants are strong if they have parents and birth sisters</td>
<td>Regionalism and tribalism in social networks: systematic “activities” organized for network members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative price of migration</td>
<td>Ethnic marriage market in migration can be advantageous for the family / lead to loss of women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic marriage</td>
<td>Forced migration of men and the reason for leaving as migrants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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83 The appendix provides a table containing all the citations from the focus group discussions and interviews in which the respondents characterize the categories of relations presented.
For the respondents, “one’s own group” primarily signifies the family environment: often after leaving as migrants, communication with the motherland is reduced to just the family circle. Respondents assess interaction in this network variably, distinguishing between positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, most respondents especially stressed the fact that the family constitutes a special migration infrastructure: if parents or close relatives do not take responsibility for looking after children, if they did not support the initiative to travel, then most of the women would not have been able to migrate. For example, when leaving their children with grandparents, labour migrants are sure that the children will not be deprived of love and care: “When I’m in Russia, my parents will do anything for my children.”

An interesting gender aspect was revealed in discussions with respondents from Kyrgyzstan. They maintained that getting married in the homeland is the motive for many young men to leave as labour migrants. In a peculiar and paradoxical way, this legitimizes the strategy of leaving the family, according to our respondents from Jalalabad and Osh.

Just having close relatives in migration was the reason many respondents to migrate for work. As one of the respondents said: “Two of my sisters were working there. They called and said there is a good job: can you come? We will not find you hard work. We will look after you, you’ll work.’ I said: ‘How can I go?’ They said: ‘Come, the conditions are good here.’ They said that my life would improve. In fact, I left, and life has improved a lot. I solved all my problems.” The same experience was voiced by another respondent: “My brother [went] first, in 2010. He worked for two years and said: ‘There is work here, you can earn – come.’ I went and worked well. But there is trust there, it’s your own blood, he will not deceive you, not leave you on the street. I was sure he would meet me and arrange things.”

The respondents particularly value the emotional component of family ties. Participant 1: “The attitude towards relatives and parents changes. That is, if you leave here, you feel sort of mischievous; you return and understand the value of your relationship with them. The fact that they are not far away. They cannot be replaced. Your attitudes to others change.” Participant 6: “When we come to Kyrgyzstan, we understand what it’s worth. Even our native water is more precious: we miss our water. And our parents. Our patterns of thought change.”

Particularly important for respondents is the role of the family in multiplying the results of migrant labour, and the family’s contribution to rational use of transfers in the interests of the respondent herself. “Find that person who will start building a house in your absence and that person is a brother, or a father-in-law and mother-in-law”; “I sent them money, but they did not even spend it, they did not take anything for themselves. My father built my house. I thought I was helping them, and they said that they were living better, and when I returned my house was built.”

Often, respondents’ assessments coincide with stereotypical expectations about “norms” of family relations. Thus, most often the respondent’s “own” parents appear as disinterested and unconditionally loving, sacrificial people who put their daughter’s interests above their own, while “his” (the spouse’s) parents on the contrary are mercantile, unfair, and not interested in taking into account the needs of the migrant girl, their daughter-in-law who is earning money for their family. Only a single respondent portrayed her mother-in-law, father-in-law and other close relatives of her husband as loving and caring, really “family”: “The children cried on the phone, my mother-in-law was like my mother, she even cried every time and asked me to come back. My husband said that she was my mother, not his. Look, she’s so upset for you, but not bothered about me at all. The children’s hearts were melting every time.”

At the same time, migration has a negative effect on family networks and the frequency and intensity of interaction, and trust may gradually be lost in these networks. For example, several respondents acknowledged that their relationships with their families had become more distant, given that not being able to participate in significant family events separated the family from the labour migrant and vice versa. “I am already distant from my parents. When you become distant, you become like an outsider. Not an outsider, but not so close, because you are far away and for a long time.”

84 Focus group, Gafurov, single women
85 Focus group, Penjikent, women on the re-entry banned list
86 Focus group, Kant, women and girls who worked as migrants
87 Focus group, Kant, women and girls who worked as migrants
88 Focus group, Gafurov, single women
89 Focus Group, Kuntuu village 5

Report: “THE FRAGILE POWER OF MIGRATION: the needs and rights of women and girls from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan who are affected by migration, 2018”
According to the respondents, in the societies of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan discussion of two key aspects of the negative impact of labour migration on family relations (the increased number of divorces and the increased number of emotionally deprived children) reflects only the tip of the iceberg (see Figure 10). In fact, these consequences have multiple impacts on both family members and broader community groups. Thus, remittances sent by respondents can lead to a feeling of dependency in the family, while family members may not understand the value of the money earned by migrant labour and start competing in the community to organize traditional toi or aasher\textsuperscript{90}: this can lead to frustration among the migrants themselves and a gradual reduction in the amount of money sent.

**Figure 10:** The iceberg of negative consequences of labour migration for the women of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

Leaving as a labour migrant makes it impossible to participate actively and intensively in the life of the family and other relatives, and in the life of the community at home. Some respondents found this restriction particularly difficult for them: Participant 7: *"I did not attend my mother’s funeral because I had to work as a migrant. We weren’t at my father’s funeral either."

To a certain extent, digital technologies – especially mobile phones, as well as messengers such as WhatsApp, IMO, and possibly Skype – are a “substitute” for participating in family life for migrant workers. Through these communication channels, male migrant workers from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are given opportunities to monitor the behaviour and lifestyle of wives and children left in their home country. This was particularly discussed in the focus groups in Tajikistan, where respondents spoke in general about the negative role of phones in divorces. For example, one respondent believes: *"If one of the husband’s relatives sees, they immediately report: ‘I saw your sister-in-law in such a place, with such and such a person.’ They already tell him by phone that his wife does this. Then, in a fit of anger, without investigating, he divorces her."

In migration, alternative forms of participation and “one’s own” group are created, as sources of social capital. For example, it can be “one’s own” clan group, consisting of people from the same region / clan, and they are included in networks of interaction and mutual support, conducting joint events of various kinds: “Yes, the Uratubinskiys are related to the Uratubinskiys. They give their daughters in marriage, and marry off their sons. They have weddings there.”\textsuperscript{93}

\textsuperscript{90} A Toy is a large feast for the Kyrgyz in connection with family events (weddings, significant dates, etc.). Ash is the mandatory wake for the dead.

\textsuperscript{91} Hissar and Yavan, wives of migrants

\textsuperscript{92} Focus group, Penjikent, re-entry banned women

\textsuperscript{93} Focus group, Istraravshan, wives of migrants
Constructed networks may not be as strong and close. The existence of Kyrgyz cafes, for example, broadens and loosens the "us" group, and the resulting links do not have the same force as networks of relatives in their homeland. For example, one of the older respondents complained that because of migration, in large cities of Russia it is not possible to influence the behaviour of young women and girls: they do not follow the norms of traditional morality and do not listen to the advice of their elders: "There are already lots of Kyrgyz cafes (belonging to Kyrgyz), young girls dressed up all the time sitting there with men, having fun. You could go every day and see them every time." 94 However, three to five years ago, groups of male migrants turned the "weak" ties of the community into a strong relationship of ethnic control, power and violence against women. 95 Our respondents also discussed this: "Some guys deceive girls. They ask to borrow 2,000-3,000 and do not return it. They promise to marry, run around and then marry someone else. And people from other nations treat girls differently. They drive girls to cafes, give our girls gifts that they like. So our guys don’t like them. There was a case when I worked there. A girl was working and went with an Azeri to a Kyrgyz cafe. They became jealous of the Azeri, beat him up and raped the girl. They told her: 'What: are Kyrgyz not enough for you — why are you walking with other nations?' Then they killed the Azeri, and they were all sent to prison. And others went and threatened: 'We will find her and kill her, she put so many of our countrymen in jail.' And if you think about it: our guys themselves were to blame." 96

Interaction with "one’s own" ethnic group during migration is generally criticized in all regions, and in both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan women talked about the unreliability of ethnic networks on documentation issues, saying that they are largely commercialized and based on deception: "You pay for the services: there are people — Uzbeks or Tajiks — who present themselves as the managers of this company or from this store, but they are also migrants, they don’t even have citizenship, so they help, and they take money for it. They will say at the beginning [how much to pay]." 97 "You fly into Moscow and they give you a migration card, and within seven days you go to the Federal Migration Service. There is an intermediary, who can trick you as well, and make money out of it. Usually everyone does that: we arrive, give money, and they trick us. It’s easier that way. But when you go yourself, you are running around when you should already be at work, you have no money. Kyrgyz trick other Kyrgyz, in short [laughs]." 98

Ethnic networks are still very effective at providing assistance with finding homes or providing short-term places to stay, as well as finding jobs: "... in Moscow I lived at first with relatives: they already have their own homes here, they long since moved here for good. I lived with them for a long time, almost a year. Then it was time for me to move on, already they were not concealing that they didn’t want me there." 99 "Some have property, rent out flats. For example, relatives help, brothers help each other until they find a place to live." 100 "They go to the market. There are lots of Tajiks. They say ‘we need this and that’." 101

Several migrants testified to the unreliability of traditional networks: "My husband’s relatives were cheated: his neighbour made an agreement with his brother that he would look after his livestock, and in return he promised to take the younger brother with him to Russia, and find him work there. He agreed, took him to Moscow, and in the airport he said that he had only agreed to take him as far as the airport, and then he left him there. He didn’t know Russian and had no relatives in Russia, and no telephone so he couldn’t call anyone. So he slept for several nights at the airport, and then at a rubbish dump." 102

In every focus group without fail there were people who stated that migration had radically changed the traditional networks of relations of Kyrgyz or Tajiks and that "there" you shouldn’t trust anyone, that the migrant has to take care of herself/himself, and should not expect relatives or acquaintances to come and help out in difficult situations.

Among Kyrgyz respondents there was not even a single mention of a case in which state structures or non-governmental organizations and civic activists provided assistance to protect their rights; while not one respondent gave a favourable assessment of the activities of embassies, consulates or diasporas

94 Focus group, Jalalabad, women and girls who migrated with their husbands / relatives but did not work
95 Ibraeva G., Moldosheva A., Ablezova M. “We will kill you and we will be acquitted!” — critical discourse analysis of a media case of violence against female migrants from Kyrgyzstan", Kruessmann, Thomas, (editor.) Women in Modern Central Asia Zurich : Lit Verlag, 2015
96 Focus group, Jalalabad, single women and girls who had been migrants and had worked
97 Focus group, Rasulov, women migrants
98 Focus group, Karaj, single women and girls who worked as migrants
99 Focus group, Bishkek, wives of migrants
100 Focus group, Penjikent, women on re-entry ban list
101 Focus group, Gafurov, single women
102 Focus group, Kulyab, wives of migrants
either. Participant 9: They can fail to pay salaries. They exploit you for two or three months and then not pay the salary. Participant 5: My husband and I, for example, worked for almost a year. Three hundred thousand roubles - salary for 10 months – we could not get it. We wrote to our Embassy on the Internet. There was no answer, and no help either.”

“You cannot even get into the embassy: there are huge queues... But in Russia there are diasporas as well. You will go there: they will not help you, they will also be rude. I saw so many, they make you upset, cry. In short, they do not need anything at all. Help will not be provided, but they will take money. In short, Kyrgyzstan’s diasporas are useless. On the contrary, we give money to the diasporas.”

Research into the specifics of unifying social capital reveals that:

- contacts with the host population are generally discriminatory, limited and often associated with corruption. In addition to direct discriminatory practices – such as insulting nicknames from colleagues and management, unequal valuing of migrant labour in the workplace, extortion and violation of the legal rights of migrants to pay – there are also symbolic forms of violence: a ban on communication in the migrant’s mother tongue in a public space, the giving of Russian names to migrants for the convenience of the local population, and so on
- interaction with the host population is never clear cut: even when there are legitimate reasons for receiving services and assistance. In official structures everything depends on the individual and the degree of subjective tolerance to the multicultural aspect of labour migration
- labour migrants are almost never included in the activities of the surrounding host population, except for limited forms of imitating the behaviour of the host population. One of the objective barriers is the lack of competence in the language of the host population
- individual migrants who manage to integrate into the host community tend to completely abandon their previous ties and lifestyle
- at the same time, there are several pieces of evidence of disinterested help and kind-hearted behaviour by citizens of the host country towards persons finding themselves in difficult circumstances.

3.2. MARRIAGE AND MARITAL STRATEGIES. DIVORCE

Though there are no precise statistics about illegal immigrants in Russia or Kazakhstan, expert estimates put the figure at between 3 and 15 million persons. According to the Russian Federal State Statistics Service, at the end of 2012 of five million foreigners working in Russia, four million were illegal. Moreover, this scale of illegal labour migration is far from exceptional in destination countries, and it is typical globally that the younger and more active sections of a given population - men and women of reproductive age – engage in labour migration.

Having such large numbers of people in the destination countries leads to various types of marriage strategy, and formats of family life and household organization are diverse.

The documentary film “Tajikistan’s Missing Men”, filmed by Al Jazeera in 2013, provides the following statistic: about a million people have left Tajikistan to work in neighbouring countries, and a third of these have migrated permanently. Every year, 14,000 Tajik men create families in Russia, despite the fact that 80 per cent of those emigrating are married. In Tajikistan there is now a set phrase “abandoned wives”, which highlights a new group who have become vulnerable as a result of migration.

