

RISK ANALYSIS ON RETURN MIGRATION AND CHALLENGES IN CENTRAL ASIA **2017**



Government of the United States



International Organization for Migration (IOM)
The UN Migration Agency



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


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Risk Analysis on Return Migration and Challenges in Central Asia 2017

1. Background

The 2016 IOM CA/Library of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Nazarbayev Center)/USAID Dignity and Rights (DAR) Regional Field Assessment Phase I report¹ has revealed that the introduction of bans on re-entering Russia for certain categories of foreigners is preventing more than 2 million individuals, mostly originating from Central Asia, from return to Russia for a period ranging from three to even 10 years. That new situation added a stimulus toward return migration, which created considerable challenges to a variety of stakeholders in Central Asian countries of migrants' origin, destination and transit: individual migrants in need to deal with growing vulnerabilities; governments challenged with the need to create additional workplaces and provide social services (health, education, etc.); societies as a whole coping with lower level of remittances and general incomes; and finally, the international community and donors under obligations to put preventive strategies and adequate assistance programmes in place.

Re-entry banned migrants could potentially become one of the most vulnerable migrant groups, exposed to the risk of recruitment by terrorist and criminal groups due to their unfavourable economic situation, inability to find a job after ban, and strong psychological stress accompanying their new life situation. Moreover, alienation, abuse of their rights in the workplace reduce migrants' trust in the ability of the states to stand up for them, and eventually they may turn for help to the extremist and/or criminal organisations. Analysis of policies adopted by the CA governments to deal with these scenarios shows

that the issue of the re-entry bans continues to be treated predominantly as a security challenge while the re-entry ban impact needs to be met with a wider integration response.²

The aim of this analysis is to validate the research findings of the 2017 IOM CA/Library of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Nazarbayev Center)/USAID Dignity and Rights Regional Field Assessment Phase II focused on the impact of return migration on Central Asian societies and economies as well as assessing migrants' re-integration needs through a risk analysis prism. The analysis also takes stock of migrant vulnerabilities analysed under the BPRM direct assistance project (2016-2017), offering a realistic approach of the dynamics of the particular vulnerable group (re-entry banned migrants). The analysis presents both the regional perspective of Central Asia and the country-level outlook for Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. Where possible, migration movements from Uzbekistan in the region have been also taken into account.³

Risk analysis considers two main aspects: (1) the likelihood of a given factor occurring and (2) the depth of its impact on the effectiveness of interventions. It takes into account both the 'objective' and 'subjective' aspects of the assessment. In the 'objective' sense, it judges what impact the legal measures, policy measures and changes in the socio-economic status can have on migrants' welfare through reference to ex-

1 IOM Central Asia, 2016 Regional Field Assessment "Migrants Vulnerabilities and Integration Needs in Central Asia, Root Causes, Social and Economic Impact of Return migration"; <http://www.iom.kz/images/inform/FinalFullReport18SBNlogocom.pdf>.

2 Ibidem.

3 Throughout this analysis, unless otherwise noted, references are made to the results of the desk and field research activities of the Phase II assessment, including expert interviews in the socio-economic, sociopolitical and radicalization areas and interviews and focus groups with migrants, NGOs and community and diaspora leaders undertaken as part of sociological fieldwork.

tensive experts' interviews as well available studies, legal documents, statistics, and other public data. In the 'subjective' sense, the various risk factors are weighted on the basis of migrants' testimonies.

In particular, an attempt is made to validate the 'theory of change' developed in Phase I USAID DAR Regional Field Assessment (2016) through measurement of potential risks to the theory application.⁴ We identify possible risk factors together with their likelihood and impact that may hamper the designed change. It is also comparing the current migratory situation in Central Asia and its multidimensional impacts with the desired 'optimal' situation as provided in the 'theory of change'. In other words, the analysis proposes the critical reflections on the 'missing milieu (middle)' between current risks and optimal state of re-integration in countries of origin (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) as well as integration in the countries of destination (Kazakhstan). It also vastly benefits from the good practices of migrants' re-integration observed during re-integration pilot schemes in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as well as from worldwide IOM experience captured in IOM/BPRM Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster (MICIC).

The analysis consists of several parts. The introductory sections, the Background, the Objectives and key terms, present the general goals and assumptions of the risk analysis, and are followed by the methodological considerations, indicating how a risk analysis may serve as a tool validating the 'theory of change' and helping program future interventions. The main part of the analysis validates each pillar of the 'theory

of change' by comparing the desired situation in the fields that are crucial for the improvement of Central Asian migrants legal and social situation against the current status quo and exploring risks and opportunities for possible change. The analysis ends up with the general conclusions and recommendations that sum up the main risks that may hamper the implementation of 'theory of change' categorised by their likelihood and impact.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 63-64.

2. Objectives and key terms

Although return migration is an issue of fundamental importance for Central Asian countries, it is very much under researched. In particular, it lacks studies on effectiveness of migration policies of both countries of origin and destination, future ways to go, linkages between migrants' vulnerabilities and wider risks and opportunities for the region. Risk analysis provides an additional perspective for interpreting the results of the socio-economic and socio-political and sociological field work (interviews) conducted in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in February-May 2017 to capture the influence of different political and social environments, and their linkages with migrants' vulnerabilities on possible future interventions aimed at improving migrants' rights observance, migration management (with particular emphasis on integration and re-integration) and the prevention of violent extremism in Central Asia. It is based upon 98 expert interviews and in-depth qualitative interviews with 350 migrants conducted in Kazakhstan (perspective of destination state), Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (perspective of countries of origin).

In particular, the risk analysis provides an analytical strand to validate the 'theory of change' developed for the needs of the IOM CA/Library of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Nazarbayev Center)/USAID DAR Regional Assessment Phase I (2016) through investigating potential risks/challenges that may hamper the positive (re)integration of returning migrants and stimulate possible migrants' radicalization. In our particular case, it was decided to bring into play the risk perspective as a most suitable approach for validating the 'theory of change' in highly dynamic and challenging migratory-related context of Central Asia.

Thus, this analysis applies two key notions: 'theory of change' and 'risk', defined as follows:

Theory of change: Theory of change is an outcome-based approach which applies critical thinking to the design, implementation and evaluation of initiatives and programmes intended to support change in their multidimensional contexts. Theory of change draws its methodological credentials from a long-standing area of evaluation. There is no single definition of what theory of change is and there is no set methodology.⁵ It is up to the concrete initiative or programme which tools it will apply. In very broad terms, theory of change is essentially a comprehensive description and illustration of how and why a desired change is expected to happen in a particular context, in a given period of time. Experts agree that the theory of change concept first of all concerns critical thinking over many underlying assumptions about how change may happen in a programme.⁶ We understand theory of change as a planning tool exploring set of beliefs, assumptions and risks and how the desired change may occur.⁷

Risk: In recent years the situation in labour migration in and outside Central Asia has become complex, requiring a broad range of policy measures to adequately respond to the emerging issues. The economic downturn in Russia has left a lasting impact on Central Asia, not least on migration movements in the region. Returning migrants find themselves in particularly precarious legal, economic and social sta-

5 I. Vogel, Review of the use of 'theory of change' in international development, Review Report, UK Department of International Development, April 2012; Hivos ToC Guidelines, Theory of change thinking in practise: a stepwise approach, November 2015.

6 Ibidem.

7 Ibidem.

tus. Specific vulnerabilities of this group need to be in focus of attention when planning migration projects and/or programmes with broader PVE activities, and specific attention should be paid to identifying the individuals who could become more vulnerable and therefore possibly a target of extremist and/or crime organizations. In those circumstances, any pursuit for a positive change encounters difficulties and is plagued by many risks.

The analysis apply a most suitable for migration research definition of risk characterizing risk as “the probability of an action taken by a particular party resulting in an undesirable impact or consequence for that party”.⁸ In other words, risk is a probability of failure of a certain action undertaken by an actor (migrant, state etc.). By avoiding or modifying these actions the actor concerned could avoid or mitigate their undesirable outcomes. Risk definitions usually consist of three crucial components: (1) undesirable outcomes, (2) the likelihood of an occurrence of these undesirable outcomes where adverse circumstances/conditions that contribute to the failure are in particular analysed and (3) how these outcomes are perceived by an affected actor.⁹

Risk concept is a very important but fairly new research approach in studies of migration or development policies, being more often used in sociology or economic theory of migration. In sociology, anthropology and economy risk has been usually studied at the individual level in the context of different mi-

grants’ vulnerabilities and adopted migration strategies.¹⁰ Risk research on the macro level (state level or international relations level) is rather derived from the management studies and is usually aimed at forecasting levels and impacts of irregular migration.¹¹

8 O. Renn, “Concepts of Risks: A Classification”, in: S. Krimsky, D. Golding (eds.), *Social Theories of Risk*, Westport: Praeger 1992.

9 C. Giersch, *Political Risk and Political Due Diligence*, Global Risk Affairs, March 2011; A.M. Williams, V. Baláž, “Migration, Risk and Uncertainty: Theoretical Perspectives”, *Population, Space and Place* 2012.

10 D. Massey et al., “Theories of international migration: a review and appraisal”, *Population and Development Review* 1993, Vol. 19, Nr 3; C. Zimmerman, A. McAlpine, L. Kiss, *Safer labour migration and community-base preventions of exploitation: the state of evidences for programming*, The Freedom Fund and London School of Hygin and Tropical Medicine 2015.

11 See: European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) annual risk analyses for practical application by border management agencies; for details of application of risk concept in migration studies see: M. Jaroszewicz, M. Kindler, *Irregular migration from Ukraine and Belarus to the EU: a risk analysis study*, Centre for Migration Research of Warsaw University, April 2015.

3. Methodological approach

Research approach and tools: For the purpose of this analysis, we look at each pillar of the ‘theory of change’ to see whether the proposed actions and goals are realistic and can be achieved, and what risks may transpire on the way to accomplish those goals. ‘Theory of change’ used here proposes a framework for a set of actions to comprehensively address re-entry ban returning migrants’ vulnerabilities and reduce possible radicalization potential of that group in the four vital entry points of intervention: (1) involvement of communities before, during and after migration (2) providing employment opportunities and integration

services in destination states (3) reducing the post-ban shock through targeted support in countries of origin (4) governments’ policies to promote safer labour migration (for details see Fig. 1). By filtering possible risks by likelihood and impact we will attempt to assess what are the weakest and the strongest elements and approaches within each pillar.

Validation of risk factors influencing the possible implementation of the ‘theory of change’ was done through a deductive method, in which the ‘optimal’ situation that was to be achieved (as stipulated in the

Fig. 1. ‘Theory of change’ four pillars developed in Phase I DAR research




Table 1. Main sources of information: desk review and field assessment

<i>Type of research</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Materials</i>
Desk review	To indentify all possible risk factors and to indentify best examples of re-integration and PvE assistance, to inductively gain knowledge on risk filtering and certain categories of failures likelihood and magnitude.	Literature review, strategic and operational documents, laws, official statistics
Field assessment	To indentify migrant's vulnerabilities and (re)integration needs, current policies and assistance frameworks, experts opinion on risk situations (including political, security, economic and social) and find out from various stakeholders (governmental officials, NGOs, community leaders, diasporas) opinions on best possible interventions	Protocols from sociological strand with interviews with migrants, Individual and group interviews with state officials and practitioners, focus groups with officials and practitioners

'theory of change') would be contrasted with a range of risk factors identified primarily through reference to the findings of the desk and field research, as shown in Table 1. Where no empirical data could be invoked, identification of risk factors has been supplemented by inductive methods, by application of similar case studies and trends' extrapolation. In parallel, current and potential opportunities for achieving the objectives under each pillar of the 'theory of change' were identified through reference to existing and feasible good practices.

The next stage of analysis involved risk filtering, which revealed main potential risk factors that may hamper or make impossible the implementation of the applied model of migrants' (re)integration and prevention of violent extremism. Filtering was conducted deductively – by selecting the risk factors with higher likelihood and impact that could severely impact envisaged interventions. The most promising opportunities will be also proposed.

'Theory of change' was also verified against other more universal intervention frameworks, in particular

IOM Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster (MICIC)¹² or IOM (re)integration effective approaches' best practices. In particular, MICIC principles and guidelines aimed at improving abilities of states, international organizations, civil society and private sector to respond to the needs of migrants in countries experiencing emergency situations can bring added value to the 'theory of change' application including better preparedness for various risks and possibility to quickly react to the changing circumstances (for details see Fig. 2).

In our case of particular consideration are the subsequent MICIC principles followed by best guidelines and best existing practices:

- **Principle no. 3** States bear the primary responsibility to protect migrants within their territories and their own citizens, including when they are abroad;

- **Principle no. 4** Private sector agents, international

¹² IOM, Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster, June 2016, <https://micicinitiative.iom.int/repository-practices>.

organizations, and civil society play a significant role in protecting migrants and in supporting States to protect migrants;

- **Principle no. 5.** Humanitarian action to protect migrants should be guided by the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence.
- **Principle no. 7.** Migrants strengthen the vitality of both their host States and States of origin in multiple ways.
- **Principle no. 8.** Action at the local, national, regional, and international levels is necessary to improve responses.
- **Principle no. 9.** Partnership, cooperation, and coordination are essential for between and among States, private sector actors, international organisations, civil society, local communities, and migrants.
- **Principle no. 10.** Continuous research, learning, and innovation improve our collective response.