In the opinion of respondents, the most profound effect of labour migration from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan has been on the institution of the family and marital relations in these countries. The Gender in Society Focus group, Kant, single women and girls who worked as migrants 104 Mukomel, 2012, p.6 105 The number of migrants in Europe in 2016 was more than 1,800,000, and 1,100,000 people were given asylum seeker status. In Kazakhstan’s labour market there are between 500,000 and one million undocumented labour migrants. South Korean academics have estimated that in total up to 250,000 illegal migrants are living in the small territory of their country, including about 7,000 from Uzbekistan (Kil-Sang Yoo 2008: 303). Thousands of people also leave the Russian Federation as labour migrants or for permanent residence abroad. According to the Stratfor analytical company, there were record numbers in 2015: about 350,000 people left the country in search of better lives. http://emigranto.ru/spravochnaya/emigraciya/migranty-v-evrope.html 106 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EOLvWEk5LgE
The most important problem is that when of, or even a precondition for, migration. marriage. Nevertheless, in the case of the Kyrgyz population, marriage... in fact can be seen as a consequence

This may seem paradoxical, as a more expected consequence of solid migration plans would be deferring likelihood that the respondent will answer a question about possible marriage in the next two years positively.

Changes to marital and reproductive behaviour among citizens of Kyrgyzstan are linked to the behaviour and context of migration, conclude the authors of a report. "The most important problem is that when divorce occurs, property acquired in common is divided in half. In Turkey, for example, the woman receives everything on divorce. Men are afraid to divorce, so I like their law. It is right. If he goes to another woman, he leaves without anything, he will not get any property: he will be left on the street. Here our women need this kind of support. But our men are free, oh, I want to live with her, go wherever."

Changes in certain demographic indicators in these countries suggest that there have been changes in marital and family-reproductive models of behaviour. A sociological survey conducted in Tajikistan in 2014 among Tajik migrants revealed that 9 per cent of Tajik labour migrants in Russia have suffered from sexually transmitted diseases in the past three years, and of these, in more than 11 per cent of cases venereal diseases have been diagnosed among members of their families in Tajikistan. According to a survey of labour migrants in Russia, 38 per cent had recently visited a doctor with reproductive health problems. Their spouses in Tajikistan were for their part less likely - at 23 per cent of respondents in this category - to seek medical services for reproductive health. The researchers believe that "these facts indicate the topicality of the issue of reproductive health for labour migrants from Tajikistan and the changing sexual behaviour of migrants."

Changes to marital and reproductive behaviour among citizens of Kyrgyzstan are linked to the behaviour and context of migration, conclude the authors of a report. "...Having a desire to migrate increases the likelihood that the respondent will answer a question about possible marriage in the next two years positively. This may seem paradoxical, as a more expected consequence of solid migration plans would be deferring marriage. Nevertheless, in the case of the Kyrgyz population, marriage... in fact can be seen as a consequence of, or even a precondition for, migration." That is, for young men – particularly from rural areas, marriage

Perception Study in Kyrgyzstan in 2016 revealed that women and men returning from labour migration face similar problems in most cases: health deterioration, difficulties finding work, distance from children, and worsening relations with their spouses. Women and men who return from migration equally often face worsened relations with their spouses, as well as psychological problems. It is noteworthy that 67.5 per cent of women believe that migration worsens relations in the family. According to subjective assessments in focus groups and expert interviews, long-term migration inevitably leads to disintegration of the family, and the divorce rate is very high. It is not feasible to judge the level of divorces realistically, as the high proportion of unregistered marriages makes it impossible to track divorces in these cases.

In both labour migrant sending countries, the issue of divorce in connection with migration is in the foreground of public consciousness, and the states concerned are trying to combat the phenomenon. The main reason for divorce is family violence. This is revealed in the study “Violence in the family: who is at fault? The family, the aggressor or society?” The survey revealed that 42 per cent blamed the family, 32.7 per cent the aggressor and 12.2 per cent society.

The focus group respondents believed that the relationship between spouses who are separated by migration is not only influenced by the distance in daily lives, but also by close relatives and acquaintances of the men, particularly their mothers. Many examples were given in the focus group of cases in which there was no lack of understanding between the couple, but where the mother-in-law in question was nevertheless not satisfied with the bride and insisted on divorce. “Our neighbours. The husband left for Russia and she herself had been married a month, and weeks had not passed since her husband left. During this period a disagreement arose between the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law. Her mother-in-law called her son and told him to send away his wife (talok), and he agreed.”

The vast majority of respondents believe that initiatives to divorce usually come from the side of the husband and his close relatives, and are connected with their understanding that a woman can simply be kicked out with nothing after many years of her service to her family. Husbands without official marriage registration are particularly bold in this respect. One of the respondents at the Chui focus group noted that women’s vulnerability in divorce is normative in nature: "The most important problem is that when divorce occurs, property acquired in common is divided in half. In Turkey, for example, the woman receives everything on divorce. Men are afraid to divorce, so I like their law. It is right. If he goes to another woman, he leaves without anything, he will not get any property: he will be left on the street. Here our women need this kind of support. But our men are free, oh, I want to live with her, go wherever."

Changes to marital and reproductive behaviour among citizens of Kyrgyzstan are linked to the behaviour and context of migration, conclude the authors of a report. “...Having a desire to migrate increases the likelihood that the respondent will answer a question about possible marriage in the next two years positively. This may seem paradoxical, as a more expected consequence of solid migration plans would be deferring marriage. Nevertheless, in the case of the Kyrgyz population, marriage... in fact can be seen as a consequence of, or even a precondition for, migration.” That is, for young men – particularly from rural areas, marriage.

Report: “THE FRAGILE POWER OF MIGRATION: the needs and rights of women and girls from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan who are affected by migration, 2018”
plays a significant role in the initiation and acquisition of the right to leave as labour migrants. Often this is also linked to the pragmatic motive of acquiring labour – a young woman – in the household during the period when the man is away as a labour migrant.

One of the important aspects of marriage and family relations is the indicator of early marriages and early motherhood. Since 2006, there has been a steady increase in the birth rate among girls aged 15-17: from 4.4 children per 1,000 girls of this age in 2006 to 7.4 per 1,000 in 2014. The birth rate among women in the 18-19 age group is also increasing: from 75.5 children per 1,000 in 2010 to 92.7 in 2014. According to the 2014 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey in 2014, approximately 12.7 per cent of women in Kyrgyzstan aged between 20 and 49 married before they reached adulthood. The Gender in Society Perception Study\textsuperscript{114} established that there are several reasons for the growth of the number of marriages, such as: the desire of the girls themselves (23 per cent), increased poverty and the desire of the family to marry off the girl as early as possible (18 per cent), early sexual activity of young people (17 per cent), the growing influence of Islam and other religions that allow girls to marry at an early age (16 per cent), as well as an increased number of cases of abduction of minors for marriage (11 per cent).

In the opinion of study respondents in both countries, another important reason for early marriage is a prevalent belief among men concerning the short duration of chastity in women, fuelled by discourse on the “depravity” of girls and women involved in migration.

Assessing their personal experience of migration, the respondents identified several types of marriage strategy for men and women in migration, and presented their views on the reasons for these models. The opinions expressed by the respondents in focus group discussions about marriages and marriage strategies of migrants are presented pictorially in Figure 11:

\textbf{Figure 11:} Marital strategies actively used by study respondents

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{marriage_strategies.png}
\caption{Marital strategies actively used by study respondents}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{114} http://kyrgyzstan.unfpa.org/en/publications/gender-society-perception-study

Chapter 3. The social capital of migrants
As can be seen from the diagram, most of the respondents noted ongoing social changes in the traditional societies of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Of these, several are crucial for marital relations and behaviour patterns in the societies of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: young women and girls in migration acquire economic independence, and can make independent decisions about marriage and marriage partners. Thus, women from Gorno Badakhshan stated: “Young people decide about marriage, then they ask permission from their parents, and send money to the parents so that they too can go to Russia, if the wedding is there.”

In Kyrgyzstan, labour migration has led to an increase in the prevalence of inter-regional marriages: this is also linked to increasingly independent decision making by young people as regards marrying and starting families.

In families in which the young men and women were already married before migration, they often choose different partners during the migration, and do not even hide this, considering these to be “temporary” marriages and “natural”, and to correspond with cultural / Islamic traditions.

Researchers into the transformation of sexual and marital strategies of male labour migrants from Tajikistan to the Russian Federation have reported discovering a variety of practices for satisfying sexual needs: some men prefer turning to prostitutes, while others form more permanent relationships with certain women - a “temporary” or “guest” wife. Patterns of sexuality in these variations differ: calling a “call girl” for the whole male group is popular in order to save money (35 per cent of respondents said that this is how they meet their needs, and even noted that sometimes the employer invites girls for workers as an incentive). Men who have “temporary” wives can live with them or separately, meeting them several times a month. The authors consider the widespread practice of polygamy at home and cultural acceptance of polygamous relations as the reason for the pervasiveness of temporary marriages.

Data from the research on the transformation of sexual and marital strategies among migrants from Tajikistan are also confirmed in Kyrgyz society, where according to the Gender in Society Perception Study, 21 per cent of female respondents considered it acceptable “if a man in a migration creates a second family, provided that he continues to take care of his first family.” Although the authors of the publication consider that guest wives are regarded as temporary under Islamic tradition, quite often this “marriage” leads to the collapse of the “permanent” family and becomes dominant in the labour migrant’s life. Focus group respondents gave testimony about such cases in Tajikistan.

Discussions on the theme of marital strategies in focus groups used the following terms:

- **State registration of marriage: the attitude of respondents and the reasons for not having state registration.** Late state registration or non-registration of marriage is common in both countries and is perceived by respondents as a rational choices for one of two reasons: either the very nature of marriage is contrary to legislation (polygamous marriages, early marriages without judicial permission, and so on), or the spouse and his relatives intend to abstain from legalizing the relationship until they are convinced of the “prospects” of the marriage.

- **Early marriages - the scale, causes and assessment of such marriages.** The range of respondents’ opinions on this included the following aspects: a) avowal of the natural depravity of girls, who are regarded as perishable goods (they start leading dissolute lives early, and even the internet and mobile phones are contributing to development of these inclinations), b) recognition of the fact that a fashion has developed for innocent girls who, unlike those with experience of migration, have not yet experienced the hardships and temptations of life; c) the fears of parents that the daughter would not marry “on time” and could end up as a spinster “because there are more women than men in the country”, d) that single parents are forced to marry their daughters off early to feed the children left behind, and e) acknowledgement of the role of Islamic ideology and dawat missionaries in mosques promoting models of early marriage as being correct from the perspective of Islamic teachings.

- **Marriage and family relations in migration.** Discussions on this topic revealed significant gender specificity and were framed in terms of auto-stereotypes and hetero-stereotypes. In particular, respondents (from both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) noted that in the households of labour migrants, who live in extremely cramped housing conditions with a high density of occupancy, a marital life of...
full-fledged intimacy is practically impossible. Moreover, given the practice of choosing a “home” close to work, some migrant spouses cannot live as married couples and are forced to meet infrequently (once or twice a month). 116 With a few “national” variations, the scenario of “seduction” of “our” girls was also presented. Respondents from Tajikistan testified about the “dishonourable” attitude of men and their relatives to young Tajik girls, whom they officially wooed from a distance, performed nikah with the help of parents and other close relatives, and then “sent for” in Russia. There, after living with them for a short time, they gave a talok divorce, having considered the relationship a trial marriage. In the Kyrgyz variation, usually the man’s relatives are not involved: the men “find” the women through social networks and “invite” them to Russia, promising to help them find work and somewhere to live. On arrival, they tend to offer to live together and in practice develop a common-law marriage.

Fictitious weddings are an important part of marital strategies. Respondents from Tajikistan discussed the prevalence of fictitious marriages among Tajik men with the aim of acquiring Russian citizenship, but discussion of such marriages demonstrated that the borders between fictitious and real marriages is rather unclear. For example, images of a young handsome man who hugs and kisses an ugly old woman, calling her his beloved wife, often featured. Sexual relationships between labour migrants from Tajikistan and Russian women in general were a very common discursive trope, and respondents spoke about the co-habitation of tenant Tajik men and Russian landladies. The argument invariably involved a stereotypical image of such Russian women: “Many landladies are unmarried, or their husbands drink and are powerless in sexual relations and do not fulfil their marital duties, so they are happy to live with our husbands. They can also do all the work around the house.” In the Kyrgyz focus groups, the issue of unequal marriages, which appear to have become “fashionable” among Kyrgyz people in large Russian cities, was raised several times. This refers to young men who cannot or do not want to work hard and earn money by means of heavy migrant labour, preferring to find an adult woman who has already “got up on her feet” and can provide not only for herself and her family, but also for her partner. Such cases were particularly discussed among the younger focus group participants, who strongly condemned such relationships, calling the men lazy shirkers.

Finally, there is a variation of marital relations in migration characteristic of women. Women (less often Tajik, more often Kyrgyz) who found themselves new partners as migrants, who were often of a different ethnicity and citizenship, spoke of a qualitatively new relationship with the man, of respect and beautiful courtship, which they have never seen from their husbands/partners in their homeland. That is, for such categories of labour migrants, migration provided valuable opportunities to expand the national marriage market and chances for family happiness.

• The influence of migration on marriage: respondents’ assessments. In general, migration is considered to be a positive influence in economic terms and extremely negative in the social and cultural fields. The economic aspect of migration’s influence includes obtaining important resources for the family that would not be possible without the income from migration: construction/buying one’s own house or flat; the possibility of paying off large debts (including bank loans); buying cars, furniture and household goods; opportunities for children to receive a professional education in prestigious educational facilities; and opportunities to open one’s “own business” and earn an income in the homeland.