Fig. 2. Relationship between 'theory of change' and IOM MICIC framework



4. Validation of risk factors

In this section the ‘theory of change’ assumptions in each of the four pillars are practically validated. This is done through comparing the situation in which the programme goals set in the ‘theory of change’ are achieved as planned (resulting in the ‘optimal situation’) against the risks and opportunities identified during analysis of the ‘current’ situation (trends and impact of return migration in Central Asia).¹³ The proposed evolution from ‘current’ to the ‘optimal’ situation will be accomplished by identifying the most serious risks and existing opportunities (risk filtering). In our analysis we will take into consideration the perspective of all three states analyzed, namely Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. Where possible, migration movements from Uzbekistan in the region are also taken into account.

4.1. Involvement of communities before, during and after migration may mitigate pull factors to radicalization

This sub-section presents the rationale and possible patterns of involvement of communities into migration management as a key mechanism mitigating possible radicalization factors. The IOM CA/Library of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Nazarbayev Center)/USAID DAR Phase I (2016) results have acknowledged that “communities’ involvement into communication and assistance provision to the vulnerable migrants are essential elements of a long-term prevention strat-

egy”.¹⁴ Phase II (2017) involves conceptualizing key parameters of ‘optimal’ involvement, current risks and opportunities, and the risk filtering relating those specific risks in broader environmental factors.

BOX 1. PILLAR 1 RATIONALE

Role of communities in migrants’ coping strategies

IOM CA/Library of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Nazarbayev Center)/USAID DAR Phase I (2016) research has come up with the hypothesis, widely shared by scholars, that *“in Central Asia local communities and social networks are part and parcel of migrants’ coping strategies and can effectively prevent migrants from social isolation and possible radicalization”*.¹⁵ Local (community-level) identity often constitutes the ‘we-they’ distinction for many Central Asian residents. In many locations the collective understanding of identity prevails over individual self-identification.¹⁶ Currently observed rise in self-expression of Muslim identity in the region in many cases is not primarily conceived as belonging into global community of all Muslim believers (*umma*), but serves to amplify certain local identities. IOM interviews with migrants confirm this collective

¹³ Analysis of the results of the socioeconomic assessment.

¹⁴ IOM Central Asia, 2016 Regional Field Assessment..., op. cit, p. 63-64.
¹⁵ IOM Central Asia, 2016 Regional Field Assessment..., op. cit, p. 19-21; G. Ubiir, Soviet National Building in Central Asia. The making of the Kazakh and Uzbek Nations, London: Routledge 2016; M. Y. Omilicheva (eds.) Nationalism and Identity Construction in Central Asia. Dimensions, Dynamics and Directions, London: Lexington Books 2015. K. Collins, The logic of clan politics in Central Asia: the impact on regime transformation, Cambridge 216, p. 75-81
¹⁶ Ibidem.

dimension of Central Asian societies' identity, which is demonstrated by instances, in which the welfare of local community or of extended family or positive perception by the local community may prevail over individual life goals. For instance, the decision to migrate is rarely made by an individual, but mostly is determined by the family or local community. Migrants are also influenced by the migration pattern of other members of the community or a need to earn for collective rituals like weddings.¹⁷

The importance of a collective identity may be also revealed in the crucial information provision role that informal leaders play in local communities in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Particularly in Kyrgyzstan informal religious leaders are respected by local communities for their high level of religious learning that is increasingly in demand in the Kyrgyz society, particularly among the youth. Informal religious leaders are relatively free to play this role in Kyrgyzstan, which permits non-radical salafist movements and other non-traditional religious organizations to operate without obstruction within the country. The Uzbek minority in southern Kyrgyzstan also often prefer to open their own religious facilities instead of attending those run by the government-supported muftis.¹⁸ In Kazakhstan, a destination country, migrants first of all turn for assistance to other migrants originating from their municipalities in the countries of origin. The first place, where vulnerable Central Asian migrants look for assistance in Kazakhstan are informal networks; at bazaars they are effectively re-directed towards their country fellow men and women, desirably originating from the same region, city or village.¹⁹




Fig. 3. Aspects of involvement of communities (Pillar 1)

4.1.1. 'Optimal' situation

The pillar involves actions in both the countries of migrants' origin and destination. It assumes that successful involvement of communities into migration management requires the presence of four crucial interlinked elements: **dialogue, trust, preventing alienation and rights awareness**. This pillar is built upon MICIC Guidelines no. 4 and no. 6 which seek to engage migrants and communities in developing crisis response strategies and to target them with communication strategies, including informal methods (Fig. 3).²⁰

In an 'optimal' situation central and local governments and NGOs both in Kyrgyzstan and in Tajikistan as well as in Kazakhstan should cooperate closely with the local communities of migrants in assistance provision to the most vulnerable migrants. Once efficient referral mechanisms are in place, vulnerable migrants who turn for assistance to the community leaders (in countries of origin) and to diaspora (in destination

¹⁷ Analysis of the results of the sociological assessment.

¹⁸ Kyrgyzstan, Expert interviews, 10-13 April 2017.

¹⁹ Kazakhstan Expert interviews, 4-8 March 2017.

²⁰ MICIC Guidelines, p. 43 and p. 51-52.

countries) are to be efficiently referred to competent institutions (state bodies and non-governmental organizations) to receive further comprehensive information and material support.

Dialogue: MICIC Guideline no. 7 calls for dialogue between various stakeholders and migrants through the active and comprehensive involvement of the governments and international community in the capacity-building activities for local governments and NGOs²¹ to effectively communicate with the local communities and informal leaders. Members of local communities, informal leaders, returning migrants themselves and their families are expected to take active part in programming of local re-integration and information campaigns. Modern dissemination techniques should be applied, including a wide use of IT tools, in particular migration-related smartphone applications. In a destination state, diaspora organizations or other migrants' organizations should be invited by the governmental institutions, international and non-governmental organizations to jointly develop re-integration programmes for the most vulnerable migrants. State institutions carry out mutually beneficial dialogue with muftis and other religious organizations, where women and young migrants' needs are addressed in particular.

Trust: Establishment of efficient referral mechanism allows for involving informal leaders into information campaigns and assistance provision to the vulnerable migrants. NGOs may use this channel to properly assess the depth of migrants' vulnerability and their assistance needs. Certain social groups (single women or re-entry ban migrants) may be best reached by informal leaders. NGOs and community organizations in the country of origin need to maintain regular contact with their counterparts in the destination country so as to refer migrants to each other. Trust serves as a guiding principle of future interventions with reach-

out strategy involving wide variety of actors, including informal/community leaders.

Preventing alienation: In destination countries like Kazakhstan, ethnic diasporas need to be further empowered to react to the fellow citizens' needs. Diaspora organizations become more inclusive towards new migrants and their integration needs, not only towards 'old' representatives of ethnic minorities, well settled in destination states. Diaspora organizations that work closely with the NGOs, international organizations, governments of both destination and origin states are able to assist vulnerable migrants to keep in touch with their families and communities in a home country. In turn, placing the migration in the community context (migrants are addressed as community members and assistance is directed also towards their families), along with involvement of religious leaders in countries of origin weakens migrants' potential for possible radicalization.

Migrant rights awareness: Informal leaders play a crucial role in providing migrants with information, however they may (often unintentionally) put migrants at risk when their migration-related knowledge is limited or inaccurate. Migrants make less risky migration decisions when they are provided by informal/community leaders, local authorities in the countries of origin as well diaspora and migrants organizations in destination countries with fair fact-based non-discriminatory information support as well as social support (in case of most vulnerable migrants). NGOs disseminate information on safe migration and radicalization deterrence among community and informal (including religious) leaders. Better quality of communication with migrants raises awareness of their rights, legal migration opportunities and possible re-integration back home.

4.1.2. Opportunities

Further interventions implementing the 'theory of

²¹ Ibidem, p. 76-77.

change' assumptions should be heavily embedded in existing realities and build upon the existing best practices of community involvement. We have revealed some good examples with positive role of communities in migration facilitation process both in the country of origin and destination.

Trust and preventing alienation: Migrants from southern Kyrgyzstan seek assistance/advice in religious organizations, mosques (also in Russia) from which they often receive material support or are referred to a potential employer.²² Members of communities/extended family in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan send vulnerable re-entry migrants money that allows them to return home.²³ Compatriots help migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan who appear at the bazaars in Kazakhstan referring them to NGOs, religious organizations, potential employers, advising where they can receive medical assistance.²⁴ In our interviews we found about the numerous cases in Kyrgyzstan where informal leaders effectively countered possible migrants' radicalization and their departure for Syria by carrying out direct communication, raising migrants' awareness on associated risks. In Tajikistan a positive role has been played by local *mahallas* (communities) where their leaders engage in facilitating contacts between migrants and the state authorities. Tajik communities in both cities and rural regions have developed a system of self-governance in the form of so-called mahalla councils. The councils have been organising various traditional activities within the community such as weddings and funerals, conducting public works and educational activities (also de-radicalization ones).

22 Kazakhstan, Expert interview, 4-8 March 2017; Kazakhstan, Focus group, March 2017; Kyrgyzstan, Focus group, 10-13 April 2017.

23 Kyrgyzstan, Expert interviews, 10-13 April 2017.

24 Kazakhstan, Expert interviews, March 2017.

BOX 2. PILLAR 1 GOOD PRACTICE

Positive involvement of informal leaders in Kyrgyzstan

Experts' interviews revealed several cases of positive involvement of community/informal leaders in preventing possible migrants' radicalization and de-radicalization activities.

'Imams ask and appeal to jamaats to help migrants in need. Thanks to that migrants do not turn to salafis'.

'Many returning migrants struggle to find jobs on their own. In this situation properly organised leisure time comes to the forefront as one of the ways to prevent their radicalization. Sporting events and sports clubs can be a solution'.

'Together with the qaziyat and hatibiyat we organise meetings for school children with former fighters who now repent their actions'.

'I personally helped one guy who had been to Syria but he says he did not take part in fighting. The police wanted to put him into prison with a long sentence. I acted as an intermediary'.

Limited trust, raising migrant right awareness:

Where it comes to NGOs, it appears that it is the most reliable channel for assistance provision; however few migrants know about NGOs activities. Moreover, assistance offered by NGOs is very limited, mainly targeting legal and medical support. In general NGOs lack capacities/resources to provide job counseling advice and provision of micro grants or loans.²⁵ Consequently, it may be expected that if the local communities in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are systemically

25 Kyrgyzstan, Focus group with NGOs, 10-13 April, Tajikistan, Focus group with NGOs, 13-14 April 2017.

involved in promoting safe migration and conducting migrants' awareness campaigns, migrants will make more rational migration decisions. Such involvement might be particularly crucial in assisting migrants to look for safer transport possibilities and legal employment opportunities abroad, consistently consider migration path and invest in obtaining skills and professions required abroad.

4.1.3. Identification of risk factors

Misused trust, alienation: Certain categories of more vulnerable migrants, for instance re-entry banned migrants, are forced to rely only on community-based networks, which in turn may deepen their specific vulnerabilities. Alienation, abuse of rights in the workplace reduce migrants' trust in the ability of the state to stand up for them, and eventually they turn to non-state actors (including, informal ones) for help. The interviews revealed that migrants' negative experience of contacts with authorities in Russia discourage them from turning to Kazakh authorities for assistance and limit opportunities for aid to informal channels.²⁶ We found out that bus drivers from local communities transporting migrants from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan via Kazakhstan usually take away passports from the migrants and return them only at the final destination in Russia. They hand over migrants to other intermediaries or future employers, often against migrant's will.²⁷ When a migrant finds out that he/she is on re-entry ban list and may not enter Russia, bus drivers may bring a migrant to the alternative workplace where he/she is severely exploited.²⁸ However, harsh economic conditions back home may induce the migrant to exploit this risky migration path once again.²⁹ Although highly risky, social networks are crucial for migrants' strategies and their absence may be even more destructive. Migrants from

Tajikistan in northern Kazakhstan who are returned from the Russian border cannot rely on any community-based networks therefore without assistance from NGOs or international organizations they have no opportunities to return home.³⁰

Limited dialogue and limited opportunities: Diaspora organizations both in Russia and in Kazakhstan have very restricted possibilities to help vulnerable migrants due to their limited human and financial capacities as well as insufficient transparency and accountability vis-à-vis migrants. They usually refer migrants to the NGOs or assist them financially only in the most critical situations like deaths.³¹ In many cases, community members, not being aware of possible risks provide migrants with the contacts to informal intermediaries, who are the only possible migration-related network they have. With very imperfect information on possible migration options accessed via community-related channels, Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek migrants in Kazakhstan and Russia usually turn for assistance to the informal networks, including relatives and private intermediaries who have been found at times to exploit migrants.³²