In every focus group (whether citizens of Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan) a similar story was told, in which a woman was able to rise from absolute poverty to become rich and influential in society, and to give her children the chance of being well-provided-for. Such a heroine often resolves marital issues at the same time: after long years she meets a man who loves, appreciates and supports her.

The social and cultural costs of migration are described by respondents in terms of:

a) increased conflict in the family and divorce (the initiators can be both women and men)
b) the appearance of a category of abandoned wives and children, who are struggling with poverty, depression and poor health
c) stigma around women and girls with migration experience, despite their contribution to the household and community economy

116 Participant 2: “Spouses go to work as migrants, but because of the situation they can not live together: it is not possible, so they live separately, and here the pitfalls can begin.” Participant 10: “A woman was working as a dishwasher, and the Azerbaijani head saw her and decided to seduce the married woman. As she and her husband worked different shifts and lived separately, she had a very hard time, having to hide behind cars until her husband came to work.” (Rasulov, women migrants)
3.3. VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES

Discourse on migration is traditionally closely intertwined with discourse of violence: it includes both issues of discrimination and violence against migrants in the host community (including forcible exploitation and nationalist attacks), and violence within ethnic diasporas (including gender-based violence by male migrant workers against female migrant workers from their countries). Meanwhile, the media is currently also discussing violence against migrant children who remained in their homeland without their parents.

Issues of domestic violence concerning migrant workers abroad and other aspects of domestic violence in migration are still being studied less actively, due to its hidden nature and the complexity of gaining access.

During this research, the respondents raised the issue of violence in migration several times, and not just in the context of the workplace, but also in the family. In their opinion, the most vulnerable in the family were — and continue to be — young brides: their daily lives are difficult both in the homeland (after their husbands leave to earn money) and as migrants (if they travel as family members).

Thus, the focus group respondents in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, particularly young ones, said that the daughter-in-law actually lives in slavery in the husband’s family, without psychological support from her husband or other family members: “Most men involved in migration marry to make it easier to live off the rich. They don’t mind that she is older. They marry there, but here their wives become ‘slaves’. I’m not making it up, I’m telling the truth. My son-in-law married my 16-year-old daughter. But now he has another wife in Russia. He comes once a year. He’ll stay one or two months and then leave again. My daughter lives with his parents and does all the work around their house. They have an official marriage certificate. They have two daughters. But she’s no one in their house. Only a maid. The husband’s parents cover up their son’s sins. My daughter is a servant girl, I always tell her, put up with it, for I myself have suffered without a husband.”

Participant 4: “My relationship with my husband did not develop well: they threw me out several times, my husband beat me. Then I became pregnant and gave birth to a baby. He fell ill, his cramps started, and he lost consciousness. In the hospital they told us that they would not be able to cure him: my husband then told me that he did not need a sick child, and such a wife. So, I have been living with my mother for six years already.”

A lot of evidence was provided about the negative role of the mother-in-law in reproducing domestic violence against the daughter-in-law. They often use their symbolic power to set up husbands against their young wives, and to force them to use physical violence as punishment for disobedience or lack of efficiency: “I can tell the story of my niece. Her future husband’s was in Russia, and had been there for two years. We did not know that he was a drug addict. He was 27 years old, and he always demanded that his mother send him money to Russia. There he had a wife and children. They courted my niece, and conducted nikah and an official marriage. They did not tell us. Then we learned that he was a drug addict. There were cases of domestic violence: he beat his wife and periodically left for Russia. My wife stayed with his parents, we often told her that she should put up with it, but he crossed all boundaries, began to beat her with an iron dog chain and a shovel handle.”

117 Focus group, Hissar and Yavan, female migrants
118 Focus group, Gafurov, single women
We realized that he ... that there was no human relationship in the family. Here there was domestic violence and the parents as well: the mother-in-law who poisoned her son, endlessly complaining about their daughter-in-law. He came back from Russia and beat his wife.”

During two focus groups in Tajikistan, older women took the position of supporting the mother-in-law who promoted violence and the expulsion of defenceless young women from her husband’s house. For example, respondents from Khatlon believed that their mother-in-law was right and fair, speaking against the daughter-in-law, and saying that daughters-in-law sometimes ‘deserved punishment’. Participant 2: “Our neighbour, she was living married somewhere for two weeks and was brought home bruised, her husband is here, not in migration. He let her study: she studies in some college. It turns out she talked with her ‘chevalier’ on her friend’s phone. So at first they trust such girls, then, when they find things out, they stop trusting. Of course mum will be right. Why should mum not tell the truth: she’s been your mum all her life, while the wife’s only been with you a year or less?”

One of the experts noted that most young women and girls in Tajikistan dream of being old women. An old woman is like a queen in the family; her children respect her; she commands her daughters-in-law and the success of her sons’ and grandsons’ marriages depend on her.

Traditionally Tajik and Kyrgyz girls, especially in rural areas, are brought up to display patience and not resistance, recognizing the right of the spouse and his parents to punish her for improper behaviour. In a traditional society it is believed that a young woman should not turn to her family for help. However, in a large number of cases, women have nowhere to turn in any case: either they do not have parents at home, their parents are migrants, or they grew up in single parent families, and a single mother is not seen as a full-fledged advocate for the rights of girls. “We suffered a lot of difficulties - without a mother, life is very hard, and our father got married and just left, forgot about us. Already in my husband’s house there were five daughters-in-law, I was the youngest in Chapaev. Chapaev is a little further than Kurgan-Tube, that’s where I was married. It was hard, because there were household problems, they told me - and ‘scythe the grass’. I could not say anything because they would immediately think I was educated and not able to do anything. I said okay: I’ll do it. I was once shown what to do by my husband’s brothers’ wives, and then I did the rest myself. I was always systematic, and sometimes I even wondered if I was doing all these things myself, or maybe someone else is doing it, that’s what I thought [laughs] Yes, when I gave birth to a girl, I was without a mother ... oh I’ve had a hard time, I don’t want to remember and talk about all my problems...”

Violence against the daughter-in-law often reaches its apogee with the process of divorce and her expulsion from her husband’s parents’ home. The husband’s family usually does not want to keep the daughter-in-law and her grandchildren after the divorce, fearing that they will claim part of the family’s property. The problem of “abandoned” wives in Tajikistan is especially difficult because they have nowhere to live after leaving the house of her husband’s parents. Return to the parental home can be impossible, because if they no longer have parents, the families of other relatives, including brothers, are not always ready to accept a woman, particularly with children. But continuing to live with violence in her husband’s house is dangerous.

Sometimes when it is not possible to hide from domestic violence in the husband’s family, the woman runs away from him as a migrant. A respondent from Tajikistan reported two such cases of women living with systematic domestic violence to a focus group. In these cases, migration to Russia was the only opportunity for the women to stop the violence. “Our second daughter, her husband had been drinking for twenty years. We hoped that everything would sort itself out. But every year it got worse. They have three boys. Last year, my daughter filed for divorce. She got a job here. But the son-in-law did not let her work: he went to her workplace and beat her. So she went to Russia, to get further away from him.”

Respondents in a Khatlon focus group spoke about the normalization of domestic violence and recalled several cases, widely reported in the media, in which young brides living with domestic violence had committed suicide and killed their young children. A recent case in Soghd, when a father-in-law killed his daughter-in-law because she appealed to the elders with a request that she, with her children, be given a room to live in with her former husband’s family after the divorce, was also recalled.

119 Focus group, Hissar and Yavan, female migrants
120 Focus group, Asht, carers for migrants’ families

46 Chapter 3. The social capital of migrants
The case studies conducted for this study of women from Tajikistan affected by domestic violence allow us to say that for some groups of women there is a kind of chronic “exclusion” and the status of a totally disenfranchised victim, which are passed down from generation to generation. The fate of these girls and women is to be bound in everyday domestic violence and lack of rights. The life of the 19-year-old respondent Z*, the daughter of a migrant from Bokhtar is one such sad story. In the interview, she admits being tired of life, laments it, and does not see any prospects (see Box 1).

Among the life stories of the women affected by migration, this story is no exception: it is almost “typical”, despite all the drama.

The vulnerability of Kyrgyz women in the family differs significantly from that of Tajik women. Focus group respondents noted that the relationship between mother-in-law and daughters-in-law has changed significantly, because among today’s girls it is not so easy to find a daughter-in-law for a younger son who is ready to live in the village with her husband’s parents all her life. There have been a number of sensational cases in the media in which daughters-in-law committed suicide, and mothers-in-law were accused of the crime of “driving to suicide”. As an elderly woman from Osh said in a focus group: “The old-school bride is no more. Now we are afraid ourselves, no matter what happens with the daughter-in-law. Modern daughters-in-law leave almost immediately. I have to run around myself like a daughter-in-law. They are not healthy enough to work around the house. And if her husband is working abroad, then it’s even worse, you have to do everything she wants so she doesn’t go away, God forbid!”

Chui respondents said: “The difference between daughters-in-law in our day and modern ones is big. We did not dare disobey our father-in-law or mother-in-law, we did not say too much. My husband and I quietly got on with family duties. Everyone respected each other. Now, too, brides have such qualities. But they are weak and fragile. I ask both unmarried girls and daughters-in-law to be patient. In life, everything happens. Patience always wins out. When I was young, my grandmother always told me about patience. A person must be patient and loving. This will overcome any difficulties. But now many girls are arrogant and proud. They believe that they are young and can live by themselves. I often notice this in my daughters-in-law”.

As much as the focus group respondents in Kyrgyzstan hid the practice of domestic violence, statistics and research in this area show that the scale of domestic violence is still massive.

122 In Kyrgyz tradition, the right of patrilineal ultimogeniture — inheritance by the youngest son — is maintained. However, this tradition is undergoing changes, and today’s generation of young people increasingly lives far from their parents, with the generation of parents is increasingly living in an “empty nest”, something that has never happened in former times. For more details on these changes, see The Impact of Migration on Elderly People: Grandparent-headed households in Kyrgyzstan, at https://www.auc.kg/uploads/Migration_Database/Impact%20on%20Migration%20on%20Elderly%20Eng.pdf.

123 In 2017 1,603 women appealed to crisis centres or aksakal courts, while 3,272 women sought medical assistance from health care facilities. Interior Ministry figures for 2017 show that 7,323 restraining orders were given to persons

The Story of Z*

She always dreamed of her own house. A house in which she would be the mistress. But until now fate has not been kind to her. Her mother, whose husband did not return from the civil war, was forced to marry a second time. Z* was born from the second marriage. But when Z* turned three years old, suddenly her mother’s first husband appeared and took her mother to Russia. He did not allow her to take the daughter. Z* believes that the case reflects regional emnity - her stepfather is from Garm, and her father from Kulyab. Until she was 15 years old, however, she did not know the whole story: she grew up with her mother’s sister family, and considered her aunt to be her mother. Z* only went to school for four years, then she had to look after her aunt’s small children. She did live with one aunt all the time: her mother had four sisters and Z* spent her childhood wandering from sister to sister: everywhere she had to help with the housework and take care of the children. When Z* turned 15 years old, her mother visited for the first time and married her off. And the marriage was registered with permission from the court. As the girl says: if was so exhausted, I did not want to keep living here and there any more: I thought I would marry and live in one place, and start my life.” But a happy life did not work: she only lived with her husband for four months before he left as a migrant. After her husband’s departure to Russia, she lived with her mother-in-law and brother-in-law and his wife for a year and eight months. About this time Z* says briefly: I was exhausted. Firstly, her husband’s relatives rebuked her because she had neither father nor mother. Secondly, the brother-in-law, who turned out to be mentally ill, constantly harassed her and pursued her everywhere. Therefore, her mother-in-law allowed her to go to her husband. When she went to her husband in Moscow, it turned out that he had already found another woman. Three months of life in Moscow were filled with conflicts with her husband and violence. She did not even see Moscow: she was always in the apartment. After another beating, her sister bought her a ticket home. But her husband’s relatives did not take her back. According to rumours, her husband was recruited by that woman into ISIL and left for Syria. For several years there has been no information about him. And Z* is living with her uncle, finding any day labour she can, doing everything around her uncle’s house so that they do not throw her out and ... doesn’t know how to live on. She tried to enter the vocational school to learn a trade, but with only four years of schooling she was not accepted. Z* says: “It’s not only hard for a single woman there, but also here at home. Though this is my home country, so police do not come to verify my documents and registration. ... If my mother had not left me and gone away, my life would be different.” Speaking of possible migration, Z* says: I’m not afraid of work, I’m afraid because I’m young. There are many guys there, they can pester, anything can happen. In Z*’s cherished dream is to meet a beloved one and marry him. She talks about this scenario: in this is the best. Live with your husband in your own home.”
physical violence in Kyrgyz society: these facts are concealed, perhaps because most of the population understands the abnormality of such situations. Kyrgyz focus group respondents did not talk about cases of physical domestic violence against daughters-in-law, but several respondents testified about practices of economic violence. Thus, women told how, when they were working as migrants and sending money to their husbands’ houses, on return they were completely alienated from the results of their labour: a house built on its migrant income, livestock acquired for transfers and so on turned out to have been registered in the name of the father-in-law or mother-in-law, while she herself was deprived of the right to decide on expenditure.

The story of one woman from Jalalabad was quite typical in this context: after three years working in Russia a woman came home and saw that her money had been used to renovate her father-in-law’s house and that 10 bulls had been bought for fattening up. She spent another year tending the house and the bulls, dreaming that when they were sold she and her husband would be able to invest in their daughter’s education. She recalled: ‘The most interesting thing was that nobody even mentioned my work. All the mahalla praised my mother-in-law, that her son had sent her for haj, and no one even said thank you to me. It’s just that my kidneys are still ill after three years of hard work in the cold Russian climate. I lost my health for nothing.”

Respondents from Kyrgyzstan actively discussed the issue of daughters’ access to the family’s property. One of the respondents in Chuy described how the husband’s family, without physical violence, deprived her of her legal accommodation and other property. The chances of a woman receiving her property and possessions in case of divorce can be eliminated by her husband’s family not through physical violence, but by regulatory means: “Men try not to register the marriage because they do not want to have property problems in the event of a divorce: When I got married here in Naryn, we only registered the marriage when I gave birth to our third daughter. He jokes sometimes and says that if I did not give birth to her, maybe he would not have registered his marriage. And I was not in a great rush. For them it is the done thing: they put everything down in the father-in-law’s name — for example, the car, the house in which live. So my husband’s younger brother divorced his wife after six years of living together. They have a state registration of marriage but she cannot get anything. Even the court will not help her. That is, they live cautiously. They live in the same house, they sleep and eat together, but not with all their heart. For me it’s like... after all, they have children in common, is he really protecting his property from his own children?”

Violent practices also do not stop in families of migrants in the countries of destination. A report on labour migrants in Kazakhstan cites the following testimonies:

“A worker at the IOM shelter in Osh told the mission about a couple that was caught in slavery in Kazakhstan and lived in terrible conditions: “The boss would start pouring drinks for the husband, who then forgot about his children, his wife. It was like the boss and the husband were on one side and the wife and children were on the other. And he withheld money on holidays, which only the husband took part in.”150 When they returned from slavery back to Kyrgyzstan, the husband would repeatedly beat the wife right in the shelter.”

Research on migrant domestic workers, as well as expert interviews for this study have highlighted the high risk of violence against women labour migrants in the home. This and other research has found that daughters-in-law are not the only vulnerable category in families. In the context of mass labour migration, adolescent girls and unmarried women, and even older women and mother, become increasingly vulnerable. The vulnerability of these categories of girls and women is linked to the context of mass labour migration, adolescent girls and unmarried women, and even older women and mother, become increasingly vulnerable. The vulnerability of these categories of girls and women is linked to the context of mass labour migration, with children who require care during their parents’ migration. The respondents highlighted that in some families the female household head sometimes needs to care for up to 7-10 grandchildren of various ages. Daughters-in-law in the focus groups even expressed resentment about this, saying that according to tradition, the children of daughters should not be brought up by her parents, but in practice mothers want to help their

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124 Kyrgyz focus group respondents did not talk about cases of physical domestic violence against daughters-in-law, but several respondents testified about practices of economic violence. This research does not cover the opinions and positions that have appeared in the media space in the last year. According to media discourse, domestic violence is more often committed by parents against children, including mothers against daughters whose behaviour does not conform to cultural norms. Media reports of so-called “honour killings” in this sense are a very disturbing sign. One such murder occurred in 2018 in Osh Oblast. See http://www.stat.kg/ru/statistics/gendernaya-statistika/

125 http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2015/0661/tema01.php

126 FIDH et al., Invisible and Exploited in Kazakhstan: the plight of Kyrgyz migrant workers and members of their families, Report 713, June 2018

127 Interviews with experts from academia in Tajikistan and a researcher in Kyrgyzstan.
daughters to improve their material life and care for their children themselves. According to a study by Help Aid International, in Kyrgyzstan in nine out of every ten families where both parents have migrated, grandparents play a major role in the bringing up of children. Despite transfers from and other close relatives working abroad, the elderly still rely on their pensions to feed and educate their grandchildren. For many, this care greatly worsens their already difficult living conditions, and more than 10 per cent of these poor, multigenerational families go to bed hungry. 128

Although cases of physical violence against older people are even more closed to the community than violence against daughters-in-law, some evidence still suggests new forms of vulnerability. Thus, one of the adult women in a Chuy focus group complained that she was experiencing difficulties, having become involved in the conflicts of the children of her son and daughter, who left the children and migrated to Russia. The woman says: “If I want to judge the disputes and fights of the children of my son and daughter fairly, I see how my daughter-in-law looks at me expectantly. And I know that if I don’t take the side of the son’s children, there will be another scandal. That’s how in my own house I turned out not to be in charge. And I feel sorry for my daughter’s children: they are growing up without a mother.”

In a gender survey for the Bai Alay project, a new and specific form of vulnerability was identified: that of older women who have always been active public and state employees. Now their sons exert psychological pressure on them and insist that they “conform to the cultural norms” of the local area and stay at home and take care of the spouse and grandchildren whose mother is abroad working. In essence, such women are denied the freedom to choose their way of life and even movement, because their children often prevent them from attending various public events. 129 In this way, a “new” vulnerable group is being created by migration.

3.4. TRUST

As the fundamental basis of social capital and its indicator, trust among labour migrants is undergoing significant transformation.

Study participants highlighted the following as the main features of the change:

1) **Narrowing of the “radius of trust”:** on the one hand, respondents often began making generalizations, and coming to conclusions, about the unreliability not merely of individuals but of persons from certain ethnic groups in particular. Specifically, in Tajik focus groups, mistrust was most often directed not just towards women whom their husbands had left in order to become labour migrants in Russia or Kazakhstan: most frequently the respondents spoke about the “unreliability” or “immoral appearance” of Uzbek migrant women and ethnic Russian citizens of Russia. It was interesting that on questions of documentation, the respondents were mainly negative about persons from their own ethnic group: the Kyrgyz believed that the Kyrgyz were likely to deceive their own people, and the Tajik respondents also thought the same about their compatriots.

2) The breaking down of traditional expectations with regard to close connections was in the same category. “For example, my husband’s friend phoned him. He boasted that everything was good there, that he has a monthly salary of 45,000 roubles. Within a month my husband bought a ticket and left. And it turned out that the salary there was 15,000 roubles.” 130

3) **“Worsening” of mistrust of female labour migrants,** because of reduced ability to monitor their behaviour when they are migrants. 131 To increase confidence and capacity to monitor, those “responsible” for the women’s reputation use all the digital communication technologies at their disposal: the internet and mobile communications. But these do not fully meet the desire for total control, and therefore mechanisms of preventive measures and sanctions in the form of stigma about

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129 PIL, Gender Survey Study “Bai Alai” Small Business and Income Creation Programme in Alai and Chan-Alai, Helvetas, 2015
130 Focus group, Istraravshan, wives of migrants
131 For more details on the relationship between the level of trust in the possibilities to control and the level of certainty and predictability of the situation, see Dementiev I. Trust as an indicator of social capital. https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/doverie-kak-indikator-sotsialnogo-kapitala
migrant women are used especially strongly. Participant 9: "If she went by herself, people would change their minds about her. The outlook of our people is a little narrow. They will think that she has been corrupted. She went with whom? How did she travel? Where did she live? What was she doing? Because of this, people would already change their opinions about her, and she would not find a match. Participant 6: There are girls like that who couldn't find husbands after getting home." 133 Participant 6: If she returns, then, as they say in our village, her name is already blackened: it will be difficult for her to marry. Participant 3: Some parents forbid their children from interacting with them.133 Participant 3: "Maybe a woman there works very hard, earns a lot, and comes back here: people will ask where she earned so much money, and say she was a prostitute there for sure."134 Participant 8: Against it. They think that if they go there they will get spoiled, they'll lead dissolute lives with friends. Participant 2: "Negative. Because it even appeared on the internet: yes, let's forbid our girls from flying abroad until they are 22 years of age."135 Participant 5: “The most interesting thing is that men in Russia are going out with other women but that is forgivable. But women cannot be forgiven. Even if a woman migrant earns mountains of gold, she will have the same problems. There is such a difference here.”136 Participant 4: “If unmarried young women go, they say that they earned money by prostitution, and if they are older, they suspect that they will seduce someone else’s husband. We only praise men. We say: I abandoned the children and left, I am not caring for my elderly mother-in-law and father-in-law, they are struggling and but she is enjoying everything there. But it’s not like that. Participant 7: The fact that [women] work hard is not of interest to anyone.”137

4) The emergence of higher levels of mistrust in private employers than in state structures:
Participant 8: “Private individuals kick you out.” Participant 11: “Twenty working days, and when it’s time for you to be paid, they kick you out. Then you need to find somewhere else.”138 Participant 6: “My daughter’s classmates went to Turkey to work. The employer of one of them raped her, and she committed suicide. She was just 21 years old. After I found out about that, I won’t let my daughter go anywhere. Last year my daughter-in-law went with her relatives to Turkey to work. She was taking care of an old woman. And the husband of this old woman demanded that she also massaged him, even the intimate zone. That’s why my daughter-in-law left that job. Who can be trusting after this and allow their children to go abroad to work?”139

5) Traditional distrust of ethnic solidarity and mutual support and the idea that envy of success is characteristic of the ethnics are also transferred to the migration environment:
Participant 1: “There is no mutual understanding between us. The Kyrgyz do not support each other: on the contrary they ‘scupper’ each other. Participant 9: I, for example, worked in the salon of one woman. I told her that I wanted to open a salon myself, and she became jealous. She could have [said]: ‘Oh well done! I worked for her, both washing the floors and as an administrator. And she did not pay me my salary, because I left. I should have [only worked for] her. That’s what we Kyrgyz are like, we’re jealous of each other.”140

One of the important conclusions that can be made from studying ethnic ties as a source of social capital is that the situation is predominantly negative and “one’s own” ethnic group is often not trusted. At the same time, it has been established that establishing ethnic networks in the countries of destination is a regular pattern of behaviour for newly arrived migrants. Doubt as to the good intentions of assistance offered by compatriots does not prevent such behaviour. Perhaps every newly arrived migrant hopes for luck in that particular case and besides, having arrived without reserves of money, without knowing the procedures and rules for obtaining registration141 in a short period of time, the migrant has no guaranteed alternative.142 That is, in a situation of uncertainty, lack of control and insecurity, access to networks with low potential for confidence seems rational, as it at least allows for traditional social relations to be stabilized in the ethnic migration environment.
CHAPTER 4. INTEGRATION AND REINTEGRATION

Researchers Russell King and Aija Lulle define the term “integration” as a two-way long-term process: social inclusion and recognition of migrants in key institutions, relations and statuses of the host society on the one hand, and learning a new culture, gaining rights, forming personal relationships in the host society and developing a sense of belonging to that society, on the other hand.

In his book “Integration of migrants: Concepts and Practices” Russian academic V. Malakhov subverts key migration terms, speaking about the ambiguity of each of them. For example, for under the rubric of “integration”, Malakhov distinguishes at least three different interlinked phenomena: 1) assimilation of the migrant (loss of identity and distinctive characteristics of the culture of the sending society, and consequent “dissolution” into the host culture); 2) cultural adaptation (adapting to the new culture without giving up one’s own identity); and 3) structural adaptation (inclusion in the social and economic life of the destination society).

For the purposes of this study, the integration of labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in their countries of destination, as well as the reintegration of returning migrants, is of particular significance. Some respondents to our expert survey expressed critical opinions about a number of aspects of the integration of migrants, as this appears on the agenda in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and the Russian Federation. Thus, an expert from Tajikistan working in the academic field noted the following problems connected with integration:

- The leaving of labour migrants from Tajikistan to the Russian Federation has real gender specifics: women and children who travel as family members of labour migrants cannot regulate their status in this capacity and not only automatically fall into a grey zone, but also suffer increasing dependence on the breadwinners (men). That is, the failings of legislation in the receiving state ineluctably produce a class of women who violate the migration regime, on the one hand, which dooms them to limited mobility, along with discrimination and violence from law enforcement agencies; while on the other hand it creates grounds for violence and discrimination against female members of the migrant’s family from the host population and members of her own family. The expert states that: “With regard to female labour migration, the IOM is aware of cases in which sexual violence, sexual trafficking specifically, was inflicted on female labour migrants by compatriot labour migrants themselves.”

- The lack of language ability in the new generation of labour migrants from Tajikistan radically differentiates them from the first wave of labour migrants to Russia, who began to leave after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This difference is often not objective, but it is used as an instrument to apply political pressure against migrants and indirectly against the sending countries. In reality, “many people work in areas in which Russian is not required at all: that is, if you work at a certain place, you can quickly learn the general terminology and work. In this regard, there are a lot of immigrant networks and you can work in teams with relatives who know the language and help you.” In the Czech Republic, there are Vietnamese who were brought 40 years ago, and many of them do not know the Czech language, but they work quietly and live peacefully with a settled status. Well, they are citizens, but do not know the language. Thus, in this regard, the problem is discrimination and chauvinism, and the fact that the police can do anything they want against people who do not know Russian; the problem is the attitude of the local community towards people who do not speak the titular language. The main problem is the attitude of Russian services to migration, which also largely depends on the attitude of the society itself towards migrant workers.”

The position put forward by the expert from Tajikistan is consistent with the research findings of V. Malakhov, which includes the following statements:

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145 Interview with academic in Tajikistan
1) **Integration of Migrants is Made into an Issue by Political Interest Groups for Political Purposes.** The author of a book on integration of migration says: “Operating in the field of politics, the term ‘integration’ is a part of politics. And politics is an area in which there is a struggle for power, including for power over ‘names’, for a monopoly on naming. Should one consider an individual / group of people worthy of equal treatment or, on the contrary, deny that person/them full access to social resources on the basis of ‘insufficient integration’? The answer to this question depends not so much on objective indicators of integration as on subjective assessment: it is different for different participants in the political process.”