As we discovered during the expert interviews, in the worst-case scenario private intermediaries may also serve as channel for possible recruitment of migrants to join ISIS or other terrorist and/or criminal organizations. Alienated, mistreated migrants in hard economic and social conditions, with no access to possible legal employment opportunities, may fall victim to recruitment by extremist or criminal organizations.³³ Some experts we interviewed claimed that Central Asian migrants have been recently more thoroughly targeted by the international terrorist organizations due to their excessive vulnerabilities and gloomy per-

26 Kazakhstan, Expert interviews March & May 2017.

27 Analysis of the results of the sociological assessment in Kazakhstan.

28 Kazakhstan, Expert interviews, March, May & June 2017.

29 Ibidem.

30 Kazakhstan, Expert & NGOs focus groups, March 2017.

31 Expert interviews in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, March-June 2017.

32 Ibidem.

33 Analysis of the results of expert assessment on radicalization in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

spectives for improvement of their socioeconomic situation.³⁴ Recruiters who enlist Kyrgyz or Tajik citizens to join international extremist and/or criminal organizations often use internet as a recruitment mean as well some mosques in Russia and Turkey where Central Asian migrants look for assistance.³⁵ But even in the case of recruitment via internet resources, local community members may be used by the recruiters in the final recruitment stage, where a migrant is provided with the financial resources and a ticket to a place of his new destination.³⁶

Absence of migrant rights awareness: Majority of Central Asian migrants interviewed by IOM experts have very low level of awareness of their rights, low level of education and fairly random access to services that would help them to defend those rights. A study prepared in 2016 by the Committee for Human Rights under the President of Kazakhstan has revealed that 10% of surveyed migrants in South Kazakhstan sought legal assistance and mere 0.1% of all cases involving migrant workers lodged appeals to the higher court.³⁷ NGOs, community leaders and other groups that could increase migrants' awareness, may also lack proper knowledge and legal comprehension. Local community leaders may have low level of legal knowledge and other migration-related awareness, and they don't have regular contacts with governmental authorities/NGOs/IOs working with migrants. Diaspora organizations both in Russia and in Kazakhstan have very limited opportunities to help vulnerable migrants, also in legal terms and are not sufficiently equipped to protect migrant rights in courts/state in-

stitutions or in relationship with the employer.³⁸

4.1.4. Assessment of risk probability and impact

Risk 1. Trust without dialogue and migrant right awareness:

There is a high probability that migrants may not reach their migration objectives (safe and legal migration, decent wages) when relying solely on community-based networks in both country of origin and destination. This includes assistance from informal/community leaders and diaspora organizations. When migration, which for many migrants is the only available life strategy, fails, this has immediate and high impact on migrants' socio-economic welfare. There is a high probability that migrants may become victims of exploitation, in some cases they will be recruited to join terrorist or criminal organizations, when using the assistance of informal intermediaries both in the home and destination country.

High probability, high impact.

Risk 2. Low trust, limited dialogue: There is a lower probability and lower impact of migrants' not reaching their goals when they rely on NGOs either in home and destination states. However, migrants rarely turn to NGOs and assistance that can be provided is very limited. Unless significantly empowered, diaspora organizations will not be able to assist vulnerable migrants from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in Kazakhstan.

Low probability, medium impact.

Risk 3. Alienation, no dialogue, manipulation: There is a growing likelihood that extremist organizations in Russia and Turkey could be using religious institutions to enlist migrants, which in some cases could have extremely negative impact in the form of recruitment for conducting terrorist attacks in Russia or in Europe. In addition, they may decide to look for possible tar-

34 Ibidem.

35 Kyrgyzstan Expert interviews, April & May 2017, Tajikistan, Expert interviews, April 2017.

36 Search for Common Ground, Messages, Images and Media Channels Promoting Youth Radicalisation in Kyrgyzstan, January 2017, <https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Kyrgyzstan-radicalization-social-media-report-ENG.pdf>; N. Tucker, Public and State Messages to ISIS Messaging: Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, CAP Central Asia Programme, February 2016.

37 КОМИССИЯ ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА ПРИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТЕ РЕСПУБЛИКИ КАЗАХСТАН, АНАЛИТИЧЕСКИЙ ДОКЛАД. АКТУАЛЬНЫЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ ЗАЩИТЫ ПРАВ ТРУДЯЩИХСЯ-МИГРАНТОВ В РЕСПУБЛИКЕ КАЗАХСТАН, 2016. p. 197

38 Expert interviews in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, March-June 2017.

gets directly in Central Asian countries, particularly using internet recruitment combined with direct communication via community networks. In the 'optimal' scenario, NGOs disseminate information on safe migration and radicalization deterrence among informal (including spiritual) leaders, particularly in Kyrgyzstan. Although there is low probability that such schemes may be put into effect in the short-term perspective, they are likely to have significant positive impact.

Low probability, high impact.

Risk 4. Alienation, no dialogue, mistreatments:

There is a risk that if Central Asian migrants in Kazakhstan will still have so restricted possibilities to legalise their stay and work, their deep reliance on informal intermediaries may bring the risk of systemic mistreatment of migrants and possible criminalisation of migrants' employment sphere.

High probability, high impact.

4.2. Validation of Pillar 2: Employment opportunities and integration services in destination countries as factor deterring radicalization

This sub-section formulates the rationale, challenges and opportunities for putting in place, in addition to existing employment opportunities, dedicated integration services for Central Asian vulnerable migrants in the destination state. Although Pillar 2 is mainly concerned with the situation in Kazakhstan as a destination state, attention has also been paid to the needs of migrants in Russia insofar as they were confirmed through the desk research or during interviews with returning migrants.

BOX 3. PILLAR 2 RATIONALE

Integration opportunities in countries of destination and origin

None of the investigated countries of migrants' origin (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, but also Uzbekistan), have so far been able to meet the challenge of ensuring stable employment to their citizens, mainly due to the quickly rising numbers of populations. The labour force supply in Central Asia is predicted to grow by up to 4 million workers over the next ten years and will continue to grow further beyond 2026.³⁹ Another problem (particularly pressing in rural regions) is low level of wages that does not allow population to secure their basic needs. For instance, In Tajikistan, the average wage in the southern Khatlon Region stands at only 715 somoni, which is less than half than that recorded in Dushanbe (1619 somoni). Despite stable economic growth, around 30% of population of Tajikistan lives below the national poverty line, and 40% of youth population is unemployed.⁴⁰ Rural poverty is also a pervasive issue in Kyrgyzstan, where in spite of reduction by 6.7%, the poverty rate was equal to 25.4% in 2016.

Central Asian emigration is stimulated by the demand from the labour market of Kazakhstan and Russia. According to the 2016 forecast prepared by the Ministry of Healthcare and Social Development of Kazakhstan, the labour market needs of Kazakhstan will grow by 60,000 people annually over the next five years with much of the demand in huge industrial and construction projects.⁴¹ Kazakhstani government underlines the country's need for highly specialised

39 IOM Central Asia, 2016 Regional Field Assessment..., op. cit, p. 39.
40 <http://documents.vsemirnyjbank.org/curated/ru/460071486972590226/pdf/112666-REVISED-RUSSIAN-WB-TJK-JobD-RU-overview-web-opt-01.pdf>
41 КОМИССИЯ ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА ПРИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТЕ РЕСПУБЛИКИ КАЗАХСТАН, АНАЛИТИЧЕСКИЙ ДОКЛАД. АКТУАЛЬНЫЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ ЗАЩИТЫ ПРАВ ТРУДЯЩИХСЯ-МИГРАНТОВ В РЕСПУБЛИКЕ КАЗАХСТАН, 2016.



migrants, while noting that influx of unskilled labour migrants may create tensions on the local labour markets.⁴²

According to the forecast of the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), the Russian working-age population will decrease by 10.3 million people in the period of 2012-2030.⁴³ As in Kazakhstan, the Russian companies report strongest demand for highly-qualified specialists and skilled workers.⁴⁴ At the same time, prolonged economic stagnation has increased competition in the sector of unqualified labour in Russian cities, due to the immigration of many Russian citizens from rural areas.⁴⁵

Despite the strong demand, Central Asian migrants' position on the labour markets of Kazakhstan and Russia has been precarious. Neither Kazakhstan nor Russia offer comprehensive integration services, and economic downturn in both countries has reduced wages. The drop in average real wages strongly affected migrants' incomes as it was revealed during the sociological interviews⁴⁶, which in turn decreased remittance flows in 2016 (by as much as 30% from Kazakhstan to other Central Asian countries and also around 30% from Russia to Tajikistan). The exception are remittances from Russia to Kyrgyzstan which in 2016 increased by 20%.⁴⁷

4.2.1. 'Optimal' situation

According to MICIC principle no. 3, regulation of the conditions of migrants' entry and stay should be ac-

companied by destination states' efforts to enable them to legalize the status of their residence and employment.⁴⁸ 'Theory of change' argues that successful integration of migrants depends on the presence in a destination state of three crucial interlinked elements: *employment situation, comprehensive integration assistance, and better planned migration strategies*. Firstly, an optimal 'employment situation' may be achieved when a wide range of issues in conditions of employment is gradually addressed so as to make




Fig. 4. Factors determining integration in a destination state (Pillar 2)

them safer and fully legal. Secondly, a migrant who implements a 'better planned migration strategy' consisting of more rational migration decisions based on wider set of information may experience lower levels of vulnerabilities and be more able to adapt to the different circumstances. When discussing comprehensive integration assistance, we refer to the policies and strategies that promote the social, economic and cultural inclusion of migrants within existing legal frameworks in countries of destination.⁴⁹

⁴² Ibidem.

⁴³ W. Mukomiel, "Labour Mobility of Migrants from CIS Countries in Russia", *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2013, pp. 21-38.

⁴⁴ Ministry of Economic Development of Russia 2017.

⁴⁵ <https://komitetgi.ru/analytics/3286/>

⁴⁶ Analysis of the results of the regional sociological assessment

⁴⁷ National Bank of Kazakhstan 2016.

⁴⁸ MICIC Guidelines, p. 19.

⁴⁹ <https://www.iom.int/migrant-integration>.

Employment status and better planned migration strategies:

In the 'optimal' situation migrants who are still likely to look at Russia as the main destination might use comprehensive informational and job facilitation assistance to make more rational choices and seek various opportunities at home or in another destination country. Integration assistance starts already in a sending country. Migrants who complete trainings/re-trainings and skills recognition procedures, are expected to acquire better language and functional literacy skills so that their skills are more in line with the needs of the destination country labour market. MICIC principles envision that destination states ought to create opportunities for migrants' legalization and show respect to their international obligations, including protection of migrants' labour rights, addressing barriers that inhibit migrants' ability to enjoy their rights, promotion of fair and legal recruitment.⁵⁰

Comprehensive integration services: As suggested by MICIC best practices⁵¹, upon arrival to a destination state, migrants, particularly those most vulnerable, gain access to trainings offered by wide range of actors including state and local authorities, NGOs, diaspora organisations, employers and others. The trainings need to cover the legal system of a destination state, cultural orientation, insurance and pension system, financial products and services. Accessible language training make migrants less vulnerable to potential crisis situations alike economic downturn or harshening of migration policy, and less susceptible to potential abuses, manipulation and possible radicalization. Other aspects of promoting integration include destination states' efforts to counter negative discourse on migrants, stress positive contributions that migrants can bring and to promote tolerance and non-discrimination as well as to provide conditions for ethical and fair recruitment and establish

standards for labour conditions in the workplace. Migrants' integration is supported by the consular posts of countries of origin and applicable consular contingency plans.

4.2.2. Opportunities

Interventions implementing this pillar could build upon good practices in the region. Legal assistance is provided by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan consular services in Kazakhstan and Russia. The Russian government has recently announced its plans for programmes of cultural orientation for migrants, which could be an opportunity for better integration into host community and increase migrants' capacity for effective defense of their human rights. The box presents the case of comprehensive integration services provided to the migrants by NGOs in Kazakhstan with the support of IOM.

BOX 4. PILLAR 2 GOOD PRACTICE

Integration services provided by IOM and NGOs in Kazakhstan

Due to limited resources, apart from basic legal counseling NGOs cannot offer migrants more targeted support. Examples of a broader set of assistance activities can be found in projects supported by IOM in Central Asia. In the IOM-run network of NGOs assisting victims of human trafficking, trafficked migrants can obtain shelter and material support, legal and psychological advice as well as assistance in returning home. Under BPRM IOM project NGOs in northern, western and central Kazakhstan provide legal counseling to re-entry ban and other vulnerable migrants and offer in limited cases assisted voluntary return.

From December 2015 to January 2016, IOM sub-regional coordination office for Central

⁵⁰ MICIC Guidelines, p. 50-53.
⁵¹ MICIC Guidelines, p. 51.

Asia/IOM Kazakhstan nine vulnerable migrants from Tajikistan were provided with return assistance with the cooperation of the NGO partner. All cases were supported by IOM with re-integration small grant assistance when back to their villages/towns.

Migrants are also assisted with legal and documentation assistance as well as basic medical aid, mainly diagnosis of tuberculosis and other infectious diseases. NGOs complaint that apart from political, organizational and financial issues that hamper effectiveness of their interventions, there are also certain problems related to the behavior patterns prevailing among migrants including: very low level of trust towards any external institutions, language problems, social and self-stigmatization.