2) Use of the terms migrant and immigrant (and even more so illegal immigrant) uncritically implies homogeneous masses. However, in reality it is not possible to divide everyone into analytical and practical categories of “ours” and “outsiders”.

3) Absolutely integrated and absolutely non-integrated migrants do not exist. Malakhov states: “From the point when an individual ends up in the territory of one country or another, that person already is to some extent integrated: in the economic web, in the circle of relatives and friends, in the “ethnic network” or a network of those from a certain territory, in the system of social support from the state or NGOs (if the discussion is of refugees) and so on”. That is, discussions are always about which fields and social systems the migrant is included in and excluded from.

Malakhov sums up Western countries’ experience of implementing integration policies by saying that the effectiveness of such a policy can be assessed by looking at the functional involvement of migrants in four main elements of society: employment, social protection, housing and education.

The experiences of the survey respondents reveal the considerable difficulties they face as labour migrants in areas such as social protection, housing, and access to education, despite the fact that education legislation in the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan is supportive of labour migrants.

Recent active discussion in the Russian media about the possible creation of rural settlements inhabited compactly by Tajiks or Kyrgyz is symptomatic of this. In general, discussion on this topic took place from a perspective of risks to the state and society of Russia from the creation of ethnic enclaves, and accusations of a desire for territorial expansion and the creation of little Kyrgyzstans and Tajikstans in the Russian Federation. The discussion was caused by two cases of compact resettlement of Tajik and Kyrgyz migrant groups, most of whom had already become Russian citizens and rescinded their Kyrgyzstani citizenship.

With regard to the area of employment, the functional involvement of labour migrants from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in this field was metaphorically classified by Romadanovsky, the former head of the Federal Migration Service, as three Ds: difficult, dirty and dangerous. However, today the key concept for any definition of the labour market for Central Asian migrants is increasingly that of the precariousness of labour, and its extreme non-sustainability, insecurity and instability.

Focus group participants expressed the opinion that even given the unsupportive nature of the state’s integration policy, the wider marriage market can “detain” and adapt women migrant workers in Russia or facilitate a further cycle of mobility: “Why do women and girls migrate or remain? Participant 1: “Well, if the girl does not have her other half here, and she finds him there, then why come back? If she has a family there. Seeing how she married there, she should be there. Participant 9: Marriage. If, for example, she marries a Russian [laughter]. Participant 8: Not a Russian: a Turk or an American. And then she will go there.”

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147 Ibid.
150 In the case of citizens of Tajikistan they can at the same time be citizens of the Russian Federation: dual citizenship between Russia and Tajikistan is allowed in law.
151 “Explotuiruem, pri etom nenavidim [We exploit, while hating]”. Migratsiya 21 Vek, No. 1, July 2010.
152 Focus group, Bishkek, wives of migrant husbands
Report: “THE FRAGILE POWER OF MIGRATION: the needs and rights of women and girls from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan who are affected by migration, 2018”

**Box.**

Excerpt 2. The case of R*: a story of successful cultural colonization

R*, 35 years old, originally from Osh city, has already run a salon business in Bishkek for six years. She presents her experience of long-term family migration to Moscow exclusively in positive terms. R* believes that three things can characterize her successful career in migration: 1) all of her life was full of well-ordered events, and her professional experience in her homeland had been designed to prepare her for migration to Russia, because she worked in a passport office and dealt with documentation issues; 2) she was lucky and is lucky in life, but her luck is deserved because she is sociable, literate and – most importantly – she speaks Russian very well, without an accent; and 3) in appearance, in her opinion, she and her husband do not look like Asians but have fair skin. An onlooker could also add: R* does not have a Russian-sounding name either…

R* believes: “First of all it is appearance. [laughs] No, it’s just that I’m fair. And the rest of, yes… First they look at your appearance, then they start talking with you. To understand who you are.”

Like most of our migrants, R* found her first job through compatriots. She recalls that in 2006–2007 it was still difficult for Kyrgyz citizens to apply for any professional positions, and despite having a higher education diploma and experience working in commercial banks she was prepared to start working as a shop cleaner. However, at the interview she was able to please the manager and so she got a job as a cashier. During six years of work in Moscow, with breaks for the birth of her children, R* was able to acquire many new professional skills: including those of bartender, beauty salon administrator, and manicurist.

Now, looking back, R* and her husband remember only the best things: it seems that she and her husband had no hard times in their past as migrants. R* believes that she did not experience any problems of adaptation and integration in Russia. They had to survive the real difficulties of integration on return: the opening their business and dealing with all the required interaction with corrupt state bodies. The staff she employed were ungrateful and callous, showing disrespect to their own parents.

The discussions in the focus groups and several interviews to examine cases revealed that for certain categories of labour migrants the integration process begins in a specific functional areas and only then contributes to changes in cultural conditions and values, and the introduction of new culture and behaviour.

Some citizens of Kyrgyzstan absorb the expectations of the citizens of the country of destination that the labour migrant should come already culturally assimilated, erasing the signs of their nationality, and having already made themselves a “cultured” migrant in their homeland: they should be Russian-speaking, and dress according to the accepted standards in the host society, preferably not standing out in the crowd. Thus, one respondent in Bishkek spoke about her migration experience as the most successful and trouble-free stage of her life, explaining that she was lucky because she “doesn’t look Kyrgyz”, dresses stylishly and speaks Russian without an accent. Another Bishkek respondent was also very proud that “being a mestizo, [she is] not like an Asian woman” and that in Russia she was often mistaken for a local woman.

One of the experts in Tajikistan identified this approach by migrant workers as that of colonized subjects who assimilate and accept the expectations of a society in which they will never be equal members.

In focus group discussions in Kyrgyzstan, women spoke from the position of Kyrgyzstanis wanting to assimilate in Russia. One of the participants offered her opinion, which most of the others in the discussion agreed with: “We will always be churki for them, whatever we do.”

For other categories of labour migrants, changes observed during migration are perceived with apprehension and a desire to protect their cultural identity, while at the same time using a normalization mechanism that is applied with regard to “not being effectively integrated” as well: Participant 5: “It’s bad that when living among Russians you learn their habits and forget about your family responsibilities. Take my neighbour Shahnoza: she has two children, she and her husband are divorced, but he only thinks about his needs, and she is raising the children herself; with no help from him at all.” Participant 10: “They are interested in any case. Why? For example, you come from Russia and already have other ideas, a different outlook, a better style of clothing than the old one, life is better.”

Participant 6: You know, some become cold-hearted, in Russia there are old people’s homes and they put their parents there, it’s the same with us. Men have become more callous, showing disrespect to their own parents. Participant 1: They are now being brought up like the Russians, with Russian culture, and that means that they don’t have to travel you send money, for example, and if other problems occur in the family, all the more so. Participant 5: If you notice, in Russia they live with one for one week, and then with another for another week, and the same tendency is beginning to emerge here - one of us divorced her husband with two sons, returned, and married a married man.”

153 Focus group, Penjikent, women on the re-entry ban list
154 Focus group, Rasulov, women migrants
The reintegration of migrant workers returning from migration, and support for family members of migrant workers who remain in their homeland are only now coming into the focus of the migration authorities in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and stable reintegration infrastructures, mechanisms and strategies have not yet developed. Initiatives such as special reintegration programmes at adult education centres in Tajikistan are promising. However, studying the circumstances of migrants’ lives and our respondents’ opinions allowed us to draw up a table of challenges of (re)integration of migrant workers, with a longer list of challenges concerning reintegration at home after returning as compared with those of challenges faced in the host country.

Table 5: Challenges of (re)integration of labour migrants in destination countries and source countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenges of integration of labour migrants in destination country</th>
<th>Challenges of (re)integration of returning labour migrants in source country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural barriers to integration: economic crisis, devaluation and inflation</td>
<td>Problems with the concept of (re)integration itself: absolutely integrated and absolutely non-integrated migrants do not exist. The case of widows and divorcees – they were not integrated even before migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The contradictory media discourse of successful integration of migrants: the spectrum from a nationalist to a human rights-defending agenda reflects the “problematization” of migrants and the need for paternal attitudes to them</td>
<td>Labour migrants, included those from groups who do not meet normative standards, do not return to their communities but complete a different migration to their homeland and become internal migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of confessional opinions and the language of hatred in public discourse</td>
<td>Stigmatization of women returning from migration, fuelled by discriminatory public discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The issue of integration of migrants in the host society is utilized by political interest groups for political purposes and actually prevents integration (language issues)</td>
<td>Reluctance to return to the routine of the traditional family role and reproductive load after a girl has seen other standards of living</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Conflict of values and conflict of expectations: after the experience of empowerment it is difficult to “lose” agency again in traditional community and social networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Social exclusion from the family (parents, siblings, children) and other kinship relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>In the flow of migration discourse, the fate of women and girls returning from labour migration is almost invisible, as the topic is not of interest for the popular media in either country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Destruction of space-time perception and understandings of the concept of “home”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Alienation of resources earned by a labour migrant for the benefit of male family members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant women are not involved in four major areas of society - employment, social protection, housing and education: there is no systematic readiness for integration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health problems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different expectations from various actors of successful integration of labour migrants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of a psychosocial support system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, it can be concluded that at state level in the receiving countries conditions are not in place for successful integration of migrant workers, and that there is a lack of readiness for structural integration of migrants, but that in public discourse this is replaced by the rhetoric of a lack of intention and desire on the part of migrant workers to integrate in the country of destination.

The source countries also continue – so far mainly rhetorically – to support reintegration, but no effective measures are being taken to address the challenges of successful reintegration of returning labour migrants in their homelands.
RESEARCH FINDINGS

The research on the vulnerability and needs of women and girls in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan affected by migration has led to the following conclusions:

Conclusions about the current status of women and girls in their families and society in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and its influence on their migration strategies and needs

1) Documentation of children and women is a component of the regulatory migration infrastructure that provides the starting conditions for (in)equality, and becomes a factor of multisectoral inequality (according to sex, social class, citizenship and ethnicity).

2) In Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan the situation and level of vulnerability of girls and women on issues of documentation differs, as does the subjective perception of the problem of documentation among women themselves: in Tajikistan study respondents prioritized problems in receiving birth certificates and passports, while in Kyrgyzstan women were more likely to discuss problems of state registration of marriage.

3) The barriers to documenting the civil status of young girls and women in Tajikistan are not only the general problems of the high cost of passport services and bureaucratic red tape, but also the gender preferences of the family in preferring to document sons because of limited financial possibilities and family interests, and the cultural presumption that registering documents for children and women is the prerogative of the man of the family. Vulnerable categories of women and girls in Tajikistan include women who have not graduated from high school, orphans or social orphans left in the care of relatives, girls who married early, and young women from neighbouring countries who married citizens of Tajikistan – so-called “border wives”. Children born at home are also often vulnerable.

4) Trends in documentation include the testimonies of respondents that in recent years a “fashion” for family migration has developed among Tajik families, which has led to a smaller proportion of undocumented women.

5) Despite the fact that the procedures for obtaining birth certificates and passports for Kyrgyzstani citizens are considered the simplest in the post-Soviet space, those experiencing barriers to documentation in Kyrgyzstan include: adult children of the previous generation of labour migrants whose parents for various reasons did not have birth certificates or passports issued for them; women who married citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic, but did not change their citizenship at the time (so-called “border wives”), and children of current migrant workers who only have birth notification documents from the maternity hospital.

6) For women and girls in Kyrgyzstan, state registration of marriage is seen as the most important issue, given public discourse about the lack of rights of women and children in unregistered marriages in cases of divorce.

7) Some respondents from Kyrgyzstan who obtained Russian citizenship perceive the fact of not having state registration of their marriages as an advantage in Russia: they argue that single mother status confers preferential access of children to the educational system and a higher level of child benefits.

8) Labour migration from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is changing the models of family and marital relations:
   a) The traditional marriage market is expanding for labour migrants, especially for Kyrgyzstanis.
   b) There are new forms of marriage for Kyrgyzstanis and Tajikistanis: “temporary / guest”, “unequal”, and fictitious marriages; and new forms of family-marital relations: distant, transnational families, and abandoned families (wives and children). Forms of marriage and family such as early marriages, polygamy, and marriage between persons from different regions of a country have become more widespread, and the number of inter-ethnic marriages is also growing.
c) In the perception of respondents, which is also reflected in media discourse, the level of violence in families and in the migrant environment is increasing, with the target of violence most often being women. The number of social orphans – children of labour migrants – is growing, along with a generation of emotionally alienated families.

9) Physical, economic, psychological and symbolical violence, and labour exploitation typify the life of rural brides in Tajikistan staying with the relatives of a husband who has left as a labour migrant. However, the proportion of “newly vulnerable” categories of women is increasing everywhere: mothers of labour migrants are under the pressure of an increased workload and economic burden because they are taking care of their grandchildren (the children of labour migrants).

CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE VULNERABILITIES AND NEEDS OF WOMEN AND GIRLS AFFECTED BY MIGRATION

The vulnerability of girls and women in labour migration primarily arises from the “work” of migration infrastructures: regulatory institutions, policies and discourses, commercial brokers of all kinds, transport and communication structures and social networks. The far-from-complete list below sets out some of the risks and vulnerabilities arising from the functioning of these infrastructures:

a) Risks of violation of rights in the labour market: refusal to enter an employment contract, non-compliance with the contract: non-payment of wages, low pay, degrading working conditions and treatment, violence, exploitation, and slavery
b) Risks of limited access of labour migrants and their children to services - medical, educational, judicial/legal and safe housing
c) Risks of separation from children, separation from family members and deportation
d) Risks of social isolation and exclusion from social networks and their resources.

PREPARATION FOR MIGRATION, MOTIVATION AND DEPARTURE

1) Age and family status are criteria that variously legitimize or stigmatize women’s labour migration. Labour migration of widowed, divorced middle-aged and older women is culturally accepted, while the migration of young women and girls without family accompaniment is not welcomed, and in certain regions can lead to cruel stigma.

2) The supply and demand conjuncture in the labour markets in the main destination countries for labour migration is a key component of migration infrastructures. Growing demand for domestic workers, labour in the service sector, the garment industry and agriculture in the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan is promoting the growth of women’s migration from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and also the labour migration of girls.

3) The spontaneity of migration behaviour of women and girls and limited awareness of labour migration issues lead to risks of discrimination and violence during migration, financial and reputational costs and health risks, including for children left in the homes of family members.

4) During the pre-departure period, women and girls critically require the following information:
   a) About the regime for stay of labour migrants in the destination country, including issues relating to finding work and accommodation: this is important not just from the perspective of law but also in terms of actual practice on the ground
   b) On the conjuncture of demand and supply in the labour market in the destination country
   c) On the practice of documentation (permit documents and migrant registration) and the risks associated with violating migration legislation
   d) On the “algorithm” for effective communication with officials from various state bodies involved in regulating migration;
   e) On projects and programmes providing pre-departure preparation services, services provided by state bodies, NGOs and international organizations
f) On stakeholders providing services (pre-departure, in the homeland and during migration) and helping to protect the rights of labour migrants.

5) Women and girls are often in greater need of language training than men. This is because of the individual character of the work women engage in, in contrast to the mainly group and brigade work characteristic of male labour migrants from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

6) Labour skills and abilities gained before departure based on understanding of supply and demand in the labour market in the destination country could significantly improve the protection of the rights of the female labour migrant.

7) Family support for the provision of care for children of labour migrants is an essential component of migration infrastructures.

8) The migration strategies of women and girls, and in particular the choice of country of destination or the specific destination of migration, largely depend on their social ties.

9) The existing official channels for information about the regimes for stay of migrant workers in the country of destination, including finding work and housing, are generally not included in the “radius of trust”, and so in general women and girls who arrive as labour migrants are guided by rumours and limited information from relatives and friends who have experience of migration.

10) Respondent women with personal experience of migration or members of families of labour migrants who remained in their homeland in both countries were not informed about the projects and programmes for pre-departure training, and do not know which stakeholders can provide such services.

11) The family responsibilities, roles and requirements of the migrant family members left behind - women and girls – change significantly. However, the labour and needs of these members of the migrant’s family remain invisible.

12) As a result of the migration of relatives, members of their families who remain in their homeland face multiple deprivations. These include limited food security (especially in so-called “abandoned” families), restrictions on access to education for children, increased workload, emotional alienation of parents and children, and social exclusion.

LIFE IN MIGRATION

1) De jure, the conditions of stay for Kyrgyzstani citizens in labour migration in Russia and Kazakhstan are very different than those of Tajikistanis, because after Kyrgyzstan entered the EAEU, labour migrants from that country have more favourable documentation status, while those from Tajikistan still suffer tough, restrictive demands of migration legislation. However, the work and life of migrants depend not only on legislation, but also on the “hidden” attitudes of the authorities regulating migration.

2) An important difference in the migration experience of female workers is the individual nature of their employment, in contrast to the group / brigade employment of male labour migrants. This fact plays a decisive role in the protection of the rights of migrant workers, as it is easier for a group / brigade of men to fight against violations of their rights.

3) The vulnerability of women from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to migration is different: Tajik women migrants predominantly follow the strategy of “being housewives, making life easier for their migrant husbands”, while migrant women from Kyrgyzstan usually work autonomously.

4) Housing for migrants is particularly unfavourable and unsupportive for family migration infrastructure. For this reason, many migrant workers are characterized by a change in the conceptual attitude to the concept of “home”. 
5) Social capital for labour migrant girls and women from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is reproduced by expectations of support from “one’s own” (primarily ethnic) group: this influences the behaviour of the labour migrant, and reinforces group norms and values; social capital is also reproduced by the receipt of privileged access to information and other resources through social (and/or ethnic) networks.

6) The main aspects of change in traditional relations include: narrowing of the “radius of trust”, which is especially true for ethnic groups, but sometimes even for family members; “aggravation” of mistrust of female labour migrants, due to reduced ability to monitor their behaviour in migration; and manifestation of greater mistrust towards private employers than state officials.

7) Human rights organizations often do not disaggregate requests for support by sex, and therefore it is not possible to objectively judge the gender specifics of awareness of migrant rights protection.

RETURN AND REINTEGRATION

1) Even if the state integration policy is unfavourable, the extended marriage market can “retain” and adapt women migrant workers or promote a further cycle of mobility.

2) The task of reintegrating migrant workers on return at home is based on the assumption that prior to migration the citizen was integrated in the community. In cases of female labour migrants who are divorced, widowed, or from poor families, this assumption is doubtful at best.

3) Women and girls who have been migrants experience greater stigmatization in rural than in urban areas, in Tajik society more than in Kyrgyzstani society, and in some regions more than others.

4) The stigmatization of women returning from labour migration significantly reduces their ability to reintegrate into their communities. In Kyrgyzstan, in cases of “successful” migration the returnees, particularly women and girls, may try to return not to their home communities but to an urban environment. Therefore the issue, not so much of reintegration as of integration of those who are already internal migrants should be on the agenda.

5) The return of female migrant workers and young migrants of both sexes can cause difficulties in their interaction with traditional networks and the entire community. This may be because of a change in values and preferences, of way of life and, most importantly, of the experience of empowerment.

6) Reduction of the bridging social capital of women labour migrants and expansion of their connecting social capital can increase their security and successful integration in the host community but at the same time be a risk factor for violence and “normalization” by traditional networks.

7) Successful reintegration of labour migrants is directly proportional to the scale of investment in social networks and in the community, and indirectly proportional to the level of empowerment. Labour migrants need to contribute to and restore their membership of traditional forms of solidarity organization.

8) The effectiveness of integration policy in the destination country and the reintegration success of a labour migrant – woman or man – in the homeland depends on that person’s functional involvement in four main fields of society: employment, the social protection system, the housing sector and education.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STUDY

• One of the key areas for the work of the state and civil society should be support for girls and women from families of labour migrants who remain in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

• In particular, it is important to train the target group of migrant children left in their home country in communication skills; to provide them with psychological support to help them to overcome emotional deprivation; and to organize self-help groups based in youth clubs, local-self government facilities, and schools.

• Parents and other carers of children of labour migrants should be trained in parenting skills, teaching a culture of non-violence, and overcoming emotional deprivation. It is also important to train these target groups in food security skills and to provide humanitarian assistance in cases of extreme poverty.

• Wives of migrant workers who have lost contact with and support from their husbands (“abandoned” wives) should be educated on their human rights; advocacy should be conducted to protect women’s rights, including their right to property; and income-generating programmes should be offered. These groups of women should receive technical support for social mobilization and promotion of social entrepreneurship in partnerships/solidarity groups.

• The state, civil society and the media should intensify public dialogue on the importance of women’s contribution to development, and the importance of recognizing the successes of women migrant workers. These activities should be aimed at empowering women migrant workers and supporting their reintegration into the community.

• In order to improve the effectiveness of the migration policy of the sending countries of migrant workers, and thereby protect the rights of migrants, it is important for states to conduct targeted and comprehensive communication and information campaigns. As part of these campaigns, information about the infrastructure for protection of rights and the rules of stay in the main countries of destination should be widely disseminated to potential labour migrants.

• Transnational human rights projects should be supported to protect the rights of migrant workers across the borders of nation-states (in sending and receiving countries). Work to protect the rights of labour migrants should mainly be conducted in the form of joint case management, with broad media support provided.

• It would be advisable to introduce a gender-sensitive approach into the work of human rights organizations protecting the rights of women migrant workers, including the collection and analysis of gender-disaggregated data.
APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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APPENDIX 2. STUDY TOOLS

Expert interview 1

Purpose of the interview: The expert survey enables: (i) the comparison of information on services and support programmes currently available for women and girls affected by migration; (ii) the collection of expert opinions on gaps in services provided through migrant support programmes; and (iii) the formulation of recommendations for action at local, national and regional levels to reduce the vulnerability of women and girls affected by migration.

Target group: State officials.

Introduction: Thank you for agreeing to participate in our research. My name is...

The aim of our research is to understand which problems and difficulties are faced by women and girls who are in migration or whose relatives are in migration, and how women / girls deal with these difficulties. The interview will take about one hour of your time. One of the important conditions is that we should record the interview on a Dictaphone, and so the Dictaphone is switched on. This is done for convenience of the interview, in order that our discussion can be processed later. I guarantee that the recording and any other materials received from you will not be used for any other purposes than those of research. You have the right to terminate the interview at any point, and also not to answer any of the questions.

Do you agree to take part in this study?

The field guide provides a list of topics and questions that need to be raised during the interview. You should remember the list of topics for discussion, but you should not memorize the questions word for word. You can improve the quality of the interview and formulate new questions, taking into account the situation, the context and the respondent’s answers.

Introductory question:

- Does your mandate cover any issues related to migration? If yes, then which? Do you provide assistance or services to persons who are leaving for or returning from periods of migration? If yes, please elaborate.

Theme 1. Policies and measures to curb migration and mitigate the negative impact of labour migration

Before migration:

- When compared to the situation 3, 5 or 10 years ago, are people leaving more or less, or has the number not changed? Why?
- Who leaves more – men or women? Why?
- How has family migration changed over this period: have more or fewer people left with their families or without their families?
- For what length of time do men and women usually travel to earn money? Why?
- Do you provide assistance to people who have decided to leave to earn money? What sort of assistance? How do you provide this assistance? What other assistance is necessary? Which additional services need to be introduced for this category of citizens?
- What assistance do men and women need?

During migration:

- Which problems do people face most frequently during migration? Is there a difference in the character of problems between men and women? Why is this?
- Who do migrants seek help from about their problems? Is this enough help? What other help do they need?
- Which services does your structure provide to citizens who are labour migrants and to members of their families in the destination country? Does your organization provide enough services? Which additional services need to be introduced for this category of citizens?
- Do migrants seek assistance with civil registration of marriages, divorces and births? Do they seek to receive passports (international and internal)?
- What is the difference in the character of problems of men and women in migration? What is the difference in the range of services provided to men and women in migration?
- Which services does your structure provide to families of migrants: women and children of migrants who remained in their homeland? Does your organization provide enough services? Which other services need to be introduced for this category of citizens?
- Which services does your structure provide for young daughters of migrants whose parents are in migration? Does your organization provide enough services? Which additional services need to be introduced for this category of citizens?

After migration:
- Which services does your structure provide for families who have returned from migration? Are enough services provided by your organization? Which additional services need to be introduced for this category of citizens?
- Is there a difference in the character of problems faced by men and women on return from migration? Where do they seek assistance with their problems? Is there enough assistance? What other assistance is needed?

Stigmatization of women:
- Do you think there is a problem of stigmatization and discrimination against women or children affected by migration? Why do you think this is?
  *If the respondent answers that there is such a problem:*
- Why do women and girls face discrimination and stigma?
- What needs to be done to resolve this problem?

And the last set of questions:
- When talking about state policy, how would you characterize state measures to support migrants? Why?
- Are there any specific state strategies or programmes aimed at mitigating the negative impact of labour migration? What are these programmes, and how do they influence the development of the lives of migrants and returning migrants and of migrants’ families?
- Can you list the programmes and projects to support labour migrants that have been implemented in our country in the last five years? Could you give a short description of the groups of migrants that the programme / project was aimed at? What were the specific services provided? How successful, in your view, were these projects / programmes?
- Is there a national referral mechanism for state structures that provide services to women and girls affected by migration? If so, please explain how you apply this in your work.

**Expert interview 2**

**Purpose of the interview:** The expert survey enables: (i) the comparison of information on services and support programmes currently available for women and girls affected by migration; (ii) the collection of expert opinions on gaps in services provided through migrant support programmes; and (iii) the formulation of recommendations for action at local, national and regional levels to reduce the vulnerability of women and girls affected by migration.

**Target group:** Representatives of international organizations.

**Introduction:** Thank you for agreeing to participate in our research. My name is...
a Dictaphone, and so the Dictaphone is switched on. This is done for convenience of the interview, in order that our discussion can be processed later. I guarantee that the recording and any other materials received from you will not be used for any other purposes than those of research. You have the right to terminate the interview at any point, and also not to answer any of the questions.

Do you agree to take part in this study?

The field guide provides a list of topics and questions that need to be raised during the interview. You should remember the list of topics for discussion, but you should not memorize the questions word for word. You can improve the quality of the interview and formulate new questions, taking into account the situation, the context and the respondent’s answers.

Introductory question:

- Does your mandate cover any issues related to migration? If yes, then which? Do you provide assistance or services to persons who are leaving for or returning from periods of migration? If yes, please elaborate.