Local integration in southern Kazakhstan: The Strategy for Social Integration of Migrant Workers in the Receiving Community in South Kazakhstan Region was developed in 2012 on the basis of a study conducted in Almaty and the South Kazakhstan Region (SKR) in 2010 as part of the Central Asian Regional Migration Programme implemented by IOM, UN Women and World Bank with support of the British Government (UKAID). In April-September 2017 IOM in cooperation with local authorities and NGO community has been running a pilot project to assess the SKR's Strategy and develop recommendations for further implementation of the Strategy. The findings of this project will provide the IOM, the Government of Kazakhstan, NGOs, donors and other stakeholders with improved knowledge and an evidence base on which to develop and implement integration strategies for other regions in Kazakhstan for the benefit of societies and migrants. The assessment will utilize a combination of qualitative and quantitative measures to comprehensively monitor the impact of the

integration activities over several months, by the end of which final narrative analytical report, including a presentation of difficulties and shortcomings, will be produced. It can potentially be used as a model, good practice for other CA countries.

Integration assistance offered by consular services in Kazakhstan and Russia: The Kyrgyz and Tajik diplomatic missions and migration services are represented in all major Russian cities and they are mandated to render legal assistance and protect their fellow citizens rights in Russia. During interviews with the representatives of Ministries of Foreign Affairs of both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, IOM experts were informed that the consulates are understaffed and underfinanced and/or lack experienced lawyers to adequately address labour migrants' needs in Russia.⁵²

Possible cultural integration in Russia: The recent terrorist attacks in St. Petersburg, carried out by a Russian citizen of Central Asian origin, has stimulated a public debate on migrants' integration as a measure to counteract possible recruitment by extremist organizations in Russia. Many Russian experts and government officials are also noting that possible radicalization of migrants in Russia takes place against the background of very poor working conditions, absence of integration programmes, mistreatments and psychological stress.⁵³ In April 2017 the Russian government tasked the State Federal Agency for Nationalities to set up dedicated programmes of cultural integration for migrants that would prevent dissemination of violent extremism.⁵⁴ The programme details are still to be determined.

52 Expert interviews in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, April 2017.

53 ru.sputnik-tj.com/analytics/20170428/1022180947/verbovka-migranty-rossiya-terrorizm-zhertva.html?utm_source=adfox_site_41949&utm_medium=adfox_banner_2069244&utm_campaign=adfox_campaign_631224&ues=1; Россия, Центральная Азия, мигранты. Откуда и куда веет угрозами экстремизма? [Russia, Central Asia, migrants. Whence and where are the winds of extremism blowing?] <http://www.fergananews.com/articles/9420>;

54 <http://www.rbc.ru/politics/11/04/2017/58ecf1c99a79477ac164b5b0>.

Possible involvement of diaspora organizations:

Diaspora organizations' of Kyrgyz and Tajiks are currently stronger in Russia than in Kazakhstan. For instance, the Tajik diaspora in Russia operates in 68 regions of Russia.⁵⁵ The scope of activities of Tajik NGOs and national cultural centers is quite extensive and includes: (a) protecting rights of migrants from Tajikistan, as well as rights of Russian citizens of Tajik nationality; (b) preserving and developing the Tajik language, culture and traditions of Tajik people, as well as harmonizing inter-ethnic relations; (c) providing assistance to the Embassy of Tajikistan in the Russian Federation in organizing and conducting important political events of Tajikistan for Tajik migrants in the Russian Federation, such as presidential and parliamentary elections and referendums.⁵⁶

4.2.3. Identification of risk factors

Irregular employment, narrowing perspectives for legalization:

Continued downturn on the Russian labour market has induced many Central Asian migrants to search for employment in Kazakhstan, which has also facilitated conditions of entry by introducing a patent system.⁵⁷ This unprecedented influx occurred during economic slowdown, producing a variety of effects: rise in irregular migration, deterioration in labour conditions, and downward pressure on wages offered to the migrants as a method of employers to reduce costs of employment.⁵⁸ These compounded the vulnerabilities, observed among migrant workers in the region, and associated with ir-

regular status. IOM's mapping of migration flows, carried out in 2014, revealed that even in times of economic prosperity Central Asia outward migration to Russia had irregular character, mainly due to the legal constraints (difficulties in obtaining legal status) and low migrant rights awareness.⁵⁹ Similarly, analysis of Central Asian migration to Kazakhstan, implemented in 2016, concluded that the main factor underlying the prevalence of irregular status among Central Asian migrants consists in the restrictive terms for legalizing their status.⁶⁰

Sociological fieldwork undertaken as part of this assessment confirmed that the overwhelming majority of interviewed Central Asian migrants interviewed exhibited one or more forms of job-related irregularities during their stay in Kazakhstan (in particular, failure to properly register residence). One issue related to the procedure for issuing a work patent, which may not be obtained by a migrant independently but instead needs to be secured by a Kazakhstani citizen. Another hurdle is the short period, in which a migrant needs to obtain registration and a work permit as well as to sign a work contract – limited to five days after arrival, which is a requirement that is difficult to meet by many of the re-entry banned migrants.⁶¹ These factors reduce opportunities for legalisation of migrants' residence, resulting in additional risks for migrants including: job-related mistreatments, unsafe working conditions that undermined their health, delay or unpaid pensions and others.⁶² All that factors led to the situation where migrants did not benefit from migration, but on the contrary – found it detrimental to their welfare.

Absence of comprehensive integration services:

Kazakhstani state institutions do not provide Central Asian migrants with any integration services,

⁵⁵http://www.iom.tj/files/en_IOM_Tajikistan_Diaspora_1June2015.pdf.

⁵⁶ Ibidem.

⁵⁷ In 2016 more than 300,000 Uzbek citizens received permits to work for private individuals (almost three times as many as in 2015). Kyrgyz citizens are not captured in migration statistics anymore since Kyrgyzstan joined the EEU, but registration statistics show an increase of around 40%. In 2016 in comparison to 2015 the number of Tajik citizens with temporary registration in Kazakhstan increased from 33,036 to 48,697.

⁵⁸ IOM, Migration and the Economic Crisis in the European Union: Implications for Policy, Brussels 2010, http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migration_and_the_economic_crisis.pdf; S. Collucello, L. Kretsos "Irregular migration, Xenophobia, and the Economic Crisis in Greece", in: S. Massey, R. Collucello (eds.), Euroafrican Migration: Legal, Economic and Social Response to Irregular Migration, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 88-97.

⁵⁹ IOM Central Asia, Mapping on Irregular Migration in Central Asia, 2015, <http://iom.kg/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/IDFPublicationeng.pdf>.

⁶⁰ IOM Central Asia, 2016 Regional Field Assessment..., op. cit, p.193.

⁶¹ Analysis of the results of expert assessment on Kazakhstan.

⁶² Analysis of the results of the sociological assessment.

including free legal counseling or job seeking assistance, or social assistance in case of most vulnerable migrants. Only Oralman (ethnic Kazakhs living abroad repatriating to Kazakhstan)⁶³ and highly qualified migrants are eligible for employment or social services in Kazakhstan. Moreover, Oralman can receive targeted re-integration assistance through specialized Centers on Adaptation and Integration for Oralman. Another aspect that makes unqualified labor migrants more vulnerable is their ineligibility for participation in health and social systems due to their specific legal status (either as irregular migrants either by migrants with patents which do not provide with insurance mechanisms). Phase I research in Kazakhstan revealed that the important integration barrier for Central Asian migrants consisted in their irregular status and absence of information how the status might be regularized.⁶⁴ Only very limited integration assistance is provided by NGOs and international community.

The Russian state institutions do not make available comprehensive integration services either, but here the picture is more complex and diversified. In major cities, city councils provide some funds/grants for diaspora organizations and NGOs provide legal assistance for migrants. In smaller cities or in rural areas the situation is much more dramatic.⁶⁵ Diaspora organizations function based on their one modest sources and in some localities there is no place where a migrant could turn for assistance.

To sum up, income-generating activities and steady employment have decisive positive impact on the welfare of both a migrant and his or her family as usually migration of one of the family members is the only source of income for huge families.⁶⁶ The

link between migrants' vulnerabilities, lack of job and potential radicalization is very complex and nuanced. In the process of radicalization, or more correctly recruitment by the extremism or criminal organizations, both socio-economic and ideological factors play a role.⁶⁷ Expert interviews have revealed that there is a link between absence of language knowledge of a destination state, feeling of alienation, mistreatment by the law enforcement agencies and the potential for radicalization. Both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan country analyses confirm that conditions that migrants experience in Russia can lead to social and psychological tensions and as a result of this, radical and protest ideas may become attractive. From the series of interviews with state officials it became apparent that they found current conditions in Russia to be conducive to radicalization of migrant workers. At the same time, interviewed experts emphasise that the phenomenon of radicalization is not new and it is an ongoing process. As a rule, dissatisfied people are ready and willing to demonstrate their discontent, which in most drastic cases may take radical forms.⁶⁸

4.2.4. Assessment of risk probability and impact

Risk 1. Low employment opportunities: Our sociological research has shown that selected categories of Central Asian migrants with certain vulnerabilities are less likely to find a job in a destination state. Migrants may exhibit one of those vulnerabilities or more. Featured migrants' categories may exhibit employment problems: re-entry ban returned migrants (bans break off their previous migration strategies and they have no time and resources to look for decent employment both in Kazakhstan and in home country), migrants who have physical or psychological health issues (they will not get employed unless receive medical assistance), migrants with poor Rus-

⁶³ <http://kazakhstanhumanrights.com/humanrightsanddemocracy/rights-of-the-oralman/>.

⁶⁴ IOM Central Asia, 2016 Regional Field Assessment..., op. cit, p. 97-100.

⁶⁵ Expert interviews in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, April 2017.

⁶⁶ In case of Tajikistan the average family that live for one migrant's remittances is 7 persons or more, in Kyrgyzstan it is a little bit smaller. Analysis of the results of the sociological assessment.

⁶⁷ Analysis of the results of expert assessment on radicalization.

⁶⁸ Analysis of the results of expert assessment on radicalization in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

sian/Kazakhstani language skills and legal knowledge (they can only rely on informal intermediaries and very poor working conditions). Also women who are divorced or widowed and who are breadwinners of the family and may rely on very limited social links are likely to remain unemployed. The young divorced females with dependents are experiencing the economic hardships and feeling lost the most.

High probability, high impact.

Risk 2. Vulnerable youth: Central Asian youth is a social group that was distinguished in our research as particularly vulnerable to the possible negative consequences of re-entry bans and failed integration. The sociological component has revealed that CA youth undertaking migration path are usually poorly educated with poor knowledge of Russian/Kazakh language. They are habitually early married, but not equipped with income-generating skills. They rarely have any professional skills or competences and fail to plan their migration strategies and as a result are not able to integrate into host society independently.⁶⁹ Some young migrants were raised without families, which additionally limit their adapting skills. Young alienated unemployed migrants and with no access to the legal assistance may experience the higher probability of being heavily exploited by the employers, or recruited by criminal or extremism organizations. Young people struggle to find their social niche in the community, feel unwanted, and may become radicalized as a result. Another aspect of the problem is the increasing trend of young people joining criminal groups merging with religious radical organizations. Religious dogmas are used to make crimes look legitimate, while armed robberies are disguised as fight for justice. Young migrants who join criminal groups may also be susceptible to radicalization in prisons.⁷⁰

High probability, high impact.

Risk 3. Nuanced link between employment, integration and susceptibility towards radicalization.

The higher likelihood of radicalization concern those migrants, who are easily to be manipulated and do not pursue clear migration strategy. They are poorly integrated in the destination state. They may encounter employment difficulties, never experienced any positive contacts with state institutions. Apart from socio-economic hardship have strong feeling of social injustice and whose rights were violated both in the home country and destination state. In that particular case negative structural and situational conditions recognized in the sociological part may harmonize with specific individual factors like individual frustration, inability to cope with the stress situation, susceptibility to manipulation. Expert interviews have also revealed that certain individuals may also be more prone to the ideological messages.⁷¹

Low probability, high impact.

Risk 4. Absence of employment, poverty and desperation:

In some cases where a migrant in a destination country has not other possibilities to bread win its family, and cannot find any other sources of income in state of extreme poverty and desperation he/she may join extreme or criminal organizations purely due to economic reasons. Such cases, albeit scarce, were mentioned to IOM experts in expert interviews in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. They included both single men, single women and whole families.⁷²

Low probability, high impact.

⁶⁹ Analysis of the results of the sociological assessment.

⁷⁰ Analysis of the results of expert assessment on radicalization. See also: M. Idrees, *Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Central Asia*, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, September 2016; S. B. Kirmse, *Youth and Globalization in Central Asia*, Campus Verlag 2016.

⁷¹ Ibidem, p.

⁷² Expert interviews in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, March-June 2017.