Theme 1. Policies and measures to curb migration and mitigate the negative impact of labour migration

Before migration:

- Does your organization conduct any programmes or projects to moderate migration? If so, please explain some more about it: What do you do? Which approaches are used? Which structures are involved in the activities? What facilitates this work? Which problems do you face with implementation?
- Does your organization conduct any programmes or projects to provide assistance to persons who decide to leave to earn money? What sort of assistance? Who provides this assistance? Is there enough assistance? What other assistance is necessary?
- How are gender aspects included in these programmes and projects?

During migration:

- Which problems do people face most frequently during migration? Is there a difference in the character of problems between men and women? Why? Who do migrants seek help from about their problems? Is this enough help? What other help do they need?
- Do migrants face problems with civil registration of marriages, divorces and births or receiving passports during their migration? If yes, which problems and why? How are these problems resolved?
- Do unregistered marriages take place among families of migrants? For which reasons are marriages not registered?
- If children are born, where do families go to receive birth certificates? Do they know where they need to go?
- Does your organization conduct any programmes or projects to assist people who are currently in migration? What sort of assistance? Who provides this assistance? Is it enough assistance? What other assistance is necessary?
- How are gender aspects included in these programmes and projects?

After migration:

- Which problems do people returning from migration most frequently face? Is there a difference in the character of problems faced by men and women on return from migration? Where do they seek assistance with their problems? Is there enough assistance? What other assistance is needed?
- In what way are gender aspects included in these programmes and projects?

Stigmatization of women:

- Do you think there is a problem of stigmatization and discrimination against women or children
affected by migration? Why do you think this?

If the respondent answers that there is such a problem:
- Why do women and girls face discrimination and stigma?
- What needs to be done to resolve this problem?

And the last set of questions:
- When talking about state policy, how would you characterize state measures to support migrants? Why?
- Are there any specific state strategies or programmes aimed at mitigating the negative impact of labour migration? What are these programmes, and how do they influence the development of the lives of migrants and returning migrants and migrants’ families?
- Can you list the programmes and projects to support labour migrants that have been implemented in our country in the last five years? Could you give a short description of the groups of migrants that the programme / project was aimed at? What were the specific services provided? How successful, in your view, were these projects / programmes?
- Is there a national referral mechanism for state structures that provide services to women and girls affected by migration? If so, please explain how you apply this in your work.

Expert interview 3

Purpose of the interview: The expert survey enables: (i) the comparison of information on services and support programmes currently available for women and girls affected by migration; (ii) the collection of expert opinions on gaps in services provided through migrant support programmes; and (iii) the formulation of recommendations for action at local, national and regional levels to reduce the vulnerability of women and girls affected by migration.

Target group: Local government officials.

Introduction: Thank you for agreeing to participate in our research. My name is...
The aim of our research is to understand which problems and difficulties are faced by women and girls who are in migration or whose relatives are in migration, and how women / girls deal with these difficulties. The interview will take about one hour of your time. One of the important conditions is that we should record the interview on a Dictaphone, and so the Dictaphone is switched on. This is done for convenience of the interview, in order that our discussion can be processed later. I guarantee that the recording and any other materials received from you will not be used for any other purposes than those of research. You have the right to terminate the interview at any point, and also not to answer any of the questions.

Do you agree to take part in this study?
The field guide provides a list of topics and questions that need to be raised during the interview. You should remember the list of topics for discussion, but you should not memorize the questions word for word. You can improve the quality of the interview and formulate new questions, taking into account the situation, the context and the respondent’s answers.

Introductory question:
- Does your mandate cover any issues related to migration? If yes, then which? Do you provide assistance or services to persons who are leaving for or returning from periods of migration? If yes, please elaborate.

Theme 1. The profile of migrants
Example questions:
- In the last three years, how many people have left this village to travel to other countries in search of work?
- What proportion of households today has migrants (working in other countries)?
Theme 2. Policies and measures to curb migration and mitigate the negative impact of labour migration

Before migration:
- Have any social development projects taken place in the last five years which have had an effect on employment in your settlement, on household income and so on? Provide more details.
- Compared to 3, 5 and 10 years ago respectively, are people leaving more or less, or has the number stayed the same? Why?
- What measures is the state taking to curb migration? Which approaches are being used? Which structures are undertaking these activities? What other assistance is needed to curb migration?
- Is assistance given to those who have decided to leave to earn money? What sort of assistance? Who provides this assistance? Is it enough? What other assistance is needed?
- Are there many unregistered marriages among migrants’ families? Early marriages? Why?
- Have people planning to leave come to you for assistance? Say a little about these cases. Which problems were they asking about? What sort of assistance do people want in general? Are there specific problems for women? Were you able to help?

During migration:
- Which problems do people face most frequently during migration? Is there a difference in the character of problems between men and women? Why? Who do migrants seek help from about their problems? Is this enough help? What other help do they need?
- Do women who have left as migrants come to you personally for assistance? Say something about these cases? Did you help? How?
- Which difficulties do families of migrants face? Which problems do the wives and children of migrants who stayed in their homeland face? And those who left together as migrants?
- Which families are most vulnerable? Are they provided with assistance? What sort? Who provides the assistance? What assistance do they need? How should families be assisted? Who should do this?
- Which problems do female children of labour migrants face when their parents are away as migrants? Are they provided with assistance? What sort? Who provides the assistance? What assistance do they need? How should families be assisted? Who should do this?

After migration:
- How many families have returned from migration to your settlement?
- What proportion of migrants return to their homeland? Why do they return?
- Which problems do persons returning from migration face most often? Is there a difference in the character of problems faced by men and women on return from migration? Where do they seek assistance with their problems? Is there enough assistance? What other assistance is needed?
- Have women who have returned from migration approached you personally for assistance? Say something about these cases? Were you able to help? How?
- How frequent is divorce among families of migrants? Why does this occur?
Stigmatization of women:

- Do you think there is a problem of stigmatization and discrimination against women or children affected by migration? Why do you think this?

If the respondent answers that there is such a problem:
- Why do women and girls face discrimination and stigma?
- What needs to be done to resolve this problem?

And the last set of questions:

- When talking about state policy, how would you characterize state measures to support migrants? Why?
- Are there any specific state strategies or programmes aimed at curbing migration and/or mitigating the negative impact of labour migration? What are these programmes, and how do they influence the development of the lives of migrants and citizens returning from migration?
- Can you list the programmes and projects to support labour migrants that have been implemented in our country in the last five years? Could you give a short description of the groups of migrants that the programme/project was aimed at? What were the specific services provided? How successful, in your view, were these projects/programmes?
- Is there a national referral mechanism for state structures that provide services to women and girls affected by migration? If so, please explain how you apply this in your work.

Expert interview 4

Purpose of the interview: The expert survey enables: (i) the comparison of information on services and support programmes currently available for women and girls affected by migration; (ii) the collection of expert opinions on gaps in services provided through migrant support programmes; and (iii) the formulation of recommendations for action at local, national and regional levels to reduce the vulnerability of women and girls affected by migration.

Target group: Representatives of local NGOs and women’s leaders.

Introduction: Thank you for agreeing to participate in our research. My name is...
The aim of our research is to understand which problems and difficulties are faced by women and girls who are in migration or whose relatives are in migration, and how women/girls deal with these difficulties. The interview will take about one hour of your time. One of the important conditions is that we should record the interview on a Dictaphone, and so the Dictaphone is switched on. This is done for convenience of the interview, in order that our discussion can be processed later. I guarantee that the recording and any other materials received from you will not be used for any other purposes than those of research. You have the right to terminate the interview at any point, and also not to answer any of the questions.

Do you agree to take part in this study?

The field guide provides a list of topics and questions that need to be raised during the interview. You should remember the list of topics for discussion, but you should not memorize the questions word for word. You can improve the quality of the interview and formulate new questions, taking into account the situation, the context and the respondent’s answers.

Theme 1. The profile of migrants

Example questions:
- In the last three years, how many people have left this village to other countries in search of work?
- What proportion of households today has migrants (working in other countries)?
- Which work or economic activities did these migrants do here?
- Could you list the most popular destination countries for migrating members of your community (in descending order, by number of people who left to earn money: that is, by order of importance and scale of labour migration to each destination country)?
Who leaves most often (sex, age, social status, ethnicity)? Why do women leave?
- What proportion of those leaving are women? What sort of women are they: married or unmarried, age and social status? How often do girls leave? What provokes them to leave to earn money?
- Who do women leave with? Who do girls leave with?
- Are there any particular periods (seasons or years) in which women and girls most often leave as migrants?
- Are there often divorces in migrant families? Why?
- Are there often unregistered marriages in the families of migrants? For what reasons are marriages not registered?
- Are there often early marriages in migrants’ families? Why?

Theme 2. Policies and measures to curb migration and mitigate the negative impact of labour migration

Before migration:
- Compared to 3, 5 and 10 years ago respectively, are people leaving more or less, or has the number stayed the same? Why?
- What sort of assistance and services are your organization providing to persons who are leaving as labour migrants? Can you give more information?
- Have people planning to leave come to you for assistance? Say a little about these cases. Which problems were they asking about? What sort of assistance do people want in general? Are there specific problems for women? Were you able to help?
- What measures is the state taking to curb migration? Which approaches are being used? Which structures are undertaking these activities? What other assistance is needed to curb migration?
- What other assistance is needed by those who have decided to leave as labour migrants?

During migration:
- Which problems do people face most frequently during migration? Is there a difference in the character of problems between men and women? Why? Who do migrants seek help from about their problems? Is this enough help? What other help do they need?
- Do women who have left as migrants come to you personally for assistance? Say something about these cases? Did you help? How?
- Which difficulties do families of migrants face? Which problems do the wives and children of migrants who stayed in their homeland face? And those who left together as migrants?
- Which families are most vulnerable? Are they provided with assistance? What sort? Who provides the assistance? How should families be assisted? Who should do this?
- Which problems do female children of labour migrants face when their parents are away as migrants? Are they provided with assistance? What sort? Who provides the assistance? What assistance do they need? How should families be assisted? Who should do this?

After migration:
- What proportion of migrants return to their homeland? Why do they return?
- Which problems do persons returning from migration face most often? Is there a difference in the character of problems faced by men and women on return from migration? Where do they seek assistance with their problems? Is there enough assistance? What other assistance is needed?
- Have women who have returned from migration approached you personally for assistance? Say something about these cases? Were you able to help? How?

Stigmatization of women:
- Do you think there is a problem of stigmatization and discrimination against women or children affected by migration? Why do you think this?
If the respondent answers that there is such a problem:
- Why do women and girls face discrimination and stigma?
- What needs to be done to resolve this problem?
And the last set of questions:

- When talking about state policy, how would you characterize state measures to support migrants? Why?
- Are there any specific state strategies or programmes aimed at curbing migration and/or mitigating the negative impact of labour migration? What are these programmes, and how do they influence the development of the lives of migrants and citizens returning from migration?
- Can you list the programmes and projects to support labour migrants that have been implemented in our country in the last five years? Could you give a short description of the groups of migrants that the programme / project was aimed at? What were the specific services provided? How successful, in your view, were these projects / programmes?
- Is there a national referral mechanism for state structures that provide services to women and girls affected by migration? If so, please explain how you apply this in your work.

**SCRIPT FOR FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS**

Aim of the focus groups: Focus group discussions allow for in-depth information to be received about the needs and vulnerabilities of women and girls affected by migration in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as information about the kinds of accessible services that they have used, are using at the moment and/or would like to use.

**Target groups:** The focus groups will be conducted with two categories of women and girls affected by migration:

1) Women and girls with experience of migration:
   a) Women and girls who migrated with husbands/relatives but did not work
   b) Women and girls who migrated with husbands/relatives and worked
   c) Single women and girls who went abroad as migrants and worked
   d) Women migrants who are on the “list of those banned from entering the Russian Federation”.
2) Women and girls who remained in their homeland:
   a) Wives of husbands who left as labour migrants
   b) Daughters without their parents
   c) Grandmothers and other relatives left with children of labour migrants.

Time needed to conduct the discussions: 120 minutes (2 hours)

**PRESENTATION, EXPLANATION, DISCUSSION PROCESS (5 MINUTES)**

The moderator introduces herself/himself and explains the goals and aims of the research.

Thank you for agreeing to participate in the focus group. My name is ___________. My assistant’s name is _____________.

The aim of our research is to understand which problems and difficulties are faced by women and girls who are in migration or whose relatives are in migration, and how women / girls deal with these difficulties.

Before we start, let me say a little about what a focus group is. Focus groups are group conversations following a pre-arranged plan of discussion, in which the attitudes of participants to certain topics are revealed.

Before we start today’s discussion I would like to explain that for me there are no right or wrong, good or bad answers. What is important for me is that your answers are true and honest, so that they reflect what you think in actual fact. You don’t need to worry about expressing opinions that are different from those of other participants or from those of the wider society. In this connection I would like to ask that you respect the right of everyone to their own points of view.

As you see, our discussion is being recorded on audio/video. This is being done for convenience, in order that the results can be processed later. I guarantee that the recording and any other materials received from you will not be used for any other purposes than those of research.
As our discussion is being recorded, I ask you all not to interrupt each other, and also to speak loudly, clearly and one-by-one. It is very important for us that you all have chances to give your opinions on any of the questions. We’re not planning to work for a long time: about 1.5-2 hours. During the conversation you will be provided with refreshments. If you have any questions about our discussion, you can ask them now. Are there any questions? Wait for questions, answer them, and then start the conversation.

If there are no more questions, then I would ask you to switch your telephones to silent mode. We’ll start.

GETTING TO KNOW EACH OTHER AND COMPLETING THE FORM (5 MINUTES)

1. First I would ask you to complete a small form.
   Gather all the forms. Check that every form has been filled in correctly. Confirm that the respondents have answered all the questions on the form. As soon as all the participants have handed in the forms begin the conversation.