4.3. Validation of Pillar 3. Reducing the post-ban shock through targeted support

This sub-section presents the rationale and possible assistance measures that could reduce the shock that Central Asian returning migrants, in particular re-entry banned ones, tend to experience after they come back to their host country. The Phase I results have recognized that combination of pre-existing vulnerabilities and the depletion of migrants' resources after unplanned return may bring about sense of shock, i.e. inability to cope with the post-ban challenges on their own.⁷³ Phase II findings offer in-depth understanding of re-entry banned migrants' vulnerabilities⁷⁴ and suggest potential support mechanisms.

BOX 5. PILLAR 3 RATIONALE

Vulnerabilities of re-entry banned migrants

Both Phase I and Phase II results have clearly demonstrated that re-entry bans tend to expose a significant group of Tajik, Kyrgyz and Uzbek migrants to precarious economic, social and psychological conditions, strongly undermining the wellbeing of their families and communities. The problems they face are of legal, economic and psychological nature. In legal terms, many migrants are not aware of the reasons/length of the ban, some are stranded in Kazakhstan with no source of assistance since their social networks are weaker or even non-existent there. Their economic position deteriorates as the majority of re-entry banned migrants do not return home deliberately after reaching their migration goals but are forced to do so, often bringing no savings or are returning with liabilities. Moreover, they are often the

only breadwinner in the family and inability to support the family further deteriorate their situation and push them to as quickly as possible find a source of income.

These challenges take toll on their psychological state and in majority of cases re-entry ban migrants can be found in the state of shock, with no strategies for the future. Phase I research has demonstrated that shock usually turns into feeling of anxiety where a migrant attempts to cope with new situating with the money borrowing or taking low-paid jobs. When none of these strategies are found to work and resolve migrant's precarious situation, the migrant may end up in alimbo phase, which is accompanied by feelings of resignation, depression, aggression. This state of mind may make the migrant more susceptible to manipulation and abuse by the criminal and extremist groups.

4.3.1. 'Optimal' situation

Pillar 3 seeks to facilitate re-integration of returning migrants in countries of their origin through targeted support. For the needs of our research, according to broadly recognized and applied IOM definition, we characterize *re-integration as re-inclusion or re-incorporation of a migrant into society in his/her country of origin*.⁷⁵ According to another definition, it is a process through which a returned migrant participates in the social, cultural, economic and political life of his/her country of origin.⁷⁶ Access to a labour market is a fundamental aspect of re-integration. However, another important component is the social re-integration by which we understand the reinsertion of a migrant into the social structures of his or her

⁷³ IOM Central Asia, 2016 Regional Field Assessment..., op. cit, p. 32-33.

⁷⁴ Analysis of the results of the sociological assessment

⁷⁵ IOM, Re-integration: Effective Approaches, 2015, p. 13, https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/DMM/AVRR/Reintegration-Position-Paper-final.pdf.

⁷⁶ Return Migration and Development Platform Glossary, <http://rsc.eui.eu/RDP/glossary-2/>.



Fig. 5. Possibilities of reducing post-ban shock (Pillar 3)

country of origin. This includes the development of a personal network (friends, relatives, neighbours) but also the development of civil society structures (associations, self-help groups and other organizations).⁷⁷ According to MICIC Guidelines no. 11 & 14, *tailored assistance should be offered to vulnerable migrants in a way that takes into account their specific needs related to their gender, age, disability and other characteristics*. This pillar envisages a range of actions aiming at reduction of migrant's shock and inability to cope with post-ban situation. The actions need to involve four crucial interlinked elements: *broad arrangements with stakeholders, access to information, targeted re-integration support, and access to public services*. As already mentioned above in the analysis of Pillar 1, an efficient referral mechanism should be created that would engage wide range of stakeholders to multiply the results of any possible re-integration activities.

Wide arrangements with stakeholders: Our analysis has established that re-integration opportunities are limited due to the scarcity of available resources

and the incidence of various vulnerabilities among returning migrants. Thus, a crucial task for the international community is to ensure support of a wide range of stakeholders (national authorities, international organizations (IOs), NGOs, local authorities, private actors and others). As suggested by MICIC guidelines "each of those stakeholders has unique skills, resources and strengths (...). Working together...improves collective responses towards migrants, and prevents duplication of efforts".⁷⁸ It is particularly important to create a working referral mechanism in which relevant actors may guide a migrant to a relevant institution. Practical cooperation mechanisms between local authorities, local NGOs and community leaders in regions of main concentration of returning migrants are put into practice. Such coordination mechanisms could be set up by international organizations, while the dissemination tasks could be effectively performed by the local authorities and/or NGOs (as was demonstrated in the case of Southern Caucasus).⁷⁹

Access to information: It has been confirmed in many studies all over the world that returning migrants experience difficulties in receiving quality information about possible re-integration support. The same conclusions were drawn in both Phase I & II research. Therefore, planned activities should pay particular attention to provision of information via as diverse as possible channels of communication, including informal channels. In an 'optimal' situation migrants can turn for information to the local authorities, NGOs, informal leaders. Information is provided via internet, hot-lines, leaflets available in different places of public access. The launch of a regional Cen-

⁷⁸ MICIC Guidelines, p. 30.

⁷⁹ In Southern Caucasus the main referral point for returning migrants are the local branches of Migration or Employment Services that have databases about all available re-integration assistance (also that provided by NGOs). See: IOM, *The Return and Reintegration of Migrants to the South Caucasus: An Explanatory Study*; 2002; <https://publications.iom.int/books/return-and-reintegration-migrants-south-caucasus-exploratory-study>; H. Chobanyan, *Return migration and Reintegration Issues: Armenia*; CARIM East Research Reports 2013; <http://www.carim-east.eu/media/CARIM-East-RR-2013-03.pdf>.

⁷⁷ IOM, *Re-integration: Effective Approaches*, 2015, p. 82.

tral Asia hotline for migrants is considered. Migrants may learn of the sources and conditions of obtaining re-integration support so that they are able to initiate the application procedure. Thanks to those efforts, quality of the word-of-mouth information improves as well and migrants are better empowered to inform each other. Special outreach techniques are applied to communicate with closed or marginalized groups.

Targeted re-integration support: Effective re-integration involves three main dimensions: economic, social and psychosocial. These dimensions in turn address three basic groups of needs of returning migrants: opportunities to become self-sufficient, access to social networks and psychological health.⁸⁰ In 'optimal' situation a mapping of main re-integration needs of returning migrants is being conducted by IOM, IOs, state and local governments and local NGOs. Based on that mapping stakeholders jointly prepare relevant programmes.⁸¹ All three elements of assistance are taken into account. The cluster method is applied to effectively use scarce resources and divided expertise. Psychological assistance is available on ad-hoc manner thus migrants in the state of the post-ban shock may receive it immediately. Psychological support includes facilitating re-insertion into social networks. Families of vulnerable migrants are also assisted with targeted support when abandoned by their breadwinners or when the breadwinner's support is terminated or reduced due to his/her unplanned return. It predominantly concerns unemployed women with children, children and youth under guard of relatives/or in boarding facilities. Possible economic interventions include: cash assistance to address immediate needs, income and employment regeneration assistance, micro-grants and micro-loans to open business. Finally, state intuitions

provide returning migrants with preferably free access to public services.

Access to public services: Effective re-integration of returning migrants assumes that they are able to make use of basic public support, regardless of their ability to contribute to the local pension and medical systems. Their welfare depends on their eligibility for the basic public medical treatment, right to be registered as an unemployed (and receive unemployment allowance and/or admittance to job-related trainings and counseling), and in most vulnerable cases access to social support (for instance family allowances). Moreover, educational system is being reformed the way that it takes into account educational needs of returning migrants, in particular training/re-training needs, and the role of vocational education. If possible, free access to the education system should be offered to most vulnerable migrants. In other cases, credits are available for migrants to repay tuition fees. Young migrants and women are also supported by flexible education programmes, for instance possibility to return to schools after migration. Local investment opportunities present incentives for migrants and their families that they consider investing remittances in a local economy.

4.3.2. Opportunities

Future interventions should build upon existing best practices and programmes already conducted in the region. Those include: re-integration economic assistance provided by IOM and common information efforts conducted by the Government of Kyrgyzstan with support of IOM.

Re-integration assistance provided by IOM and international community: Currently international community provides returning migrants with rather limited assistance programmes. These are mainly IOM-funded activities, in particular pilot re-integration projects in Kyrgyzstan (BPRM) and Tajikistan

⁸⁰ IOM, Re-integration: Effective Approaches, op. cit., p. 13

⁸¹ This mapping could take into account a recent assessment carried out by the State Agency for Labour and Employment of Tajikistan entitled "Empowering migrants through improving access to social assistance and the reintegration system".

(USAID DAR). However, migrants are also supported by other UN agencies (UN Peace Building Fund, UN Women, UNICEF), Russian-Kyrgyz Development Fund, the Soros Foundation through the network of NGOs.

BOX 6. PILLAR 3 GOOD PRACTICE

Pilot IOM direct assistance in Kyrgyzstan (BPRM) and in Tajikistan (USAID DAR)

In 2016-2017 under BPRM and USAID DAR/PVE financed IOM-implemented programmes at least 200 migrants in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan are to receive direct assistance for income generating activities and micro business development to address their socio-economic vulnerabilities. These are direct beneficiaries of the re-integration assistance while in-direct beneficiaries involve migrant's families. Since on average family in CA consists of 5 to even 10 family members, we assume that at least 2000 persons will benefit from the assistance provided.

In January 2016 *in Tajikistan* 9 male migrants were assisted to return to Tajikistan from Astana and received re-integration assistance within BPRM project. In January 2017 after monitoring of 7 out of 9 above-mentioned beneficiaries 5 females from the households of the vulnerable re-entry banned migrants. Within the DAR/PVE project, 40 vulnerable migrants have been (or are about to be) covered with re-integration direct assistance in the form of launching income generating activities or small business projects and 50 will have received social or legal assistance.

In 2016, under BPRM project, *in Kyrgyzstan* 35 re-entry banned migrants received re-integration direct assistance. At least 100 vulnerable re-entry banned migrants will have received di-

rect assistance by September 2017. Monitoring of selected assisted cases have illustrated that provided assistance (micro-grants and business plans' development) has in general been successful and it significantly decreased migrants' vulnerabilities. While the link between reduction in vulnerabilities and decrease of radicalization risk was not tested in the sociological strand due to the security concerns, it was preliminarily acknowledged through experts' interviews in the socio-economic and socio-political strands.

State institutions and IOM: common information efforts in Kyrgyzstan.

In cooperation with IOM, the State Service on Migration of the Kyrgyz Republic has opened in Bishkek and Osh Information and Consultation Centres, which provide migrants with the information on their ban situation but also with legal and job counseling assistance. The Centers also refer vulnerable cases of re-entry banned migrants to IOM for income generating and micro business support. 17,000 beneficiaries obtained consultations from the Centres in 2016, and around 6,500 migrants were assisted in the first 3 months of 2017.

Job creation efforts in Tajikistan: In total 2066 re-entry banned and returned migrant workers were provided with jobs in 2016. Furthermore, in collaboration with the Centre for the Ferghana Valley Water Resources Management Project, over 2000 migrant workers with temporary bans to enter Russia were employed in seasonal jobs cleaning irrigation canals and drainage networks in the Khatlon Region.

Potential opportunities: Re-integration activities, carried out by IOM (job-related counseling, micro-loans and grants for opening the business, business plan development services) in the framework of BPRM and DAR have been shown to address many of the identified vulnerabilities. However, their impact could be broader through ensuring long-term partnership with the governments, business sector and



other actors. One way of initiating such partnership could be the launch of a pilot re-integration platform in the key areas of concentration of returning migrants to identify barriers to employment of this group at the local labour market and to initiate pilot re-integration projects in main concentrations of returning migrants (for instance supported migrants' associations could establish common business). Possible geographic location for such pilot projects are: in Tajikistan – Soghd oblast and Rudaki region, in Kyrgyzstan – southern part of the country. The pilot project should be constructed with the involvement of wide range of stakeholders including the government, local communities and business representatives and may follow the cluster approach.

4.3.3. Identification of risk factors

No stakeholders' arrangements and limited information flows: There are some bureaucratic, financial, human and other barriers that limit the effective information flow and possible launch of comprehensive re-integration measures, particularly in collaboration between the governments and non-governmental sector, between the central government and local authorities as well as local communities. among state and non-state actors. Both Kyrgyz and Tajik governments declare they are open to such dialogue, including via Almaty Process.⁸² However, one barrier could be high levels of interpersonal, intergroup, as well as institutional distrust in the region.⁸³ Interviewed NGOs mentioned growing reluctance of state institutions to partner with NGOs.⁸⁴ Systemic distrust may be overcome by organizing regular dialogue forums on re-integration with the participation of governmental and non-governmental actors as well as by implementing pilot re-integration projects. State institutions representatives could also be invited to get acquainted with best global re-integration prac-

tices. In expert interviews corruption, economic instability, unfavorable tax conditions were referred to as a main reason why private business is reluctant to partner in economic re-integration of returning migrants alongside with the governments.⁸⁵ At the same time, both governments of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in their development strategies indicate as a priority a need to launch free economic areas or to promote 'economic specializations' of certain regions.⁸⁶ In cooperation with the international community under pilot re-integration platforms those concepts could be tested in the locations with high level of returning migration where special tax and credit regimes are granted alongside with targeted anti-corruption measures.

No targeted state-provided re-integration assistance: Re-integration of returning migrants has not received sufficient attention in national strategies or activities. Tajikistan has identified the need to re-integrate certain categories of returning migrants as a priority in the National Development Strategy till 2020. On the other hand, such a priority has not been acknowledged in strategic documents, issued by the Kyrgyz government. However, such activities are stipulated by the draft Migration Strategy of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan to be adopted in the nearest future.⁸⁷ Neither Kyrgyzstan nor Tajikistan have elaborated dedicated (re-)integration policies targeting returning migrants. There are general job creation efforts, particularly in Tajikistan, and micro-loans programmes available (in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). However, those programmes are designed with the general population in mind, and returning migrants rarely know about their existence, e.g., only 3248 of the ca. 120,000 citizens who sought out services of employment centers in Tajikistan in 2016 were returning migrant workers. Out of those three thousand

⁸² <https://www.iom.int/almaty-process>.

⁸³ http://www.iom.tj/files/en_IOM_Tajikistan_Diaspora_1June2015.pdf.

⁸⁴ Expert interview in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, March-April 2017.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Analysis of the socio-political and socio-economic expert assessment on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

⁸⁷ Ibidem.

of returning migrants who turned in for assistance to state organs, 343 were provided with jobs, 162 helped with setting up business and 562 undertook public works.⁸⁸ In 2016 around 30,000 adults received new profession or upgraded their qualification free of charge in the centers run by the employment service, however it is not known what was the proportion of returning migrants.⁸⁹ In Kyrgyzstan migrants can turn to microcredit agencies present in every region of the country for loans to set up a business (loans of up to 50,000 som). Moreover, the new working places are usually of temporary character and the salary paid is very low. The Central Asian governments are reluctant to highlight and provide benefits to returning migrants as this would become a heavy burden on the local labour markets.

Limited information and access and to public services: Phase I research has demonstrated that migrants usually attempt to re-integrate via unofficial channels.⁹⁰ Majority of migrants interviewed in both Phase I and II did not turn for assistance to any governmental agencies except to learn about the duration of their re-entry ban.⁹¹ While generally this could result from returning migrants' absence of trust to the state institutions, an equally important factor is their limited access to the public services. For instance, since their pension rights are not transferable from/to the destination countries, they cannot receive pension after return home. They can receive job-related counseling in employment centers and apply for job advertised there, but the number of job offers is many times smaller than the number of candidates. The third reported reason is the low quality of provided services. Majority of migrants with health problems we interviewed ask NGOs to assist or took loans for medical treatment.⁹² Another important so-

cial problem are the children who lack proper care, when their parents go for migration. They are often left with relatives or in religious schools with no proper access to any public service due to their unregulated legal status.⁹³

4.3.4. Assessment of risk probability and impact

Risk 1. Vulnerabilities after returned migration and risk of failed integration: Our research has clearly demonstrated that there is a high probability that returning re-entry banned migrants as well as their families may find themselves at the risk of social isolation and economic deprivation and may encounter post-ban shock manifested upon return in depletion of savings and absence of any life strategies or of concrete job plans. The negative impact of returned migration may be high or very high. Considering that for returnees, migration is the only working life strategy, majority face not only objective deterioration of economic status (poverty and unemployment) but also negative impact of failed integration on their individual capacities (severe psychological traumas and long-term inability to play any socially beneficial role). Migrants' ability to cope is further limited due to social stigma, which compels them to hide their re-entry ban status. While the cases of post-ban shock evolving into limbo phase have been relatively rare, the sociological strand has observed limbo in several investigated cases (including depression). Interviewed NGOs were referring to the growing problem of alcohol and drugs abuse and suicides.⁹⁴

High probability. high impact.

Risk 2. Migrants who are not likely to cope without targeted support: Several categories of returning migrants are least likely to independently re-integrate into the community: the breadwinners with long ban

88 Data of Ministry of Labour, Migration and Employment of Tajikistan.

89 Ibidem.

90 IOM Central Asia, 2016 Regional Field Assessment..., op. cit, p. 34.

91 Analysis of the results of the sociological assessment.

92 Analysis of the results of the sociological assessment.

93 Expert interview Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, March-April 2017.

94 Ibidem.

period, abandoned women with dependents, people with health problems, persons with short professional experience or those who in a destination countries were involved in less paid general jobs. In some cases, multiple vulnerabilities were found, when structural factors were compounded by situational and individual factors. These circumstances decreased returning migrants' chances to integrate back into their host society very significantly, forcing them to look for new migration possibilities, often at any cost.

High probability, high impact.

Risk 3. Women in need: Due to the predominant patriarchal social patterns in Central Asia, abandoned or divorced women returning from migration cannot rely on social networks. Usually, their family members are not capable to provide them financial support while the members of husband's family reject possible assistance. After return, those women cannot independently provide livelihood for the family because of structural problems at the local labour market, inadequate wages and generally low level of education. Moreover, the skills they acquire while in emigration (household services, cleaning etc) are not in demand in the home country.

High probability, high impact.

Risk 4. No arrangements between stakeholders, no investment opportunities: According to the representatives of business associations, migrants are less likely to invest remittances home. Instead, they prefer to invest their capital and build their business in Russia. Several studies have also revealed that migrants do not believe that they can invest in businesses after their return to the home country. Without partnership with private actors, local communities will not be able to re-integrate returning migrants.

High probability, high impact.

4.4. Validation of Pillar 4: Governments' policies to promote 'safe migration'

This sub-section presents rationale, opportunities and challenges involved in the implementation by the countries of origin and destination state of a set of policies that would promote safe migration, protect migrants' rights and provide migrants with legal residence and employment as a long-term radicalization prevention measure.

BOX 7. PILLAR 4 RATIONALE

Central Asian governments' active migration policies

This pillar sets forth various activities in support of measures that the governments of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan could pursue as part of their active policy on external migration of their nationals. These cover, inter alia, conclusion of bilateral agreements on labour migration and protection of migrants' rights, adherence to relevant international legal instruments and the use of a regional integration mechanism such as the Eurasian Economic Union to promote fair treatment of migrants and provision of social, medical and pension support. In case of Kazakhstan the focus is on concluding international agreements or regulating the operation of foreign employment agencies to combat exploitation by dishonest intermediaries and employers. MICIC guidelines go step further and recommend concluding pre-arranged international agreements on cross-border cooperation taking into account particular needs of migrants in crisis situations. Although in Central Asia we do not observe the onset of crisis situations, these measures could be applied in a preventive manner through addressing risks of pre-crisis scenarios emerging.




Fig. 6. Role of government policies in promoting legal labour migration (Pillar 4)

There are certain differences in the emigration policies pursued by the Kyrgyz and Tajik governments. Kyrgyz authorities claim that they base their policy on Philippines example which includes active operation of private foreign employment agencies and heavily involvement of employers' representatives. Tajikistan pursues more centralised and controlled emigration policies which is based on concluding bilateral labour migration agreements and cooperation with diaspora organisations.

4.4.1. 'Optimal' situation

This pillar involves actions in both countries of migrants' origin and destination. It assumes that there are four crucial interlinked elements associated with the long-term strategic promotion of legal labour migration in the Central Asia region, namely: (1) *conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements*, (2) *looking for alternative migration destination*, (3) *reaction to sanctions/discrimination practices*, (4) *long-term development strategies/social cohesion*.

Conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements:

In an 'optimal' situation, sending countries' governments pursue an effective policy of promoting safe legal migration through conducting international agreements, participating in international organisations and integration forums and implementation of international migration law etc. In turn, countries hosting migrants like Kazakhstan and Russia accord migrants legal residence and employment opportunities.

Looking for alternative migration destinations:

Applying rich international experience, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have managed to effectively diversify their nationals' migration destinations. They have done so through a combination of legal measures (application of various instruments, including conclusion of bilateral labour migration agreements), regional cooperation and support from international organizations (widening of legal migration options for their citizens) as well as through involving private actors (application of the best practices in regulating private employment intermediation and cooperation with the business organizations from destination states). They continually strive to raise educational levels of their prospective migrants to meet expectations of global labour market.

Reaction to sanctions/discrimination practices:

Sending states are able to timely react to any sanctions (like ban situations) or discrimination practices against their citizens abroad by concluding relevant agreements minimising the negative effect of sanctions and guaranteeing citizens a stable legal position with regard to residence and employment rights.

Long-term development strategies/social cohesion:

CA governments should elaborate and implement long-term development strategies for social and economic inclusion of their citizens, (also re-entry ban migrants) providing them with accountable treatment on the part of governmental agencies, em-

ployment opportunities and social serviced. Central Asian governments are called for to apply balanced and based on respect for human rights and rule of law approach to the growing role of religion and related risks and challenges. They recognize the deeper roots of growing popularity of extremist salafist ideas among young people in a comprehensive manner, acknowledging a variety of factors at play. In other words, they attempt to address root causes of potential radicalization, not their consequences.

4.4.2. Opportunities

Reaction to sanctions/discrimination practices: Negotiating with Russia on the re-entry ban list.

Both Kyrgyz and Tajik governments declare that promotion of safe labour migration remains their priority and they strive for taking away as many migrants as possible from the Russian re-entry ban list. In their effort they remain fairly successful.

BOX 8. PILLAR 4 GOOD PRACTICE

Negotiating with Russia over removal of certain categories of Kyrgyz and Tajik citizens for the re-entry ban list

As of May 2017, 104,000 Kyrgyz citizens remained on the re-entry ban list of Russian Federation. According to the State Migration Service of the Kyrgyz Republic, about 44,000 Kyrgyz citizens will see their ban expire soon and it is expected that fewer new additions will be made to the list. Since Kyrgyzstan's accession to the Eurasian Economic Union residence regulations have been relaxed, therefore new additions to the re-entry ban list will probably mainly consist of cases of irregular employment. Kyrgyz government is also striving to take off the list those migrants who committed only minor administrative infringements.

Progress in reducing the number of re-entry

banned nationals has also been reached by the Tajik government. In February 2017 Russia and Tajikistan concluded an agreement on removing from the re-entry ban list those Tajik migrants who committed minor administrative infringements. In March 2017 Russian government announced a short-term amnesty for certain categories of Tajik citizens who could be removed from the list. As a result, around 106,000 formerly re-entry banned migrants were allowed to legalise their stay in Russia.

However, both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan still are in talks with Russia and Kazakhstan on concluding agreements on pension recognition and/or medical assistance. A potential introduction of an employment record book that is recognized by all EAEU Member States would be a major step toward ensuring effective protection of labour migrants' rights and reducing their long-term economic vulnerability.

Looking for alternative migration destinations:

While Russia remains the by far most popular and most accessible destination among migrant workers, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have managed to diversify migration destination for some of their migrants. An increasing number of Kyrgyz citizens find employment through 151 licensed private employment agencies in Turkey, South Korea and Arab states of the Persian Gulf. There are around 18,000 Kyrgyz working in South Korea, mostly in agriculture, industry or as drivers. Kyrgyz government is also planning to sign with a number of countries (notably Germany, Poland and Finland) international labour agreements that would facilitate employment through the use of private agencies. In contrast, the Tajik government concentrates its activities on stimulating migration to Russia, inter alia via signing agreements with regional authorities or universities. In cooperation with local authorities in

Saint Petersburg in Tajikistan, several centres for organised recruitment of labour force were opened in the Leningrad oblast.⁹⁵

Almaty Process: In a number of events conducted within the Almaty Process and devoted inter alia to rights of migrants, re-integration and access to protection mechanisms for migrant workers including those who faced re-entry bans, the government representatives emphasized the importance of adherence to international standards, including those in the area of human rights, international labour, transnational criminal and other branches of relevant international law. Almaty Process has already brought tangible results in establishing regional approach to migration management in Central Asia. They include: sharing of national practices, assessment of regional trends through independent assessment and cooperation of state bodies on the working level.

4.4.3. Identification of risk factors

Limited interest in safe migration agreements/difficulties in finding alternative migration destinations: In modern realities governments of destination states are less willing to conclude bilateral agreements on labour migration, finding them fairly slow and relatively limited mechanisms which require a long negotiation procedures. They prefer to manage labour migration through application of domestic immigration stimulation policies, seeking to attract certain categories of migrants in the deficit sectors of their labour markets. Countries of destination who however decide to conclude such agreements, usually combine them with the readmission agreements, agreements on fight against irregular migration, assisted voluntary return etc. It is worth noting though that while the tendency to conclude bilateral agreements on labour migration has been declining in Europe, it appears to be

gaining popularity in Asia.⁹⁶

Limited mechanisms to react to sanctions / discriminatory practices: While Central Asia governments are quite successful in exporting surplus labour force abroad, their successes in fighting against abuses of their country fellowmen rights in the destination countries are less visible (also due to obvious difficulties in securing own citizens' rights abroad). Our sociological assessment reveals that over time returned migrants who have experienced in both a destination and sending country mistreatment and abuse of rights may develop a sense of social injustice which combined with socio-economic factors may ultimately lead to the greater susceptibility to radicalization. Majority of interviewed migrants both in the Phase I and II claimed they had been mistreated or abused both in the country of destination (by law enforcement, intermediaries and employers, their fellow countrymen and diaspora organizations, criminal groups, or fell victims to the racist attacks) as well as in their home country (corruption and extortion by state institutions, raider attacks, abuses by intermediaries and criminal groups, abuses by the relatives).⁹⁷ While the direct link between a personal sense of injustice and radicalization potential was not observed in the sociological fieldwork, the psychological setup of many of the migrants is characteristic of groups that have been found in other studies to be more susceptible to extremist messaging. Those studies have revealed that main ideological message that extremist recruiters are targeting migrants with is the issue of injustice, mistreatment of migrants that could be avenged where migrants enter 'holy war' (jihad).⁹⁸

⁹⁵ For details pls see socio-economic and socio-political sections on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, p.