2. Now, to get to know each other, I would ask each of you to introduce yourself and say a little about yourself. For example, who gave her name and why?

DOCUMENTATION QUESTIONS (20 MINUTES)

3. Do girls receive passports when they turn 16? If not, why do they not get them?
4. Is it difficult to get a passport for girls compared to boys? If so, why?
5. Approximately what proportion of spouses register their marriages in the registry office in your community?
6. Why do people prefer not to register their marriage?
7. Under what circumstances do the spouses register their marriage?
8. Are early marriages (under 18 years) frequent? Why do parents marry off girls under 18 years of age?
9. Do you consider having just a religious marriage (nikah) sufficient for yourself? Why?
10. Are divorces common in migrant families? Why does divorce occur more often in such families? What problems do women face on divorcing?
11. Do families receive birth certificates for children in time (within three months of birth)? If not, why not?

A. MOTIVATION FOR MIGRATION (15 MINUTES)

12. How often do women leave your settlement as migrants? Approximately how many women per year?
13. Why do women leave?
14. For what reasons do parents take their children with them on migration or not? If children of school or preschool age are taken, do they go to school or kindergarten? Why / why not?
15. Do girls under the age of 18 leave as labour migrants? Why do girls leave as migrants?
16. Can it be said that these girls belong to a particular social group? What are these groups?
17. Do you think that these women / girls could solve their problems without going abroad as labour migrants? Why do you think this?
18. What reasons keep women / girls from migrating?
19. Which reasons make women / girls leave as labour migrants?
20. Does the experience of migration of other family members motivate women and girls to migrate too? If so, tell me more.
21. Who made the decision about the woman / girl leaving to work?

B. PREPARATION FOR MIGRATION (15 MINUTES)

22. What assistance do people who decide to leave the settlement for work need? How can they be helped?
23. Do you know which documents need to be prepared in order to leave the country? Do you know what documents need to be prepared to enter the migrant’s country of destination?
24. Does anyone help people who decide to leave to draw up documents correctly?
25. Where do migrants find money to cover transport expenses?
26. Does anyone help those who decide to leave to find work or accommodation?
27. Who should help people who decide to leave? How?
28. Do you know about opportunities to receive information/services/assistance on migration issues at public facilities? Have you tried to take up these opportunities anywhere? What service/assistance was it?

C. LIFE AS A MIGRANT (20 MINUTES)

29. What do women / girls do in migration? (Use a table that will allow you to see the differences and similarities in the choices of areas of activity). Why?
30. If they work, then where do they work and for whom? How do they find work? In what conditions do they work (work schedule, physical conditions, earnings)?
31. Do the women conclude contracts with their employers? If not, why not?
32. What strategies do women use and what do they do if they want a job but cannot find it on their own?
33. What are the main problems that women / girls face in labour migration? Do these problems face all migrants or do women / girls in migration face specific problems?
   Sound out further. It is important to know if there are gender differences in the problems of migrants. You can make a list of specific male and female problems.
34. What kind of problems face women who work and those who do not?
35. Who helps women / girls solve these problems? Is it enough help? Who should help?
   What assistance is still needed for women / girls who are migrants?
36. Questions on health in migration: Who helps to resolve them? How does family planning take place in migration?
37. How do migrants manage their monetary assets during migration and after it?
38. Who usually manages the money of women migrants and how? Is their opinion taken into account when managing this money?
39. Do migrant children continue their education as migrants?
40. How is the relationship between women migrants and children left in the homeland maintained?

D. ADAPTATION PROBLEMS OF WOMEN RETURNING FROM LABOUR MIGRATION (20 MINUTES)

41. Which factors determine if a woman or girl migrant will return or stay for a long time? Who, in general, returns?
42. How does life move on after migration? What do they do when they return?
43. What difficulties do they face after they return?
44. Are there specific problems for women and girls returning from migration?
   It is important to outline a wide range of problems, and talk not only about financial and material problems, but also about problems in interactions with people.
45. Is any assistance provided to resolve these problems? What assistance? Who provides it?
46. What additional assistance is necessary? Who should provide it? (Sound out possible assistance in various sectors: economic, social, psychological and medical)
47. For whom is it easier to adapt after return: men or women? Women or girls? Why?

E. ASSESSING EXPERIENCE OF MIGRATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (25 MINUTES)

48. How do people in your village feel about women leaving to earn money? Why do you think this? Give reasons for your answer.
   This requires probing. Possibly the answers / attitudes of respondents will vary depending on the characteristics
of the women: young or middle-aged, with or without children, married or divorced, etc.

49. How does women's departure influence their families? Let's start with positive changes. Which aspects of life improve in families after women depart?

50. And now let's discuss the problems that arise in families. For questions about positive and negative changes, if respondents do not state these, then discuss the impact of migration on the following aspects:

- Economic
  - household income
  - household expenditure
  - the workload of family members arising from migration
  - management of loans for travel expenses and other needs

- Social
  - social status in society
  - quality of food
  - access to health services
  - access and quality of children's education
  - the behaviour of children (who may become less controllable or, on the contrary, more obedient, etc.)

- Legal
  - for example, problems with drawing up legal documents

- The psychological and emotional conditions of family members
  - relations between family members
  - increased sense of insecurity and depression among family members

51. What positive changes have you seen in the local community as a result of labour migration of women and girls? What negative changes have occurred in the local community as a result of labour migration of women and girls?

52. Does the social role of women in the family change during and after migration?

53. From your perspective, which opportunities open up for women labour migrants? How does labour migration serve the personal development of women and girls?

a. In which cases would you argue that a woman's migration was successful for her family or herself? Under which conditions would you consider that a woman did not leave to work in vain? Tell us about specific cases in your locality. How can this case be seen as an example of successful migration?

b. In which cases, would you argue that a woman's migration was unsuccessful for her family or herself? Under what conditions would you consider that the woman had left to work in vain? Tell us about specific cases in your locality. How can this case be seen as an example of unsuccessful migration?

CONCLUSION

Thank you for your participation!

IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS WITH WOMEN WHO HAVE RETURNED FROM MIGRATION

Purpose of the interview: The interview will provide in-depth information about the needs and vulnerabilities of migrant women and girls affected by migration, and provide a subjective view of the factors that affect this vulnerability.
Introduction: Thank you for agreeing to participate in our study. My name is.... The purpose of our study is to understand the problems and difficulties of women and girls who have been migrants or whose relatives are migrants, and how they cope with these difficulties. The interview will take about one hour of your time. One of the most important conditions is that we will have to record the interview on a Dictaphone, and therefore the Dictaphone is turned on. This is done for convenience, so that later we can process the interview findings. I guarantee that the recording and all other materials received from you will not be used for any other purposes than those of research. You have the right to terminate the interview at any time, as well as not to answer any of the questions.

Do you agree to take part in our research?

The field guide provides a list of topics and questions that need to be raised during the interview. You should remember the list of topics for discussion, but you should not memorize the questions word for word. You can improve the quality of the interview and formulate new questions, taking into account the situation, the context and the respondent's answers.

A. SOCIAL ORIGIN

1. Say a little about yourself. Where were you born? Where did you grow up?
2. Talk about your parents. What did they do?
3. What is your education level? Where did you study? If the women/girl has not completed secondary school ask: Why did you not continue your studies?
4. Did you study when you were a migrant? If yes, where and what, and for how long? Why did you decide to study? Did you pay for your education? If yes, where did you get the money?
5. Are you married? If so, can you say a little about your husband and children?
   a. If divorced: Why did you divorce?
   b. If married or divorced: Was your marriage officially registered?
   c. If it was not registered: Why not? How did you feel about it? Did you try to register the marriage? Why?
6. How did your family live? Compared with other families, what was the material and social status of your family?
7. Which work or economic activity did you perform before migration?

B. REASONS FOR MIGRATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF MIGRATION

8. Where did you go and when? Who made / influenced this decision? How did you feel about the decision?
9. Why did you decide to leave to work? Which life circumstances influenced your decision to leave?
10. Did you know which city you were going to migrate to?
11. Did you work as a migrant? What were your expectations of working abroad? Were they met?
12. What skills did you learn as a migrant?
13. Which problems did you face when you left? (Focus in on economic, psychological and social problems)
14. Did you seek help to solve these problems? From whom? Were you helped? Did you need more help?

15. For whom is it easier to adapt to migration: men or women? Why?

16. What are the main problems that women face as labour migrants? Are these problems for all migrants or are they specific to women migrants? What about girls?

17. What kind of help should be provided to women/girl migrants? Who should provide such help? International organizations, diasporas, NGOs, etc.?

18. How did your departure affect your family?
   a. Let’s start with positive changes. Which aspects of life improved in your family as a result of your departure to work?
   b. And now talk about the problems that arose in your family as a result of labour migration.

19. Is there a difference in the consequences for the family if only a man leaves? Only a woman? A girl?

C. ADAPTATION PROBLEMS OF WOMEN RETURNING FROM LABOUR MIGRATION

20. Why did you decide to return?

21. What is your life like after migration? Do you have any regrets about your return? Do you regret that you left as a migrant?

22. What are you doing at the moment?

23. Which difficulties did you encounter after your return?

24. Do you have any help to solve these problems? What help? Who is providing it?

25. Is this assistance sufficient? What help do you need? Who should provide this help?

26. Who finds it easier to adapt after return: men or women? Why?

27. Do you think about ever migrating again? Why?

D. ATTITUDE TO MIGRATION

28. In your opinion, which opportunities open up for women as a result of labour migration? How can labour migration serve the personal development of women?
   a. In which cases would you argue that a woman’s migration was successful for her family or herself? Tell us about specific cases in your locality.
   b. Under which conditions would you consider that a woman to work in vain? Tell us about specific cases in your locality.

Thank you for your participation!

DESCRIPTION OF THE LEGAL ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

It is necessary to gather information on all legislation and regulations of Kyrgyzstan using the following keywords:

1. Migration
2. Status of a migrant
3. Trafficking in human beings
4. Exploitation, slavery
5. Rights of migrants
6. The Law on External Labour Migration
7. Services for migrants
8. Assistance to migrants
9. Diaspora
10. Families in difficult life situations
11. Forced migrant

Possible sources in Kyrgyzstan:
CIS website: site not found, but can be searched here: http://e-cis.info/page.php?id=18788

### List coding:

1. **Number**: the reference number of the article  
2. **Name**: Full name  
3. **Type of law or regulation**: 1 = constitutional law, 2 = code, 3 = law, 4 = presidential decree, 5 = decree, 6 = concept, 7 = plan, etc.  
4. **Date of adoption**: day, month, year of adoption  
5. **Status**: 1 = extant, 2 = not extant  
6. **If not extant, then from what period**: year  
7. **Date of amendment**: day, month, year of amendment  
8. **Description of the amendment**: a description of all the changes

### DESCRIPTION OF THE CONTEXT ANALYSIS METHOD

It is planned to analyse media products in five leading online informational agencies in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as follows:

For content analysis, articles published between 1 May 2017 and 31 May 2018 should be selected for the following key words:

1. migration  
2. migrant  
3. “victim”  
4. children of migrants  
5. daughter of migrants  
6. fate of a migrant  
7. services to migrants

### Coding list for content analysis

It is important to remember that the list of categories is not exhaustive and can be supplemented by the researchers performing the analysis.

1. **Number**: the reference number of the article  
2. **Source**: agency name  
3. **Date**: day, month, year of publication  
4. **Title of the rubric (if any)**: the full name of the rubric  
5. **Article name**: full name of the article  
6. **Size**: number of characters  
7. **Original / reprint**: 1=original, 2=reprint  
8. **Structure**: list the subheadings  
9. **Illustrations**: 1 = photo, 2 = caricature, 3 = chart or table, and so on.  
10. **Number of pictures**: record
11. **Nature of illustration**: 1 = abstract, 2 = concrete
12. **Creator of the illustration**: 1 = creator acknowledged, 2 = no creator acknowledged
13. **Referents**: list the organizations and persons to whom the author refers
14. **Use of statistics**: record statistics
15. **Use of research results**: record the research topic
16. **Functional use**: 1 = quote to support the statement, 2 = shows trends and facts about migration, 3 = for a counter-argument to stereotypical views ...
17. **Reason for product**: 1 = significant date, 2 = key political events, 3 = crime
18. **Description of reason for product**: write down the event around which the publication is timed
19. **Location**: write the name of the settlement
20. **Name of author**: given name and family name of author
21. **Sex of author**: 1 = man 2 = woman
22. **Status of author (if there is one)**:
23. **Author’s comments**: 1 = yes, 2 = no
24. **Heroine**: 1 = concrete, name open / concrete, 2 = changed name, 3 = composite character
25. **Image of heroine**: 1 = victim, 2 = aggressor / criminal, 3 = role model, positive deviant
26. **Family status of heroine**: 1 = never married, 2 = married, 3 = widowed, 4 = divorced
27. **Professional status**: works where and what as
28. **Age of the heroine**: number of full years
29. **Region**: region of origin of the heroine
30. **Is there direct speech from the heroine**: 1 = yes, 2 = no
31. **Is there direct speech about its other heroes**: 1 = yes, 2 = no
32. **If so, who is quoted**: write down who is being quoted
33. **Metaphors**: write down all the metaphors that are used
34. **Definitions of the heroine**: write down the adjectives and nouns that are used to describe the heroine
35. **Number of commentaries to the article**
36. **Link**: internet link to the article