⁹⁶ ILO, Bilateral labour agreements: trends and good practices, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/presentation/wcms_422397.pdf; OECD, Migration for Employment: Bilateral Agreements at the Crossroads, 2004.

⁹⁷ Analysis of the results of the sociological assessment

⁹⁸ Search for Common Grounds, Radicalization of Central Asian Labour Migrants in Russia, results of applied research, presentation in Osh in April 2017.

Long-term development challenges: Apart from fairly successful regulating of external migration, all Central Asian are faced with more long-term structural problems that require resolution as well. They include among others: gradual deterioration of 'hard infrastructure' inherited from the Soviet past like roads and railroads, need for sustainable development of energy infrastructure in the region and provision of social services alike reform of healthcare and education institutions. Another set of problems is the challenge of meeting the demographic challenge. Governments of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are making efforts to generate additional workplaces to employ quickly growing number of population, however these are mainly poorly paid seasonal jobs in public sector or agriculture that cannot create a sustainable alternative for migration.

At the same time, the region is still very much underdeveloped in term of regional cooperation, including low dynamics of inter-regional trade. Supra-national integration—within the framework of the World Trade Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union—may offer prospects of better market access for labour-intensive exports, inter alia through deeper integration into global and regional value chains. Some forecasts are relatively optimistic about the Kyrgyz Republic's prospects for expanding the production and export of labour-intensive goods and services to other EAEU countries (chiefly Russia and Kazakhstan) following its August 2015 accession.⁹⁹ Other researchers bring attention to the negative impact of Kyrgyzstan's accession to EAEU when Kyrgyz producers suddenly faced competition from Kazakh, Russian and Belarusian companies in its domestic market and contradictory directions of Russian and Kazakhstan migration policies and legal norms stipulated by the EAEU treaties.

4.4.4. Assessment of risk probability and impact

Risk 1. Limited possibilities of 'centralized' promotion of legal labour migration: There is a high probability that Central Asian countries of origin will continue to search for alternative migration destinations for their citizens, trying to pursue safe migration schemes. However, the possible positive impact of their activities is limited by: external geopolitical and cultural factors (migration crisis in Europe, declining openness to further immigration), economic actors (mismatch between skills and competences possessed by migrants and the demand in the destination countries) as well as limited capacity of the Central Asian governments to efficiently negotiate and execute labour migration agreements. Medium probability, high impact.

Risk 2: Unsuccessful fight against discriminatory practices: Kyrgyz and Tajik governments may become successful in further removing of certain categories of their migrants from Russian re-entry ban list. It is also probable that they further elaborate instruments for promotion of safer labour migration, through organized recruitment and cooperation with regions and education institutions in Russia. It cannot however be excluded that Central Asia migrants may become affected by restrictive changes of migration legislation in Russia and in Kazakhstan, particularly if further terrorist attacks with the involvement of CA residents continue. Medium probability, high impact.

Risk 3. Social-political destabilization: In the long term, Central Asian countries remain vulnerable to social/political destabilization, which might have a high impact (social upheaval, violent regime change, religious radicalization, ethnic conflicts). In the short-term, however, the governments are likely to manage potential social unrest and radicalization by promoting

⁹⁹ UNDP 2015, Labour Migration, Remittances, and Human Development in Central Asia, <http://www.eurasia.undp.org/content/rbec/en/home/library/poverty/central-asia-trade-and-human-development.html>; EDB Centre for Integration Studies, 2015.

migration and conducting some limited modernization efforts. In the short-term the probability of social unrest is relatively low, and its occurrence may have limited, localized impact (regional conflicts, terrorist attacks). Possible social unrest is likely to be economy-driven (further recession in Russia and growing poverty and unemployment in the region) but ideological/religious motivations may come to play as well.

Low possibility. high impact.

Risk 4. The feeling of social injustice among returning migrants will magnify. Social injustice is a phenomenon that cannot be assessed in purely objective terms and the notion remains elusive to define, operationalise and assess. Rather, it is a relative concept, focused on alleged unfairness or injustice of a society in terms rewards and burdens are allocated and resulting inequalities as interpreted by the observer in line with his or her general outlook. It bears no universal measurement – social injustice differs depending on the society and the individuals.¹⁰⁰ What however has been observed globally is the fact that higher level of perceived social injustice were reported in the countries with higher disparities in incomes, high unemployment and low incomes of majority of population (in particular young people), poor quality of public services, observed corruption and non-transparency of political developments.¹⁰¹

The likelihood of incidence of strong perception of social injustice among Central Asian migrants is also related to the fact migrants have usually wider perspective, in which they tend to compare socio-political situation in the country of destination (with obvious higher economic development indicators) and in a home country. The third stimulating factor is the fundamental role that the notion of so-

cial justice is accorded in Islam. All of the Qur'anic teachings are essentially directed towards enabling people to live with each other in peace and to fulfill their mutual obligations honestly and faithfully so as to ensure justice and general well-being.¹⁰²

High probability. high impact.

100 See L.A. Rudman, „Social Justice in Our Minds, Homes, and Society: the Nature, Causes, and Consequences of Implicit Bias”, Social Justice Research, Vol. 17, No. 2, June 2014.

101 D. G. Gil, *Confronting Injustice and Oppression. Concepts and Strategies*, Columbia University Press 2013; G. Haman, *Towards a new Social Contract. Social Justice in North Africa and Middle East*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Perspectives 2011.

102 A. Z. Yamani, „Social Justice in Islam”, Islamic Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1, Spring 2002, pp. 5-34; A. Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamic Turn*, Stanford University Press 2006.



5. Conclusions

5.1. General considerations

This chapter provides the validation of assumptions underlying the ‘theory of change’ developed in the Phase I (2016) of IOM CA/Library of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Nazarbayev Center)/USAID DAR Regional Assessment that seek to address the needs of returning migrants in a systemic fashion to strengthen resilience of that group and reduce the risk of their potential radicalization.

Although in 2017, in comparison to 2016, the negative impact of return migration to Central Asia associated with the re-entry ban migrants forced to leave Russia has decreased, many risks, particularly of more strategic character, remained unaffected. These include, inter alia:

- absence of systemic re-integration policy in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as well as integration policy in Kazakhstan,
- ineffective channels of communication between the governments, migrants and communities they live in,
- growing feeling of alienation and injustice expressed by the youth.

When designing possible future interventions that could bring the largest added value and comprehensively address the phenomenon of returned migration in Central Asia, particularly of re-entry ban migrants, certain crucial ‘points of entry’ may be identified in each pillar of the ‘theory of change’. Risk analysis has enabled us to validate the main risk factors that could hamper achieving those goals and assess

the likelihood of their occurrence as well as determine the depth of their impact. The results of the analysis are presented in the validation section above and summarized in the risk matrices, covering both the environment of the country of destination (Kazakhstan) and of the countries of origin (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan).

5.2. ‘Points of entry’ for future interventions

Here are the key implications of the analysis for the identification of re-integration needs and choice of corresponding ‘points of entry’ for each pillar of the ‘theory of change’.

In the **Pillar 1 (involvement of migrants’ communities in integration and re-integration)** it is proposed that four crucial ‘points of entry’ are addressed: **dialogue, trust, preventing alienation and rights awareness**. By **dialogue** we mean creating opportunities for a discourse between central government, international community, non-governmental organizations, migrants’ communities, diaspora organizations and migrants themselves. **Trust** has been operationalised as participation of communities to obtain migrants’ receptivity to the proposed actions. By involving communities (also migrants’ families) we may efficiently **prevent migrants’ alienation**. And finally, crucial aim of the community-based approach should be **raising awareness of migrants rights** and promotion of safe migration channels. In particular, it is projected that community leaders (mahalla’s /religious leaders) are actively involved as the best placed actors to prevent/counteract possible radicalization. It is proposed to establish an **efficient referral mechanism** allowing

for linking informal leaders into information campaigns and assistance provision to the vulnerable migrants, **in particular youth and women**.

In the **Pillar 2 (employment opportunities and integration services)** we have distinguished the following four crucial elements: **employment situation, comprehensive integration assistance, and better planned migration strategies**. During our research it was confirmed that access to the safe and legal **employment** in a destination state has a strongest radicalization deterring impact. Secondly, accessible integration services (particularly language and legal trainings) make migrants less vulnerable to potential crisis situations such as economic downturn, and less susceptible to potential abuses, manipulation and possible radicalization. When those first two conditions are in place, migrant may better plan his/her migration strategy and is more geared up to cope with a stress and crisis situations. It was discovered, that the higher likelihood of radicalization concern those migrants, who are easily to be manipulated and do not pursue clear migration strategy. They are also poorly integrated in the destination state and may encounter employment difficulties. The pilot migrants' integration project currently run by IOM in southern Kazakhstan may serve as a tool of operationalisation of crucial integration elements.

In the **Pillar 3 (reducing the post-ban shock)** we have recognised the four crucial 'point of entry' of possible intervention, namely: **broad arrangements with stakeholders, access to information, targeted re-integration support, and access to public services**. Re-integration opportunities in Central Asia are limited due to the scarcity of available resources and the

incidence of various vulnerabilities among returning migrants. Thus, a crucial task for the international community is to **make arrangements with wide range of stakeholders** (national authorities, international organizations, NGOs, local authorities, private actors and others). Secondly, planned activities should pay particular attention to **provision of information** via as diverse as possible channels of communication, including informal channels. **Targeted re-integration support** involves prior mapping of re-integration needs and application of cluster method. Finally, effective re-integration assumes that returning migrants have access to public services, regardless of their ability to contribute to the local pension and medical systems. Based on the results of pilot BPRM and USAID DAR/PVE financed IOM-implemented programmes we may conclude that the likelihood of CA re-entry ban migrants experiencing social limbo may be decreased by application: in the first stage (shock), of psychological assistance, legal advice and labour counselling; in the second stage (anxiety), active job placement, micro-loans or micro-grants for business development and/or income generating activity. It is proposed to consider **launching of a pilot re-integration platform** to identify barriers to employment of returning migrants at the local labour market and to initiate job-focused re-integration projects (e.g., supported migrants' associations could establish common business).

In the **Pillar 4 (governments' policies to promote "safe migration")** following crucial components have been recognised: **conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements, looking for alternative migration destination, reaction to sanctions/discrimination practices, long-term development strategies/social cohe-**

sion. It was confirmed that Central Asian states were fairly efficient in the **reaction to sanctions situation** (vide Russian re-entry ban policy and negotiating with Russia over removal of certain categories of Kyrgyz and Tajik citizens for the re-entry ban list) and in looking for **alternative migrants destination** (Kazakhstan, Turkey, South Korea, Persian Gulf states, the EU). The conclusion of **bilateral/multilateral agreements** is hampered by the limited willingness of destination states to conclude agreements on labour migration, finding them fairly slow and relatively limited mechanisms which require a long negotiation procedures. The main challenge for Central Asian states remain an issue of adopting of realistic vision of long-term development in the situation where many structural problems have not been resolved (infrastructure upgrading, education reform, medical system reform, job-generating activities). New opportunities could be created by the development of intra-regional cooperation.

Annexes

Annex 1 | Risk matrix **Kazakhstan** (destination state)

Pillar's name	Main risks	Likelihood and Impact	Recommended policy response
Pillar 1. Involvement of communities may mitigate pull factors to radicalization (<i>dialogue, trust, preventing alienation and rights awareness</i>)	Risk 1. No dialogue, alienation, low migrants' right awareness (when migrants continue to rely only on community-based networks without external assistance and raising their awareness on their rights, they may fall victims of exploitation, in some cases they will be recruited to join terrorist or criminal organizations)	High likelihood, high impact	<u>Strategic Guidelines for Pillar 1</u> In line with MICIC Principle no 7. (Migrants strengthen the vitality of both their host States and States of origin), Kazakhstani government is advised to consider addressing the issue of dynamically arriving CA re-entry banned migrants, particularly most vulnerable one without one community-based assistance.
	Risk 2. Low trust, limited dialogue (when migrants rely on currently available NGOs and diaspora assistance, there is a lower risk that they will be mistreated, but also lower opportunity that they will be effectively assisted)	High likelihood, high impact	As suggested by MICIC guidelines 6 and 7 (effective communication with migrants, establishing of coordination agreements) it is advised to consider launching systemic dialogue with diaspora and migrants organizations. dialogue with diaspora and faith-based actors may facilitate access to migrants with irregular status.
	Risk 3. Alienation, no dialogue, manipulation (there is a growing risks that extremist organisation target migrants as a group prone to manipulation due to their harsh economic position, desperation and human right abuses)	Low likelihood, high impact	<u>Risk 1& 2</u> NGOs in Kazakhstan should look for more effective ways of communicating with CA migrants (for instance bazzars) and building own credibility in the migrant community. Tajik and Kyrgyz diaspora organisations in Kazakhstan in partnership with NGOs should be strongly empowered to be able to assist vulnerable migrants. Diaspora organizations or other migrants' organizations should be invited by the governmental institutions, international and non-governmental organizations to jointly develop re-integration programmes for the most vulnerable migrants <u>Risk 3</u> Diaspora organizations become more inclusive towards new migrants and their integration needs, Diaspora organizations that work closely with the NGOs, IOs, governments of both destination and origin states are able to assist vulnerable migrants to keep in touch with their families and communities in a home country. Religious leaders/authorities should be involved.

Pillar's name	Main risks	Likelihood and Impact	Recommended policy response
Pillar 2. Employment opportunities and integration services as radicalization deterrent (employment situation, comprehensive integration assistance, and better planned migration strategies)	<p>Risk 1. Low employment opportunities, irregular employment (Majority of CA migrants interviewed exhibited one or more forms of job-related irregularities during their stay in Kazakhstan; it increase the risk of job-related mistreatments, unsafe working conditions that undermined health, delay or unpaid pensions etc.)</p> <p>Risk 2. Absence of comprehensive integration services (If current situation with very limited integration assistance available to migrants continues, there is a risk that migrants with low language skills, lack of regular job and access to any public services may harmonized with specific individual factors like individual frustration, inability to cope with the stress situation, susceptibility to manipulation may fall a victim of radical groups)</p>	<p>High likelihood, high impact</p> <p>Low likelihood, high impact</p>	<p><u>Strategic Guidelines for Pillar 2</u></p> <p><i>MICIC guidelines (nr 3 on empowering migrants) suggests organizing of post-arrival trainings on rights and potential rights violations or abuses.</i></p> <p><i>In line with the MICIC Guideline no. 11 (Provide humanitarian assistance to migrants without discrimination) Kazakh government supported by international community should consider the possibility of provision of basic humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable migrants at the border with Russia who found out about their ban situation.</i></p> <p><u>Risk 1</u> Access to the safe and legal employment in a destination state has a strongest radicalization deterring impact.</p> <p><i>The most critical services that are required by Central Asian migrants in Kazakhstan are: language trainings and legal assistance, counselling on the possibilities to obtain legal job/ conclude legally correct job contract. Migrants should also have rights to obtain basic medical assistance.</i></p> <p><i>Kazakhstan government should promote rules of ethical and fair recruitment and keep control over labour conditions in the workplaces occupied by migrants and efficiently penalise dishonest intermediaries and labour exploitation</i></p> <p><u>Risk 2</u> The pilot migrants' integration project run by the IOM in southern Kazakhstan may serve as a tool of operationalisation of crucial integration elements.</p> <p><i>Under BPRM IOM project NGOs in northern, western and central Kazakhstan provide legal counseling to re-entry ban and other vulnerable migrants and offer in limited cases assisted voluntary return.</i></p> <p><i>Diverse actors should fight against negative discourse on migrants, stress positive contributions that migrants can bring and to promote tolerance and non-discrimination.</i></p>

Pillar's name	Main risks	Likelihood and Impact	Recommended policy response
Pillar 3. Reducing the post-ban shock through target assistance (broad arrangements with stakeholders, access to information, targeted re-integration support, and access to public services)	<i>Non-applicable (relates to countries of origin)</i>	Non-applicable (relates to countries of origin)	<i>Non-applicable (relates to countries of origin)</i>
Pillar 4. Governments' policies to promote safer labour migration	<p>Risk 1. Limited interest in safe migration agreements and fight against discriminatory practices (CA migrants at risk of long-term mistreatment, irregular and unsafe migration and growing feeling of injustice)</p> <p>Risk 2. Long-term development challenges (Long-term structural problems that require resolution alike: include among others: gradual deterioration of 'hard infrastructure', need for sustainable development provision of social service: reform of healthcare and education institutions, demographic challenge, possible social unrest)</p>	<p>High likelihood, high impact</p> <p>Medium likelihood, high impact</p>	<p><i>Kazakhstan governments and employment agencies could be presented with best global experiences in fair recruitment of foreign labour force and combating informal intermediaries.</i></p> <p><i>Kazakhstan could consider conclusion of agreements on portability of social contributions and pensions (in the EEU framework and bilateral ones).</i></p>

Annex 2 | Risk matrix Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (countries of origin)

Pillar's name	Main risks	Likelihood and Impact	Recommended policy response
Pillar 1. Involvement of communities may mitigate pull factors to radicalization (dialogue, trust, preventing alienation and rights awareness)	Risk 1. No dialogue, alienation, low migrants' right awareness (when migrants continue to rely only on community-based networks without external assistance and raising their awareness on their rights, they may fall victims of exploitation, in some cases they will be recruited to join terrorist or criminal organizations, possible criminalisation of migrants' employment sector)	High likelihood, high impact	<u>Strategic Guidelines for Pillar 1</u> <i>In line with MICIC guideline no. 4 (incorporate migrants in prevention, preparedness and emergency response systems) and Guideline no. 6 (communicate effectively with migrants) migrants and communities they live in should be invited to prepare migration-related strategies and to use wide range of communication strategies towards migrants including diverse, multiple, formal and informal methods.</i> Risk 1 Governments of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan could consider expanding dialogue with informal religious leaders, using the authority of those leaders in the local community for promotion of safe migration and counteracting possible radicalization.
	Risk 2. Low trust, limited dialogue (when migrants rely on currently available NGOs and diaspora assistance, there is a lower risk that they will be mistreated, but also lower opportunity that they will be effectively assisted)	High likelihood, high impact	<i>Engage community, spiritual and informal leaders at all stages of designing and implementing programmes targeting re-entry banned migrants. Community leaders may serve as a bridge in terms of re-integration. Partner NGOs could play important facilitating role.</i> Risk 2 Establishment of efficient referral mechanism allows for involving informal leaders and NGOs into information campaigns and assistance provision to the vulnerable migrants. If such a mechanism exists, NGOs could be perceived as more reliable.
	Risk 3. Alienation, no dialogue, manipulation (there is a growing risks that extremist organisation target migrants as a group prone to manipulation due to their harsh economic position, desperation and human right abuses)	Low likelihood, high impact	<i>The most probable issue of common interest could be the promotion of fair treatment of vulnerable groups (e.g. women and children).</i> Risk 3 Government authorities and could engage local educational institutions into awareness raising campaigns. Schools should be warning against risks related to the migrations like human trafficking, illegal intermediaries, potential radicalization etc. <i>Communication with young migrants via different e-solutions is advised, safe migration should be promoted via internet resources. Local community leaders could disperse pre-departure information via internet channels.</i>

Pillar's name	Main risks	Likelihood and Impact	Recommended policy response
Pillar 2. Employment opportunities and integration services as radicalization deterrent (employment situation, comprehensive integration assistance, and better planned migration strategies)	Risk 1. Low employment opportunities, irregular employment (Majority of CA migrants interviewed exhibited one or more forms of job-related irregularities during their stay in integration, it increases the risk of job-related mistreatments, unsafe working conditions that undermined health, delay or unpaid pensions etc.)	High likelihood, high impact	<i>This pillar relates to the destination states, however Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan governments could consider increasing financing of consular missions in Kazakhstan and Russia; partner with international organizations/NGOs.</i>
	Risk 2. Absence of comprehensive integration services (If current situation with very limited integration assistance available to migrants continues, there is a risk that migrants with low language skills, lack of regular job and access to any public services may harmonized with specific individual factors like individual frustration, inability to cope with the stress situation, susceptibility to manipulation may fall a victim of radical groups)	Low likelihood, high impact	

Pillar's name	Main risks	Likelihood and Impact	Recommended policy response
Pillar 3. Reducing the post-ban shock through target assistance (broad arrangements with stakeholders, access to information, targeted re-integration support, and access to public services)	Risk 1. Vulnerabilities after returned migration, failed re-integration (deterioration of economic status, poverty and unemployment, severe psychological traumas and long-term inability to play any socially beneficial role, depression and limbo, alcoholism, criminalisation)	High likelihood, high impact	<i>Strategic Guidelines for Pillar 3</i> Application by Krygyz and Tajik governments as well international community MICIC guideline no. 11 (provide humanitarian assistance to migrants without discrimination) that calls upon tailored assistance to migrants that take into account needs that may arise from gender, age, disability, immigration status, or other characteristics as well MICIC Guideline no. 14 (address migrants' immediate needs and support migrants to rebuild lives) that calls for possible interventions including cash assistance to address immediate needs, psychosocial counseling, health care, physical rehabilitation, income and employment regeneration assistance as well as social cohesion programs addressing migrants, migrant networks, and host communities to prevent and mitigate tensions and foster reintegration.
	Risk 2. Migrants who are not likely to cope without targeted support (breadwinners with long ban period, abandoned women with dependents, people with health problems, persons with short professional experience)	High likelihood, high impact	<i>The cluster method is applied to effectively use scarce resources and divided expertise.</i>
	Risk 3. Women in need (as a rule women cannot independently provide livelihood for the family because of structural problems at the local labour market, inadequate wages and generally low level of education)	High likelihood, high impact	<i>Risk 1</i> Re-integration activities, carried out by IOM (in the framework of BPRM and DAR have been shown to address many of the identified vulnerabilities. However, their impact could be broader through ensuring long-term partnership with the governments, business sector and other actors. One way of initiating such partnership could be the launch of a pilot re-integration platform. <i>Planned activities should pay particular attention to provision of information via as diverse as possible channels of communication. Information and Consultation Centres created by the government with IOM support in Kyrgyzstan showed good results so far.</i> <i>Psychological assistance is available on ad-hoc manner thus migrants in the state of the post-ban shock may receive it immediately. Families of vulnerable migrants are also assisted. Possible economic interventions include: cash assistance to address immediate needs, income and employment regeneration assistance, micro-grants and micro-loans to open business. Finally, state intuitions provide returning migrants with preferably free access to public services.</i> <i>Risk 2 & 3</i> Target re-integration assistance should be first of all offered to the unemployed women (both psychological support and detailed job-counseling, professional activation) and youth (here education possibilities should be offered first). <i>If possible, free access to the education system should be offered to the most vulnerable migrants. Young migrants and women are also supported by flexible education programmes, for instance possibility to return to schools after migration.</i>

Pillar's name	Main risks	Likelihood and Impact	Recommended policy response
Pillar 4. Governments' policies to promote safer labour migration	<p>Risk 1. Limited interest in safe migration agreements and fight against discriminatory practices (CA migrants at risk of long-term mistreatment, irregular and unsafe migration and growing feeling of injustice)</p> <p>Risk 2. The feeling of social injustice among returning migrants will magnify (higher level of perceived social injustice were reported in the countries with higher disparities in incomes, high unemployment and low incomes of majority of population (in particular young people), poor quality of public services, observed corruption and non-transparency of political developments)</p> <p>Risk 3. Long-term development challenges (Long-term structural problems that require resolution alike: include among others: gradual deterioration of 'hard infrastructure', need for sustainable development provision of social service: reform of healthcare and education institutions, demographic challenge, possible social unrest)</p>	<p>High likelihood, high impact</p> <p>High likelihood, high impact</p> <p>High likelihood, high impact</p>	<p>Risk 1 Kyrgyz and Tajik governments are advised not to limit to promoting safe labour migration and put more focus on securing migrants' rights in countries of destination, securing their pensions' and other social rights. They should team up with international organisations, diaspora and NGOs in destination countries in common lobbying efforts.</p> <p>CA governments could further pursue to establish the legal framework for organised employment of own nationals abroad and discuss with Kazakhstan and Russia possible conclusion of relevant agreements (bilateral ones or within EEU).</p> <p>International community should consider provision of legal and language assistance to the governments of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to facilitate their efforts aimed at concluding further international agreements on labour migration</p> <p>Risk 2 & 3 The main challenge for Central Asian states remain an issue of adopting of realistic vision of long-term development in the situation where many structural problems have not been resolved (infrastructure upgrading, education reform, medical system reform, job-generating activities). New opportunities could be created by the development of intra-regional cooperation.</p> <p>Kyrgyz and Tajik governments should consider recognizing the deeper roots of growing popularity of extremist salafist ideas among young people in a comprehensive manner, acknowledging a variety of factors at play.</p>

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КОМИССИЯ ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА ПРИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТЕ РЕСПУБЛИКИ КАЗАХСТАН, АНАЛИТИЧЕСКИЙ ДОКЛАД. АКТУАЛЬНЫЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ ЗАЩИТЫ ПРАВ ТРУДЯЩИХСЯ-МИГРАНТОВ В РЕСПУБЛИКЕ КАЗАХСТАН, 2016.

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